

Case Number: CV2022-095403

Part 2 of 10

A

1 **IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ARIZONA**

2 **IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA**

3 Kari Lake,

4 Contestor/Plaintiff,

5
6 v.

Case No.

7 Katie Hobbs, personally as Contestee and
8 in her official capacity as Secretary of
9 State; Stephen Richer in his official
10 capacity as Maricopa County Recorder;
11 Bill Gates, Clint Hickman, Jack Sellers,
12 Thomas Galvin, and Steve Gallardo, in
13 their official capacities as members of the
14 Maricopa County Board of Supervisors;
15 Scott Jarrett, in his official capacity as
16 Maricopa County Director of Elections;
17 and the Maricopa County Board of
18 Supervisors,

19 Defendants.

DECLARATION OF KURT OLSEN

20 I, Kurt Olsen, hereby declare as follows under penalty of perjury:

- 21 1. I am over the age of 18 and competent to make this declaration.
- 22 2. I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the District of Columbia.
- 23 3. I am an attorney licensed in the State of Maryland and the District of Columbia.
- 24 4. Attached as Exhibit 1 is a fair and accurate copy of a document describing the

25 Elections Misinformation Reporting Portal which was produced in *Missouri v. Biden*, Case No.
3:22-cv-01213 (W.D. La.) (“*Missouri First Amendment Litigation*”).

1 5. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a fair and accurate copy of an e-mail chain including a
2 request from the Arizona Secretary of State's office involving the request for removal and
3 removal of two Twitter posts, which was produced in the *Missouri First Amendment Litigation*.
4

5 6. Attached as Exhibit 3 is a fair and accurate copy of *Protecting Critical*
6 *Infrastructure from Misinformation & Disinformation Subcommittee Meeting*, published by the
7 CISA Cybersecurity Advisory Committee on March 29, 2022.
8

9 7. Attached as Exhibit 4 is a fair and accurate copy of a complaint submitted by the
10 Arizona Secretary of State reporting a private Facebook post claiming President Trump won the
11 2020 election in Arizona.

12 8. Attached as Exhibit 5 is a fair and accurate copy of an interim report prepared by
13 Arizona Attorney General Mark Brnovich for Arizona Senator Karen Fann dated April 6, 2022.
14

15 9. Attached as Exhibit 6 is a fair and accurate copy of the Declaration of Andrew
16 Myers.

17 10. Attached as Exhibit 7 is a fair and accurate copy of the Declaration of Yvonne
18 Nystrom.
19

20 11. Attached as Exhibit 8 is a fair and accurate copy of the Declaration of Jacqueline
21 Onigkeit.

22 12. Attached as Exhibit 9 is a fair and accurate copy of the Declaration of Denise
23 Marie.
24

25 13. Attached as Exhibit 10 is a fair and accurate copy of the Declaration of Leslie
26 White.

1 14. Attached as Exhibit 11 is a fair and accurate copy of the Declaration of Richard
2 Baris.

3 15. Attached as Exhibit 12 is a fair and accurate copy of the Declaration of Shelby
4 Busch.

5 16. Attached as Exhibit 13 is a fair and accurate copy of the Declaration of Clay Parik.

6 17. Attached as Exhibit 14 is a fair and accurate copy of the Declaration of Kelly "KJ"
7 Kuchta.
8
9

10
11 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
12

13 
14

15 Dated: December 9, 2022

Kurt Olsen

1

Elections Misinformation Reporting Portal

Benefits to election officials

- A single place (i.e., the portal) for reporting mis- and disinformation across multiple social media platforms with a streamlined, consistent user experience.
- An ability to report activity that occurs on multiple platforms at the same time.
- Visibility of what's going on with mis- and disinformation in the election's community within and outside their jurisdictions, including to see trends and be able to strategically respond.

Benefits to social media platforms

- Consistent reports of mis- and disinformation that include a standard, consistently formatted set of information fields (type of report, screenshots, links, as well as narrative explanation of the concern).
- An ability to accept reports without having to vet the submitter, as those submitters will already be vetted by the election's community upon registration in the portal. This will enable them to respond more quickly to a given election official's first report.

Benefits to state-level elections offices and national associations (NASS, NASED)

- The ability to look across the elections jurisdictions to identify patterns and potential impact of misinformation activity. This will permit national-level organizations to help put priority on response actions and make decisions regarding media engagement in parallel with actions taken by the social media companies.
- An opportunity to focus efforts at the national level to improve the overall health of the election administration across the country.
- Redirecting resources spent on assisting election offices with reporting to those focused on remediation activities.

Benefits to voters

- More accurate election information available at any given time
- More rapid correction of erroneous information, leading to more voter confidence
- An overall healthier, more productive social media environment.

2

From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]
Sent: 1/7/2021 10:58:39 PM
To: Misinformation Reports [misinformation@cisecurity.org]
CC: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; gov@twitter.com
Subject: Re: FW: Election Related Misinformation

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thank you, [REDACTED] Both Tweets have been removed from the service.

Thank you,
[REDACTED]

On Thu, Jan 7, 2021 at 3:53 PM [REDACTED]@twitter.com> wrote:

Thank you, [REDACTED] We will escalate.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

On Thu, Jan 7, 2021 at 3:44 PM Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org> wrote:

[REDACTED] Twitter,

Please see this report below from the Arizona SOS office. Please let me know if you have any questions.

Cc: [REDACTED] I am not sure the best contact email to send this to at Twitter.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]


From: [REDACTED]@azsos.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 3:26 PM
To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Cc: [REDACTED]@azsos.gov>; [REDACTED]@azsos.gov>
Subject: Election Related Misinformation

Hello,

I'm [REDACTED] communications director for the Office of the Arizona Secretary of State.

Email: [REDACTED]

I am flagging this twitter account for your review. @ [REDACTED]



Of specific concern to the Secretary of State are the following tweets:

<https://twitter.com/WhatAreYouHiding/status/1346451683384160257>

<https://twitter.com/WhatAreYouHiding/status/1346233687160008704>

Reason: These messages falsely assert that the Voter Registration System is owned and therefore operated by foreign actors.

This is an attempt to further undermine confidence in the election institution in Arizona.

Thank you for your consideration in reviewing this matter for action.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

.....

This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.

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CISA CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Misinformation & Disinformation Subcommittee Meeting March 29, 2022

Purpose of Meeting

- The purpose of the CISA Cybersecurity Advisory Committee (CSAC) Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Misinformation & Disinformation (MDM) Subcommittee meeting was to hear a brief from Mr. Stephen Richer, County Recorder in Maricopa, AZ, on current election processes and needs among elections officials and to discuss CISA's role in the MDM space. Subcommittee members also heard a brief from Ms. Kim Wyman, Senior Election Security Lead, CISA, on CISA's current election-specific actions to combat MDM.

Discussion

- Ms. Megan Tsuyi, Designated Federal Officer (DFO) for the CSAC and the MDM Subcommittee brought the meeting to order and turned the meeting over to the Chair, Dr. Kate Starbird and Ms. Kim Wyman.
- Dr. Kate Starbird, Associate Professor, Human Centered Design & Engineering, University of Washington, MDM Subcommittee Chair and Ms. Kim Wyman, Senior Election Security Lead, CISA, introduced Mr. Stephen Richer, County Recorder in Maricopa, AZ.
- Mr. Richer thanked the subcommittee for their partnership to ensure safe, secure, and reliable elections across the country by fighting current and emerging misinformation and disinformation threats, and provided an overview of his background. Mr. Richer was elected in November 2020 and is responsible for the recording of election documents, a voter registration database of 2.6 million registered voters—the second largest county voter database in the nation—, and the administration of elections. He identified a shift in public interest in how elections are administered in 2016 and outlined how his office has refined their messaging to stay on pace with the public's increased interest. One way his office has met the demand of increased public interest is through media engagement. He stated that the 2020 elections provided media the opportunity to learn about elections and the mechanics behind administering elections. He discussed new and difficult challenges with how the nature of the media landscape has changed considerably. Such changes include that all outlets are not held to the same journalistic standards, many are not open to government feedback, and they are not concerned with releasing correct information.
- Mr. Richer walked the subcommittee through three examples to illustrate situations his office is currently facing to include:
 - Misinformation: A news release by Gateway Pundit provided factually inaccurate reporting announcing that Maricopa County elections officials held an unannounced meeting at the election and tabulation center. This meeting was, in fact, a publicly announced tour with members of the public and legislators from both parties.
 - Disinformation: A doctored image tweet of an election management server room depicted to suggest the server was connected to the internet to manipulate the election results. The server was, in fact, air gapped, only accessible to three people, and hard wired without internet connection. The image was doctored from a photo taken from the live streaming cameras and was easily disproved.



CISA CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE

- Malinformation: Abuse of Arizona's permissive public records process. In 2019, Maricopa County received 30-40 public records requests. In 2021, they received over 350 requests ranging from requests to produce everything related to the 2020 election to all email communications related to elections, to all the rules and processes on how the elections are administered. This example highlights how individuals can use lawful means to burden a system already stretched thin.
- Mr. Richer expressed concern that if the elections landscape continues like this, the pressure on his staff will continue to build and it will become difficult to perform statutory responsibilities needed to establish safe, credible, and fair elections.
- After cautioning the subcommittee on the current and emerging problems among elections officials, Mr. Richer identified opportunities for CISA support. These opportunities include:
 - Educate the public and determine how people are manipulating the public's understanding of the truth;
 - Funding and resources;
 - Intelligence and metrics;
 - Partnership with social media; and
 - Share best practices on pre-bunking
- Mr. Richer shared his current efforts of releasing information on websites, educating poll workers, and calling out MDM posts online. Mr. Richer thanked the subcommittee for their support and opened the meeting to questions.
- Subcommittee members deliberated on what CISA's role and the government's role should be in this space.
 - Ms. Suzanne Spaulding, Senior Advisor for Homeland Security and Director of the Defending Democratic Institutions Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), asked Mr. Richer to evaluate the credibility of the federal government and CISA in rumor control. Mr. Richer notes that CISA's credibility and the credibility of the federal government is lowest with populations most in need of assistance and most in disbelief of the accuracy of the 2020 election results. Mr. Richer suggested that local citizens within the communities remain the most trusted sources of information and upheld the credibility of main media institutions, social media companies such as Twitter and Facebook, and encouraged the business community to mobilize and share information from CISA.
 - Ms. Spaulding identified a potential recommendation to CISA to better consider what audiences they are targeting in their messaging and information campaigns. Mr. Richer suggested that CISA hold bootcamps for media representatives such as FOX News or CNN to enhance media's understanding of how elections are administered, as well as work with members of Congress to reach the information leaders.
 - Dr. Starbird asked how CISA can help Mr. Richer reach constituents directly. Mr. Richer stated that he could benefit from CISA's expertise in identifying and articulating how a more sophisticated deep fake could happen.



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- Mr. Michael Moore, Cybersecurity Director, Maricopa County Records Office, identified public education campaigns as the greatest area for CISA support. He recommended that CISA launch marketing campaigns to better reach wide audiences on misinformation and disinformation.
- Mr. Richer cautioned that the federal government cannot stay silent and identified a void in the immediate aftermath of the 2020 election that allowed false information to circulate unchecked. He encouraged CISA to flood the zone with factual information.
- Ms. Wyman asked if Mr. Richers' office partners with any universities or academic institutions. Mr. Richer noted that they mostly partner with community colleges in Arizona but are currently working with elections projects from MIT and University of Chicago as well as data analysts in Arizona to show the validity of the 2020 election. Mr. Richer identified the judiciary as key components of the 2020 election in upholding the truth and process.
- Subcommittee members discussed challenges of releasing correct information in a landscape of misinformation and disinformation in a timely matter.
 - Ms. Vijaya Gadde, Legal, Public Policy, and Trust and Safety Lead, Twitter, encouraged the elections boards to release credible information which would enable social media companies to redirect misinformation and disinformation claims to accurate information. In the absence of reported factual information, Ms. Gadde explained that social media companies are only able to remove false information without redirecting the public to credible sources.
 - Ms. Gadde shared the effectiveness of pre-bunking on Twitter. She reported a decline in the spread of false information when correct information was shared early and often ahead of an event.
 - Mr. Richer identified the challenge of choosing to act quickly with 95% confidence, or waiting a few days to act with 99% confidence before responding to ensure there is no truth in the perceived falsity and to back up the correct reporting with three additional sources. Ms. Gadde shared that the vast majority of a tweet's impressions occur within the first 24 hours of posting and cautioned that waiting to correct the information leaves consumers to digest false information.
 - Ms. Wyman highlighted the work with the Election Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council (GCC) to create incident response planning guides to encourage jurisdictions to troubleshoot potential attack points in advance to craft a plan.
- Subcommittee members identified pre-bunking as a main recommendation for CISA to encourage state and local elections officials to release accurate information on the administration of elections prior to misinformation and disinformation campaigns.
- Dr. Starbird thanked Mr. Richer and Mr. Moore for attending and turned the meeting over to Ms. Wyman to provide a brief presentation on CISA's election-specific actions within the MDM scope.
- Ms. Wyman shared examples of Geoff Hale's work on CISA's overall approach to MDM and her current efforts to create resources and tools for state and local partners to use, such as the resource guide for MDM planning prior



to elections. She noted the importance of targeting different age groups and demographics to build societal resilience against MDM in different spaces.

Deliberative Process

- Dr. Starbird thanked the subcommittee for their participation. Ms. Megan Tsuyi identified the next meeting date is set for April 12 and adjourned the meeting.

Action Items

- A1: Ms. Suzanne Spaulding is contacting the Brunswick Group and Harvard University for information on the D3P study.



CISA CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Attendees*

Participants

Name	Organization
Dr. Kate Starbird, Chair	University of Washington
Ms. Vijaya Gadde	Twitter
Mr. Geoff Hale	CISA
Ms. Suzanne Spaulding	CSIS
Ms. Alicia Tate-Nadeau	Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA)
Ms. Kim Wyman	CISA

Other Meeting Attendees

Name	Organization
Mr. Marcus Milam	Maricopa County Recorder's Office
Mr. Michael Moore	Maricopa County Recorder's Office
Ms. Devi Nair	CSIS
Ms. Abby Raddatz	Maricopa County Recorder's Office
Mr. Stephen Richer	Maricopa County Recorder's Office
Ms. Allison Snell	CISA
Ms. Claire Teitelman	JP Morgan Chase

Government and Contractor Support

Name	Organization
Ms. Megan Tsuyi, DFO	CISA
Mr. Hanny Ayad	MountChor Technologies
Ms. Mariefred Evans	TekSynap
Mr. Maurice Hudson	Arcfield
Mr. Tony Messer	Arcfield
Ms. Dana Ripley	Arcfield

**Meeting was held via Teams/teleconference*



**CISA
CYBERSECURITY
ADVISORY
COMMITTEE**

**PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM MISINFORMATION &
DISINFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE
BRIEFER BIOGRAPHY**



**Mr. Stephen Richer
County Recorder
Maricopa, AZ**

Stephen Richer is the Maricopa County Recorder in Phoenix, Arizona. He was elected in November 2020 and assumed office in January 2021. As Recorder, Stephen runs an office of 165 full time employees and is responsible for the recording of public documents, the county's voter registration database of 2.6 million voters, and the administration of the county's elections – 62% of the voting population of Arizona.

Prior to beginning his term as Recorder, Stephen worked as a lawyer and a business person.

Stephen was named "Republican Politician of the Year – 2021" by Phoenix New Times and "Arizonan of the Year – 2021" by The Arizona Republic.

Stephen holds a B.A. from Tulane University and both an M.A. and J.D. from The University of Chicago. Stephen received the Presidential Volunteer Service Award, Gold Class, from President George W. Bush in 2006.

4

From: Jannelle Watson [jannelle@fb.com]
Sent: 11/6/2020 10:14:11 AM
To: Misinformation Reports [misinformation@cisecurity.org]; Scully, Brian [brian.scully1@cisa.dhs.gov]; CISA Central [central@cisa.dhs.gov]; CFITF [cfitf@hq.dhs.gov]; tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net
CC: kmatta@azsos.gov
Subject: Re: Case #CIS-MIS000182: Misinformation post that Trump already won AZ

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thanks for sending this over – we're looking into it.

--

Jannelle Watson
 U.S. Politics & Government Outreach
 E: jannelle@fb.com
FACEBOOK

From: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Date: Friday, November 6, 2020 at 10:09 AM
To: Brian Scully <brian.scully1@cisa.dhs.gov>, Central CISA <central@cisa.dhs.gov>, "cfitf@hq.dhs.gov" <cfitf@hq.dhs.gov>, "tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net" <tips@2020partnership.atlassian.net>, Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Cc: Jannelle Watson <jannelle@fb.com>
Subject: Case #CIS-MIS000182: Misinformation post that Trump already won AZ

Brian and EIP, I included Facebook in this report.

Misinformation report: (private) Facebook post that Trump already won AZ

From: Ken Matta <kmatta@azsos.gov>
Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 9:54 AM
To: Misinformation Reports <misinformation@cisecurity.org>
Subject: Fake statement by Arizona Election Worker about fraud

Hi There.

<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=3966754973352465&set=p.3966754973352465&type=3>

This post was on a private FB page, above. I've included a screenshot.

Thank you!



KATIE HOBBS
SECRETARY OF STATE
State of Arizona

Ken Matta
Information Security Officer
Arizona Secretary of State's Office

Email: kmatta@azsos.gov
Office: 602-926-3828
Cell: 602-513-3945

This message and any messages in response to the sender of this message may be subject to a public records request.

.....
This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.

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5



MARK BRNOVICH
ATTORNEY GENERAL

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF ARIZONA

April 6, 2022

The Honorable Karen Fann
Arizona State Senate
1700 W. Washington St.
Phoenix, Arizona 85007

RE: Interim Report - Maricopa County November 3, 2020 General Election

Dear President Fann:

Six months ago the Arizona Attorney General's Office (the "Office") received reports sent from the Arizona State Senate concerning its Maricopa County Forensic Election Audit. In addition, the Attorney General's Election Integrity Unit (EIU) has received and is reviewing additional complaints alleging election failures and potential misconduct that occurred in 2020.

Our team of EIU investigators and attorneys has now collectively spent thousands of hours reviewing the Senate's audit reports and other complaints, conducting interviews, and analyzing Maricopa County's election system and processes. We have reached the conclusion that the 2020 election in Maricopa County revealed serious vulnerabilities that must be addressed and raises questions about the 2020 election in Arizona.

As our state's chief law enforcement officer, I am very concerned by any potential vulnerabilities in our state's election systems, including those that the audit and other complaints have alleged. The EIU's review has uncovered instances of election fraud by individuals who have been or will be prosecuted for various election crimes.¹ The EIU's review is ongoing and we are therefore limited in what we can disclose about specific criminal and civil investigations. Thus, this interim report will focus on what our office can presently share and the current status of our review.

We can report that there are problematic system-wide issues that relate to early ballot handling and verification. The early ballot signature verification system in Maricopa County is insufficient to guard against abuse. At times election workers conducting the verification process had only seconds to review a signature. For example, on November 4, 2020, the Maricopa

¹ See Arizona Attorney General's Office – Fraud & Special Prosecutions Section, Prosecutions Related to Voting or Elections Since 2010, *available at* https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/docs/criminal/viu/EIU_Prosecutions_February_2022-02-02.pdf.pdf.

County Recorder verified 206,648 early ballot affidavit signatures, which resulted in an average of 4.6 seconds per signature. There are simply too many early ballots that must be verified in too limited a period of time, thus leaving the system vulnerable to error, fraud and oversight.

Moreover, our review has determined that in multiple instances, Maricopa County failed to follow critical procedures when transporting early ballots from drop locations to the election headquarters. It is estimated that between 100,000 and 200,000 ballots were transported without a proper chain of custody. Because most voters in Arizona now choose to vote by early ballot, it is imperative that the processes for handling and verification of early ballots be strengthened before the 2022 elections per our recommendations below.

The first half of this report discusses document production issues we have confronted with Maricopa County and the EIU's ongoing review of the Senate's audit reports and other complaints. The rest of this report then sets forth our election integrity concerns and recommendations in the areas of early-ballot signature verification, ballot drop boxes, use of private grant monies by election officials, election document preservation and transparency, and our ongoing actions to defend election integrity in active litigation.

I. Document Preservation & Production Issues

Our ongoing review of the Senate's audit reports requires that we carefully assess the Maricopa County election system and processes. Maricopa County has not always timely and fully responded to our requests for records, necessitating follow-up correspondence or additional requests. The most recent response from Maricopa County came just yesterday. Similar to the manner in which it responded to the Senate subpoena, Maricopa County occasionally chose a combative and/or litigious approach to providing requested information rather than assuming a posture of transparency.² Because we do not have civil subpoena authority, this has necessarily delayed the EIU in investigating all issues.

Following the receipt of the Senate's audit report, the EIU sent its First Request to Maricopa County on September 27, 2021, to notify Maricopa County that all materials related to the 2020 elections should be preserved, including all potentially relevant materials related to the 2020 General, Primary, and Presidential Preference Election. Maricopa County initially interpreted the letter as an attempt to sequester all election equipment and twice threatened legal action. The EIU reiterated the letter's stated purpose, to *preserve the data* contained on the equipment, not to sequester or prevent its ordinary use.

The EIU sent the Second Request to Maricopa County on October 7, 2021, requesting Maricopa County provide "all written procedures, policies, guidelines, and manuals (excluding the 2019 Elections Procedures Manual and the related Addendum) used by Maricopa County to conduct the 2020 General Election, whether official or unofficial, whether issued or written by Maricopa County or another county, agency, vendor, or third-party, including the original and

² The Attorney General's Office filed an amicus brief in support of the State Senate's ability to subpoena information from Maricopa County involving the 2020 elections. See Minute Entry *supra* note 1, at p. 3.

subsequent updates to those documents” and included “emails, memos, or other communications that provided temporary, preliminary, or permanent changes to any procedures, policies, guidelines, and manuals during the course of the 2020 General Election.”

Maricopa County provided the first set of responsive documents on or around February 1, 2022, nearly four months after the initial request. The EIU’s initial review found several deficiencies, including Maricopa County’s failure to provide internal policies and procedures that had been disclosed to litigants in various court proceedings, but were noticeably absent from the document set.

The EIU sent the Third Request to Maricopa County on March 9, 2022, renewing the request for *all* written procedures, policies, guidelines, and manuals, noting certain documents known to exist, but not provided. In addition, the Third Request included a new request for records related to mismatched signatures initially identified by a third-party review of ballot affidavit signatures but also independently verified by the EIU as potentially problematic ballot affidavit signatures. Notably, it was on March 23, 2022, only after Senator Kelly Townsend issued a subpoena to Maricopa County, that it acknowledged receipt of the Third Request. In Maricopa County’s response, three of the documents identified as missing from the initial response were provided, but documents such as any written procedures regarding the extra-statutory “Household Exchange” program used by Maricopa County to rehabilitate early ballot affidavits signed by the wrong household member remain outstanding. In addition, no emails or internal communications relating to the informal procedures have been provided to date.

On March 24, 2022, Maricopa County provided a partial response to our request for the signature files of the ballot affidavits that the EIU identified as being problematic. Instead of sending *all* signatures on file, as well as any historical records of attempts to cure, Maricopa County sent the ballot affidavit signature and one exemplar from the file. Many of the exemplars were from the August 2020 Primary, and virtually none were from the original voter registration form.

The Office is still receiving new information that is relevant to its ongoing review of the Maricopa County election systems. This includes materials from Maricopa County, which has not fully complied with the Office’s document requests. It also includes the completion of Special Master Shadegg’s report that was released on March 23, 2022, and the Auditor General’s Report on voting systems and private monies that was released on March 30, 2022. *See* Section V, *infra*. The Office is also reviewing newer analyses of early ballot signatures and potential ballot harvesting.

Conclusion: The Office’s investigation is still developing in material ways. The Office has been sending repeated requests for information from Maricopa County, and new information is coming in, including as recently as yesterday. This Interim Report comes at the six-month mark after the Senate sent its reports to the Attorney General. Investigations (civil and criminal) of this magnitude and complexity take many months if not years to complete.

To address the deficiencies and delays in the manner in which Maricopa County has chosen to cooperate with the EIU, we recommend that the laws be changed to require the

immediate production of information when requested by the Arizona Attorney General. Notably, if Senate Bill 1475 had passed, it would have provided the Attorney General civil subpoena power, mirroring the AGO's civil powers under Arizona's Open Meeting Laws. *See* A.R.S. § 38-431.06. Absent such civil subpoena power, the AGO remains limited to submitting public records requests. Such power will help expedite the Office's review, but investigations of this magnitude take substantially longer than the present six months to complete.

II. Early Voting Signature Verification

Mail-in voting is and has been a facet of Arizona law, but the opportunity for fraud increases the moment a ballot leaves the protective custody of the election official and enters the postal system. The bipartisan Commission on Federal Election Reform chaired by former President Jimmy Carter and former Secretary of State James Baker identified this concern and noted that absentee ballots are vulnerable to abuse in several ways that are difficult to detect, and therefore steps must be taken to reduce the risks of fraud and abuse. Report of the Comm'n of Fed. Election Reform, *Building Confidence in U.S. Elections* 46-47 (Sept. 2005). Although steps have been taken to reduce this fraud, including the enactment of Arizona's ballot harvesting ban, it is imperative that additional steps be taken to provide for a stronger and more uniform early ballot signature verification system and to increase transparency so that party observers can actually see the signature verification process in real time and lodge any objections, which should then be adjudicated in a fair manner. Each of these recommendations is discussed below.

There must be stronger procedures in place for early-ballot signature verification, and those procedures need to be uniform across the state. Under state law, an early ballot is not complete, and cannot be counted, unless and until it includes a signature on the ballot affidavit. Once received, election workers at the county recorder's office are required to compare the signature on the affidavit with the signature in the voter's registration record. A.R.S. § 16-550(A). If election officials determine that the signature matches that on file, the ballot is counted. If, on the other hand, election officials determine that the signature on the ballot affidavit does not match that on file, then the ballot cannot be counted unless the voter verifies the signature. Requiring a match between the signature on the ballot affidavit and the signature on file with the State is currently the most important election integrity measure when it comes to early ballots.

The Ninth Circuit acknowledged, in response to a constitutional challenge to the deadline for submitting signed ballot affidavits, that "Arizona requires early voters to return their ballots along with a signed ballot affidavit in order to guard against voter fraud." *Ariz. Democratic Party v. Hobbs*, 976 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2020). Election officials, therefore, must be extremely diligent in ensuring that early ballot affidavit signatures match those on file with the State. Regardless of the sheer quantity of early ballots received, the administrative burdens imposed by verifying each one, or for any other reason, election officials and their staffs cannot violate their statutory duty to match *every* signature.

Early voting is widely used in Arizona: 79% of Arizona voters cast early ballots in 2018 and that number reportedly increased to 89% for the 2020 General Election. With over 3.4 million ballots cast in the General Election, Arizona elections officials were required to match

signatures on over 3 million early ballot affidavits during a five to six-week period in 2020. This large number of early ballots combined with the administrative burden of confirming every one of the signatures submitted in a very short period of time, when not administered diligently, could result in election officials accepting early ballot affidavits that should not otherwise be approved without further verification.

Statistics for Maricopa County, for example, over the last three election cycles reflect that the number of early ballots rejected because of missing and mismatched signatures is trending down. During the 2016 General Election, when Helen Purcell was county recorder, Maricopa County received 1,249,932 mail-in ballots. Of that amount, Maricopa County rejected 2,209 early ballots because of missing signatures and 1,451 early ballots because of mismatched signatures.

Just two years later, during the 2018 General Election, after Adrian Fontes became county recorder, Maricopa County received 1,184,791 early ballots, just 65,141 less than in 2016. Yet the number of early ballots rejected in 2018 because of missing signatures (only 1,856) and mismatched signatures (only 307) declined significantly—the number of missing signature ballots decreased by 353 and the mismatched signature ballots decreased by 1,144 (a 79% decrease). By comparison, Pima County received 302,770 early ballots (882,081 less than Maricopa) and rejected 488 (135 more than Maricopa) because of mismatched signatures.

During the 2020 General Election, Maricopa County saw a significant increase in the number of early ballots, receiving 1,908,067 early ballots (an increase of 723,276 early ballots). Yet the number of early ballots rejected because of missing signatures continued its dramatic decrease (to only 1,455 ballots) and the number of early ballots rejected because of mismatched signatures increased only slightly (to 587 ballots).³ To be sure, Maricopa County has explained that the number of early ballots rejected for mismatched signatures during the 2020 General Election was impacted by the Legislature's creation of a 5-day post-election cure period for mismatched signatures. But the existence of that cure period in 2020 does not explain the dramatic decrease—on an absolute or percentage basis—of ballots with missing signatures from 2016 to 2020⁴ or the dramatic decrease in early ballots with mismatched signatures from 2016 to 2018. One possible explanation for these trends, and the AG acknowledges there could be others, is that Maricopa County became less diligent with signature review beginning in 2018.

Certain data stemming from litigation following the 2020 General Election is also instructive. In November 2020, certain individuals filed an election challenge under A.R.S. § 16-672. In connection with that challenge, the trial court ordered that the parties' counsel and retained forensic experts could review 100 randomly selected early ballot affidavits and conduct a signature comparison of ballot affidavits where a signature match had occurred. *Ward v. Jackson*, CV2020-015285, 2020 WL 13032880, *3 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 2020). Two forensic document examiners testified during an evidentiary hearing, one for the plaintiffs

³ Pima County by contrast rejected nearly the same number of early ballots based on mismatched signatures (572) despite receiving 1,479,386 fewer ballots.

⁴ Early ballots with missing signatures were required to be cured prior to close of polls on election day.

and one for the defendants. The plaintiffs' expert testified that of the 100 ballots reviewed, 6 signatures were "'inconclusive,' meaning she could not testify that the signature on the envelope/affidavit matched the signature on file." *Id.* at *4. The forensic expert for Defendants, who sought to defeat the election challenge, "testified that 11 of the 100 envelopes were inconclusive, mostly because there were insufficient specimens to which to compare them."⁵ *Id.* Neither of the forensic experts found any sign of forgery. *Id.*

Although the trial court rejected the election challenge and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed,⁶ that does not render the forensic experts' findings irrelevant for purposes of analyzing whether current election procedures can be improved. And the fact that two forensic experts could differ so widely on whether particular signatures matches were inconclusive (one thought 6 signatures were inconclusive, the other 11) and that defendants' own expert concluded, less than one month after the General Election, that 11% of signatures sampled were inconclusive, suggests that improvement is needed.

The stresses on the mail-in voting system are largely driven by the combined population growth and increased usage of early voting. With over 80 percent of the Maricopa County electors choosing to vote early, there can be insufficient time for the county recorder to process and verify the large volume of early ballot affidavit signatures. Moreover, there is no uniform procedure in place to assure that the ballot affidavit signatures are being processed correctly and uniformly, not only in Maricopa County but throughout the State. The Arizona Secretary of State has offered non-enforceable "guidance" to the county recorders regarding signature verification but has never promulgated uniform procedures as required by A.R.S. § 16-452. Importantly, the Secretary's "guidance," is insufficient and could create more issues than it purports to resolve. *See* Brief of Amicus Curiae Attorney General Mark Brnovich, Section II(C), *Arizona Republican Party v. Hobbs*, No. CV-22-0048-SA (Ariz.).

Our review determined that early ballot affidavit signature verification is often performed in an expedited manner by individuals with limited training in signature analysis. Because of the volume of early ballots that arrive close to or on election day and the limited time allowed by law to verify signatures, the process can be rushed, which weakens the integrity of the verification. Although we may have more to say about this process, we are concerned that the expedited manner in which thousands of early ballot affidavit signatures are processed inevitably leads to a diminished review. At times the election worker conducting the verification process has only seconds to review a signature. For example, on November 4, 2020, the Maricopa County Recorder verified 206,648 early ballot affidavit signatures, which resulted in an average of 4.6 seconds per signature.

Conclusion: We have reached three primary conclusions on this critical issue. First, the early ballot affidavit signature verification system in Arizona, and particularly when applied to Maricopa County, may be insufficient to guard against abuse. We therefore recommend that the

⁵ There was no indication in the trial court's ruling rejecting the election challenge whether there was overlap between the 6 affidavits that Plaintiffs' expert found inconclusive and the 11 affidavits that Defendants' expert found inconclusive.

⁶ *Ward v. Jackson*, 2020 WL 8617817, *3 (Ariz. Dec. 8, 2020).

law be amended to provide additional security for early ballots, including a requirement that voters who choose to vote by early ballot provide some additional form of government identification. We note that a referendum sponsored by Senator J.D. Mesnard will ask voters at the November 8, 2022 general election to put in place such requirements. *See* SCR 1012, available at <https://apps.azleg.gov/BillStatus/BillOverview/76391>.

Second, the verification standard set forth in statute is insufficient to control the discretion of local officials and must be addressed by Legislation. A.R.S. § 16-550(A) provides that “the county recorder or other officer in charge of election shall compare the signatures [on the early ballot envelopes] with the signature on the elector’s registration records.” This requirement to “compare” should be expanded and clarified to provide what steps election officials must take, including the minimum amount of time that should be spent reviewing each signature and an objection and appeal process. Given how important this check is, there must be more specific requirements contained in statute.

Finally, we conclude that because signature verification is the most important current check on early ballots, there must be opportunities for parties’ election observers to meaningfully observe the signature verification process in real time and to raise objections if officials are not doing their jobs to actually and accurately verify signatures. The Legislature should act to ensure transparency on this check.

III. Early Ballot Drop Boxes

The EIU received a complaint alleging that the Maricopa County Elections Department violated the procedures that govern how early ballots are transferred from drop-off and drop-box ballot locations to the Maricopa County Tabulation and Election Center (MCTEC). These are early ballots that voters drop off at designated locations, including polling locations on election day. The report specifically alleged that the County failed to maintain chain of custody and properly document the retrieval, transportation, and count of the ballots.

The procedures for transporting these ballots to MCTEC during the 2020 general election were governed by the 2019 EPM, which was adopted pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-452. Section 1.7 of the 2019 EPM required at least two individuals with different political party affiliations to retrieve the early ballots. The individuals retrieving the early ballots were then required to document the location, date and time of arrival, time of departure, number of ballots, and follow a strict protocol when securing the container of ballots. These procedures designed to preclude ballot tampering are critical given the volume of early ballots that were dropped at these locations during the 2020 general election. Maricopa County reported that 901,976 ballots were collected from drop box locations. Most of those ballots (729,858) were collected during the early voting period from October 7, 2020 to November 2, 2020. The remaining 172,118 ballots were returned from drop boxes at polling locations.

Our review uncovered multiple violations of ballot transportation procedures. Specifically, our investigation confirmed that out of 1,895 Early Voting Ballot Transportation Statements, 381 forms or 20% were missing required information. This included missing audit signatures, missing ballot count fields, missing Election Department receiver signatures, missing

courier signatures and missing documentation of security seals and lack of the two required seal numbers. In other words, it is possible that somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 ballots were transported without a proper chain of custody.

Conclusion: Maricopa County failed to follow the EPM procedures when transporting 20% of the early ballots from drop box locations to MCTEC. And because the Secretary of State did not present the Attorney General a lawful EPM for approval in 2021, as required by A.R.S. § 16-452, there is currently *no* EPM in place governing the 2022 elections, exacerbating the issue for the upcoming election.

The Arizona Legislature should codify ballot custody and transportation procedures for early ballots using guidelines published by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. *See* U.S. E.A.C, *Chain of Custody Best Practices* (July 13, 2021) (available at <https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/chain-custody-best-practices>). It is also recommended that the legislature enact laws that increase transparency in early ballot chain of custody, including the ability of observers from the political parties to monitor this process. Finally, because of the security issues associated with voted early ballots sitting in bins and containers in remote locations, the Legislature should enact laws that either prohibit drop box locations altogether or limit them to early ballot voting centers, polling day locations, or other secure locations staffed and closely monitored by election officials. House Bill 2238, sponsored by Representative Jake Hoffman, would accomplish this recommendation by prohibiting the use of an unmonitored drop box for receipt of voted ballots. *See* <https://apps.azleg.gov/BillStatus/BillOverview/76693?SessionId=125>.

IV. Use Of Private Grant Monies

To secure the purity of our elections, our laws prevent election officials and others from influencing the manner in which electors choose to exercise their right to vote. During the 2020 elections almost \$8 million dollars of private, nongovernmental grant monies were used by Arizona Secretary of State Katie Hobbs, Maricopa County, and Pima County for various election purposes as outlined in a report prepared by the Arizona Auditor General dated March 30, 2022. Available at <https://www.azauditor.gov/reports-publications/counties-state-agencies/secretary-state-office/report/arizona-secretary-state>. We are carefully reviewing this report to determine if any election laws were violated through the use of these funds. Although our review is ongoing, our initial findings raise serious concerns regarding the legality of certain expenditures.

As noted by the Auditor General, in the time since Secretary Hobbs, Maricopa County, and Pima County received and used these private, nongovernmental grant monies, Laws 2021, Ch. 199, §1 (adding A.R.S. § 16-407.01), was enacted, which prohibits the State and a city, town, county, school district, or other public body that conducts or administers elections from receiving or expending private monies for preparing for, administering, or conducting an election, including registering voters. Specifically, effective September 29, 2021, the State and its counties (and other political subdivisions) are statutorily prohibited from receiving the aforementioned grant monies or similar monies. As a result of this new law, the election officials may not use private grants or donations to perform their election duties or engage in any type of publicity campaign during the 2022 elections.

V. Future Auditing Of Elections

In addition, the Legislature should enact legislation that expands the powers of the Auditor General to conduct future audits of election systems. The Auditor General is well positioned to perform this function and should be given the resources to handle such audits in house in a professional and prompt manner. The Auditor General should be given authority to request Attorney General assistance in obtaining documents and equipment in the possession and custody of state and local officials. Periodic audits performed by the Auditor General, with reports to the Legislature, will ensure that state and local officials are complying with the law, identify shortcomings, and foster confidence in our state's election systems.

VI. Increase The Penalties For Election Crimes And Protections For Whistleblowers

The Legislature should also consider increasing the penalties for election-related crimes and adding protections for whistleblowers. Due to the difficulty in detecting ballot harvesting, the Legislature should review whether it should increase the classification of the felony for that crime. The Legislature should also consider adding a crime where members of an organization, including a non-profit or non-governmental organization, that knew *or should have known* members (whether employees or volunteers) in their organization are engaged in widespread ballot harvesting are subject to criminal liability.

The Legislature should also enact specific criminal penalties for anyone who tampers with or damages a ballot-drop box in a way that could damage any ballots contained in such drop box. Finally, the Legislature should consider strengthening criminal penalties for failure to comply with a legislative subpoena or request by the Auditor General or Attorney General, and the Legislature should strengthen protections for whistleblowers who are aware of any potential wrongdoing. Such protections should be made retroactive, and permit whistleblowers to come forward with evidence related to past elections as well.

VII. The Attorney General's Office Is Vigorously Defending Arizona's Election Integrity Laws And Protecting The Legislature's Powers

We all share a strong commitment to election integrity, and by any objective measure the Office is fully engaged in successfully defending Arizona's election integrity laws. The U.S. Supreme Court recently observed in *Brnovich v. DNC*, 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021), that the state has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process and preventing voter fraud. "Fraud can affect the outcome of a close election, and fraudulent votes dilute the right of citizens to cast ballots that carry appropriate weight. Fraud can also undermine public confidence in the fairness of elections and the perceived legitimacy of the announced outcome." *Id.* at 2340. It is imperative that our election system guard against fraud, abuse, mistake, and oversight. And the Arizona Legislature must therefore be able to enact laws that "secure the purity of elections and guard against abuses of the elective franchise." Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 12.

Defending the integrity of our elections is one of my top priorities as Attorney General. We repeatedly and successfully defended Arizona's election integrity laws from an onslaught of

attacks in 2020, which include important victories in the following cases.

- *Brnovich v. DNC*, 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021) (upholding Arizona’s ballot harvesting and out-of-precinct voting laws against challenge under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
- *Miracle v. Hobbs*, 808 F. App’x 470 (9th Cir. 2020) (upholding Arizona’s law requiring petition circulators to show up to court if subpoenaed).
- *Ariz. Democratic Party v. Hobbs*, 976 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2020) (upholding law requiring ballots to be signed by 7 p.m. on election day).
- *Mi Familia Vota v. Hobbs*, 977 F.3d 948, 950 (9th Cir. 2020) (reversing erroneous lower court decision extending voter registration deadline).
- *Arizonans for Fair Elections v. Hobbs*, 454 F. Supp. 3d 910, 915 (D. Ariz. 2020), *appeal dismissed*, No. 20-15719, 2020 WL 4073195 (9th Cir. May 19, 2020) (upholding prohibition on electronic signature gathering for initiatives).
- *Arizonans for Second Chances v. Hobbs*, 249 Ariz. 396 (2020) (also upholding prohibition on electronic signature gathering for initiatives).

Most significant among these is *Brnovich v. DNC*, which was the most important election integrity case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in years. The case bears my name because I stood up before the U.S. Supreme Court and defended Arizona’s common-sense laws protecting against ballot harvesting and out-of-precinct voting. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in our favor by a 6-3 majority, decisively rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous decision that would have hamstrung Arizona’s legitimate election integrity efforts and saddled the state with millions of dollars in attorneys’ fees. You don’t have to take my word for it. Prominent liberal law professor Erwin Chemerinsky lamented it as “**the most important decision of 2021.**”⁷ He said, “*Brnovich* will make it much more difficult to challenge [common-sense election integrity measures enacted by states,] and these laws could play a decisive role in the 2022 and 2024 elections.” *Id.* But for my office’s involvement there would be no *Brnovich v. DNC* decision, period.

The Office is also actively protecting election integrity for the upcoming 2022 elections and beyond. This includes defending against multiple lawsuits that have already been filed. In August, *Mi Familia Vota* filed a lawsuit challenging SB 1003 and SB 1485 from the 2021 legislative session. Case No. 2:21-cv-01423 (D. Ariz.). These laws relate to early voting signature requirements and the active early voting list. The Office vigorously defended this case, and the Plaintiffs conceded that they would not seek any injunctive relief for the 2022 elections.

Just last week, two lawsuits were filed challenging HB 2492 from the 2022 legislative session, which relates to proof of citizenship when registering to vote. *See Mi Familia Vota v. Hobbs*, No. 2:22-cv-00509 (D. Ariz.); *Living United for Change in AZ v. Hobbs*, No. 2:22-cv-00519-SRB (D. Ariz.). The Office is actively defending these cases in advance of the 2022 elections. Finally, the Office is participating in *Arizona Republican Party v. Hobbs*, No. CV-22-

⁷ Available at <https://www.abajournal.com/columns/article/chemerinsky-most-significant-supreme-court-cases-of-2021>

0048, at the Arizona Supreme Court, and asking the court to ensure that there is an Elections Procedures Manual (EPM) in place for the 2022 elections. Having a lawful EPM in place for the 2022 elections is a major election integrity priority for the Office.

It is also important to note that the Office has supported the separation of powers and the Legislature's authority to subpoena election records so that it can have data and information to make informed decisions on potential legislation. In the dispute between Maricopa County and the Senate regarding the Senate's subpoenas, the court ultimately agreed with the Office and the Senate in *Maricopa County et al. v. Fann, et al.*, CV2020-016840, Minute Entry at 15 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. 3/1/2021).⁸ Later, the Senate issued another subpoena to Maricopa County, which again refused to comply. The Office determined that this refusal was in violation of state law, and Maricopa County subsequently complied.⁹

Arizona is successfully defending its election integrity laws in active litigation. Arizona could have been like other states and had its laws judicially rewritten on the eve of an election.¹⁰ Arizona could have been like the Ninth Circuit majority held (but for *Brnovich*) and been hamstrung in all of its future efforts to secure its elections. But, fortunately, Arizona has the authority to enforce its existing laws and the freedom for its elected legislators to modify those laws as circumstances change and experience shows that additional or different election integrity measures are needed. In sum, Arizona can ensure that it is easy to vote and hard to cheat.

VIII. Conclusion

With each passing election, Americans on all sides of the political spectrum have less confidence in the integrity of our elections. This is a crisis that should be addressed immediately with bipartisan solutions grounded in the rule of law.

Public confidence in the fairness of elections is paramount. As elected officials, we can, and must, do better for our constituents. Whether we agree with peoples' reasons for questioning election integrity or not, we should go above and beyond our call of duty to assure Americans that each legal vote was counted, and no illegal votes were allowed.

This dilemma is not relegated to Republicans and the 2020 election. Democrats spent years in uproar over the 2000 election after George W. Bush defeated Al Gore. And they viciously questioned President Trump's election in 2016. Congressional Democrats also challenged the Electoral College count several times over the past two decades when their candidate lost the race. It is dishonest to pretend that the 2020 election concerns are unprecedented. Both sides have had their share of issues with elections processes and

⁸ Available at https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/docs/press-releases/records/3_1%20minutes%20entry.pdf

⁹ See https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/docs/complaints/sb1487/21-002/MCBOS_1487_Report-8-26.pdf.

¹⁰ See, e.g., *Pennsylvania Democratic Party v. Boockvar*, 238 A.3d 345, 354 (Pa. 2020), *cert. denied sub nom. Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Degraffenreid*, 141 S. Ct. 732 (2021).

procedures, and it is time for Americans' elected representatives to put aside political differences and do what is necessary to reassure their constituents that every legal vote counts.

That's why our office has taken election integrity so seriously—both before and after the 2020 election. Arizonans were extremely frustrated and angry that they were not receiving answers to questions that had been raised about the 2020 election. Our office has left no stone unturned in the aftermath of the 2020 election. We supported the Arizona State Senate's right to conduct the audit of Maricopa County's election, and we have followed up with several investigations into the 2020 election.

As has been stated previously, the 2020 election in Maricopa County left significant holes to be answered and addressed. All branches of government in this state must come together to provide full assurance of the integrity of our elections and answer every outstanding question from the 2020 election. That's what our Office is committed to doing. We hope that this interim report and cooperation with the legislative branch will continue to reassure Arizonans that election integrity is of primary concern in our state.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Mark Brnovich", with a stylized flourish at the end.

Mark Brnovich
Attorney General

6

DECLARATION OF ANDREW MYERS

I, Andrew Myers, hereby declare as follows under penalty of perjury:

1. I am over the age of 18 and competent to make this declaration.
2. I am a citizen of the United States and of the State of Arizona.
3. I reside in Phoenix, Arizona.
4. From October 14, 2022, through November 15, 2022, I served as a part-time employee of the County working as a level one signature verification worker. I also performed ballot curing.
5. At my location, in the room where I worked there were a total of about 15 people reviewing and verifying signatures. We were divided into two rooms and the other room had about 10 people working. In addition, there was also a night crew of several people working from about 3 p.m. until about 7:30 p.m.
6. The process for signature verification of ballots was composed of two levels, and a third level developed toward the end of the four weeks. Level one was composed of part-time employees of the county who compared an image of the ballot envelope against three images of a signature in the voter file which are normally the three most recent images of voter forms. I performed level 1 review, and we were the most inexperienced of all levels.
7. Ballot signatures at level one review were either approved or rejected; another way to describe rejected ballots was that they were marked "exception."
8. If a ballot signature was rejected, then it was automatically reviewed at level 2. Level 2 signature verification was composed of managers who were longer, part-time employees of the county and had the most experience at signature verification. This

would also include the full-time managers and supervisors for the county. Review at level 2 allowed the managers to view the same three images as level 1, but level 2 was also allowed to see additional images of the signatures in the entire voter file and were allowed to zoom in on signature images.

9. There was a level 3 review of signatures developed at the end of the project. Level 1 workers were the most inexperienced workers and were being asked to overrule level 2's decision on the excepted signatures. Level 1 was given the same access that level 2 had, which was first time many of the level 1 had seen the history of the voter's signatures. I did not take part in this, because I felt that I did not have enough experience to overrule level 2 decision. Also, shortly after the request was made, I had to work on curing.
10. Level 2 managers were the full-time managers and supervisors, of the county and some long-term part-time employees like Andrew.
11. When the excepted numbers grew the managers would resend those excepted signatures back out into the general pool, hoping that someone would approve those same signatures, which would thereby reduce the excepted signature load.
12. After the above signature review, the approved signature ballots were counted, and the rejected signature ballots were sent into a process whereby the ballots could be cured.
13. The bulk of what I did was curing. The curing process was as follows. Michelle would bring a USPS bin with green affidavits. We would put a preprinted label on the affidavit, marked "LS" for letter sent with that day's date also preprinted on the label. We would then take the "labeled" affidavits to Melissa, minus the affidavits that did

not have phone numbers. Melissa would scan the green envelopes which would generate an address label for each affidavit.

14. We would then put the address label on an envelope that was pre-stuffed with a letter informing the voter that the county was having trouble verifying their signature. The voter was given a phone number to the Star Center to assist with curing their ballot. Thereafter, we would put the green envelopes in alphabetical order. I was responsible for working through files beginning with letters M-Z. After everything was in alphabetical order, we would start the curing process.
15. The curing process consisted of matching print outs from Star Center, a third-party contractor, or the Text to Cure method. When we had a cure matched and approved, we would paper clip the printout from Star Center or Text to Cure to the green envelope and the supervisor would stamp "Signature Verified" and send it to Runbeck to be rescanned. The text to cure process changed toward the end of the election. We were no longer curing through the Text to Cure method but were only using Star Center print outs. Celia said it took too long to print out text to cure and she would handle it.
16. Observers were allowed to watch and listen to my curing work. I rarely made calls.
17. The process in my curing room was controlled and there were really only two of us doing the curing and putting labels on and matching print outs with green envelopes.
18. The first week I worked about thirty-five (35) hours over five days. I worked primarily on curing, but in terms of signature verification, I processed about 3,000 ballots the first week. The rejection rate was about 15-20%, so about 450 to 600 ballots were rejected by me this first week.

19. The second, third and fourth week I worked about fifty (50) hours per week. I worked on curing and do not believe I processed any signature verification on ballots in weeks two, three and four.
20. The total ballots I processed for signature verification over four weeks was about 3,000 and the total ballots I rejected was about 450 to 600, but that was because almost all of my time was spend on curing and not on signature verification.
21. In my room we had a white board that Michelle would update with the number of ballots to be verified that day. Throughout the day Michelle would update the progress the people were making in verifying signatures. The math never added up. Typically, we were processing about 60,000 signatures a day. I would hear that people were rejecting 20-30% which means I would expect to see 12,000 to 15,000 ballots in my pile for curing the next day. However, I would consistently see every morning only about 1000 envelopes to be cured. We typically saw about one tenth of the rejected ballots we were told we would see.
22. Andrew, one of the signature reviewers, would tell me every day that I was going to get crushed the next day because he was excepting (rejecting) a “ton” of bad signatures. However, we never saw a correlation.
23. I can only think of two explanations for why our cure pile was consistently only about a tenth of the numbers we were expecting based on the information given to us by the level 1 signature verification teams. The first explanation is that the signature verification workers were incorrect. I do not think this is the case because I spoke with many of them, and the difference was consistently ten times less than we expected. The second explanation is that the level 2 managers who re-reviewed the

rejections of the level 1 workers were reversing and approving signatures that the level 1 workers excepted and rejected. This seems to me to be the more likely explanation. If this is the case, then the level 2 managers were changing about 90% of the rejected signatures to accepted.

24. The computer records show the number of signature rejections by all workers at all levels. All approval of rejected ballots by level 2 should be evidenced on the computer system.
25. There was a black bin that held green envelopes where the voter told the caller during the curing process that they had not voted, or it that was not their ballot.
26. When I left work on my final day of November 15, I estimate that in my room there were 5,000 uncured envelopes. There were a number of voters that were never able to vote because they said that they went through the curing process, but their ballots were never cured. I recall one lady in particular who sent an email claiming that she had successfully completed the curing process but was told she was not cured. I did my best to look through the above pile of 5,000 envelopes to resolve her situation. Her ballot should have been in that batch, but it was not. This is simply one example of the disorganized situation we experienced.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct.

Signed: 
Andrew Myers

Date: 12/7/22

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DECLARATION OF YVONNE NYSTROM

I, Yvonne Nystrom, hereby declare as follows under penalty of perjury:

1. I am over the age of 18 and competent to make this declaration.
2. I am a citizen of the United States and of the State of Arizona.
3. I reside in Mesa, Arizona.
4. From October 31, 2022, through November 15, 2022, and November 20, 2022 and November 21, 2022. I served as a part-time employee of Maricopa County working as a level 1 signature verification worker. It was my job to, among other things, perform signature verification on ballots.
5. To perform our work, we were given the following materials, and were told to follow them:
 - a. Attached as Exhibit A is the "Maricopa County Elections Department, 2022 General Election" manual,
 - b. Attached as Exhibit B is the "Electronic Adjudication Board Procedures," and
 - c. Attached as Exhibit C is the "Maricopa County Elections Department VRAS System-Research" manuel.
6. At my location, there were a total of 24 people reviewing and verifying signatures. We were divided into two rooms. In addition, there was also a night crew, in which I was part of the night crew, of about eight to ten people working 3 p.m. until about 7:30 p.m.
7. The process for signature verification of ballots is as follows:
 - a. There were three levels for signature verification. Level one was composed of part-time employees of the county who compare an image of the ballot envelope

against one to three images of a voter's signature in the voter file which are normally the three most recent images of voter forms.

- b. ballot signatures at level one was either approved or rejected; another word for rejected ballots was "exception."
- c. If a ballot signature was rejected then it was automatically reviewed at level 2. Level 2 signature verification was composed of managers who were more experienced employees of the county. Review at level 2 included the same images as level 1, but level 2 was allowed to see more images of the signature in the voter's file, and was allowed to zoom in on signature images.
- d. There was a level 3 review of signatures as well. It is not clear whether this third level was part of level two or an additional level. In any event, I worked at level one and it was my clear understanding that there were three levels of review, and that each of the above levels had the ability to reverse a rejection of a ballot signature. Level 2 could reverse level 1. Level three could reversed level 1 and/or 2. Level 3 managers also would send the whole managers "que" back to the level 1 part-time employees to review the signatures that had already been rejected by level 1 and 2 personnel to accept the signatures or reject them again.
- e. There were observers watching the review of level 1. Some observers in other rooms were able to see some of level 2 managers. I do know that in my room for the evening shift, the observers were not able to see or observe the managers in my room.
- f. After the above signature review, Runbeck batched ballots into categories for those with approved signatures and rejected signatures. The accepted ballots were

sent to ballot processing and counted and the rejected signature ballots were sent into a process whereby the ballot could be cured.

- g. The curing process was flawed for at least two reasons: (1) inadequate personally identifiable information (“PII”) and (2) an inability for the voter to see and verify that their signature was in fact the signature being viewed by the curing worker. The voter was on the phone and, of course, could not see signature that was being viewed by the curing worker on the actual green envelope.
- h. The process for curing included a person who would call the voter at the number listed on the green envelope. Most of the time, perhaps sixty to seventy (60% - 70%) of the time the person calling the alleged voter only had the name on the ballot, the phone number and the address. This was because the curing worker was not at a computer and was only able to look at the actual green envelope. However, the person who sent the green envelope and ballot was permitted to write a phone number on the green envelope that was mailed in that was different from the one listed in their voter file. This occurred a number of times. There were probably forty percent (40%) of phone numbers on the green envelopes that were different from the number listed in the voter file. Of course, voters do change phone numbers, but this seemed to be a very large number of different numbers. The above struck me and the curing workers as odd.
- i. Observers were allowed into the curing process, but not in some areas. Some of the curing process occurred in the ballot processing room and the observers were only allowed in a designated area in that room and that area was far away from where the curing employees were working.

- j. The part-time employees performing of the curing function were given a batch of stickers to place on a ballot, including stickers indicating that a ballot was: “Letter Sent (LS),” “Left Message (LM),” “Phone Disconnected (PD),” “Wrong Number (WN),” “Verified (VER),” and other statuses. One of the problems with the stickers was that workers were not controlled or kept accountable with access to stickers and placement of stickers. Nothing prevented a worker from accessing many “approved” stickers and placing them on ballots. Once stickers were placed on ballots there was no record on the ballot or elsewhere to determined who placed the sticker there; there were no individual identifying initials or signatures on the sticker. The system was insecure and subject to abuse by permitting false placement of approved stickers without accountability.
8. If a signature was rejected then it would be reviewed by the first level manager which was William, Jeff Beimer, or Andrew George. Those are the three first level managers. If these managers agreed with me and also rejected the signatures, then it went to the next level managers, for second level manager approval. Those second level managers were Aloma Richmond, Michelle Acker, Tony (Antonio) Ortiz, and Celia Nabor. Bill Gates was occasionally there, but I don’t know if he performed signature verification review. Scott Jarrett and Rey Valenzuela were co-elections directors, and they were there every day. I am not sure if Scott and/or Rey performed signature verification of not, but they were third level managers.
9. We had observers watching level 1 signature verifiers such as myself, but they did not watch all level 2/3 managers who also performed approvals and rejections on signature

verification. There were times when my level 1 queue of work was worked by a level 2 or level 3 manager above me without observers watching their work.

10. My job was to review a scan of the actual green affidavit with the voter's signatures and to match the signature with one of the three (or less) signatures of the voter on file to verify or reject the signature.
11. I worked a total of 16.5 hours in signature verification during the time I was working the election. The other hours were spent in ballot processing, ballot duplication, ballot adjudication and SEB (Special Elections Board).
12. It took me approximately a minute on each signed affidavit envelope to either approve or reject a voter's signature. Some affidavits took much less time due to no signature, obvious wrong signature, a protected signature and such. Those signatures were immediately rejected.
13. From my experience during my time, the rejection rate for bad signatures was approximately thirty-five to forty percent (35% - 40%). The highest rate of rejection was forty percent.
14. I do not know the rejection rate for others in my room, but I do know that a lot of people working in my room said that they were also not verifying numerous signatures because of how bad they were.
15. On November 15th, before we left for the last day of the job, Jacque and I questioned Aloma about the remaining ballots requiring curing because there were still several bins with about two to three thousand ballots to be cured. Aloma told us we were free to go and to not worry about those thousands of ballots since they were only for the managers

to handle. However, it is my understanding that no observers monitored the curing process of the managers.

16. The computer records from EVRT program showed the number of signature rejections by me and the managers. I do not know how many times the managers reversed my rejection of the signatures. I was not able to see that information. I do know that observers were not watching the work of the managers above me who had the ability to change my rejection of signatures. If one of the managers changed by rejection, then that should be recorded under their name in the computer records of the EVRT program.
17. The reversal of signature rejections was handled through a process of curing. This was after the last level of managers still disapproved of the envelope signature it would go to the process of calling the voter to cure the signature. We had a script to talk to the voter or leave a scripted message for them to call the Star Center, which was a third-party contractor that worked completely off-site but had the same access to the voter's file information as we did on the computers at MCTEC, to cure their affidavit signature. My understanding of the Star Center's curing process was to verify information from the voter's file, i.e., the last 4 of their SS #, driver's license #, street address, full name and any other identifying information in their file. It is my understanding that the Star Center was able to cure and did cure ballots, but were not able to see the actual ballot with the signature on it. It is my understanding that the Star Center work was not monitored with observers, whereas my work was required to be monitored by observers. Since they had the ability to cure and reverse the rejection of signatures, I do not know why their work was not monitored by observers.


18. Part of the process for curing ballots that had been rejected for bad signatures, was for the part-time employees to call a number for the voter and speak with a person they thought could be the voter. They would ask for personal identifying information ("PII") to confirm the person and ask them if they were the voter, but the person who allegedly voted was never able to see the signature to see if it was their signature, they would simply say they were the voter, give some PII, and say they signed the affidavit.
19. There were times that the curing workers called voters that had rejected signatures and those alleged voters would tell us that they never voted. For example, we had some college students who said they never voted and did not sign the ballots. Obviously, we voided those ballots, but as long as the person on the phone said they were the voter, and was able to give some PII, it is my understanding that those ballots were approved and went on to the ballot processing, even if the signature was previously rejected.
20. The permanent employee managers were Tony (Antonio) Ortiz, or Aloma Richmond or Michelle Acker. They had more experience and were trained on curing poor signatures. When they cured a ballot that had been signed by the spouse, it is my understanding they would just put a label on the affidavit with the voter's name on it that said the husband or wife had signed the affidavit for the other as a type of household signature exchange. The ballot would then go to Runbeck for scanning and the green ballot envelope would go through the same signature verification as any other ballot envelope.
21. On the last day of work, November 15, we were asked by manager Celia to go through perhaps 5,000 to 7,000 ballots, that had already been rejected at levels 1, 2 and 3. We were asked to go to the SHELL program and to only find one signature that matched the green envelope, even if all other signatures in the program did not match the green

envelope. The implication from Celia is that was desperate to get the work complete and that she wanted the ballots approved. These 5,000 to 7,000 ballots had already been through the full level 1, 2, and 3 process and been rejected. Therefore, I do not know why were going through them again, and that is why it seemed that Celia wanted them approved.


I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct.

Signed: Yvonne Nystrom
Yvonne Nystrom


Date: 12-7-22




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2




3



VOTING OPTIONS

1. By Mail
 - November 1 last day, recommended to mail back an early ballot
2. Drop it Off
 - Secure Ballot Drop Boxes
 - ✓ A ballot is accepted until 5:00 p.m.
3. In Person, 27-days early voting
4. In-Person, "vote anywhere" Vote Centers on Election Day


4



WHAT IS A VOTE CENTER
Increasing Access to Vote In-Person

- ✓ 230 – 325 Vote Anywhere Locations
- ✓ Phased Opening Schedule, Oct. 12 through Nov. 8
 - ✓ 27 Days: 12 Days, 1 Day, 1 Day
- ✓ Located in high density areas including locations that serve Native American & rural communities
- ✓ Dispersed across the County, every 1-2 miles
- ✓ Ballot-on-Demand Printers, Site Books

5



Vote Center Location Information
Find Out Where You Can Vote

WHAT VOTERS NEED TO KNOW

- Find Hours and Locations
- Sort by Shortest Wait-times
- Call at 602-506-1511 with questions or to find a location

Locations.Maricopa.Vote

6

MARICOPA COUNTY ELECTIONS DEPARTMENT
BeBallotReady.Vote



View and update your personalized voting information online. Simply visit the website BeBallotReady.Vote on your smart phone or computer. Then, log-in and you can find everything from What's On Your Ballot to details about upcoming elections.

#BeBallotReady

YOUR PERSONALIZED VOTER INFORMATION

- Check Your Voter Status
- View Election Calendar
- Update Your Address
- Find Election Security Info
- Track Your Ballot
- View Voting History
- Update Registration Info
- More...






7

ESTIMATING VOTER TURNOUT
Data Driven Decisions

- Forecasting Challenges
 - Frequency of Elections
 - Voter Interest
 - Recent Events/Ballot Contests
- Voting Models/Date Inputs
 - 2 Models & 6 Simulations
 - Recent Elections/Trends
 - Historical Elections 1946-2020


<u>Early Ballot Participation</u>	<u>Election Day Participation</u>
83-90%	/ 10-17%
NOV Early Voters: 1.2-1.5 million	NOV Elec. Day Voters: 150-321K

TOTAL TURNOUT
NOV: 1.4-1.9 Million (55-69%)

8

MARICOPA COUNTY ELECTIONS DEPARTMENT
EARLY VOTING DIVISION



9

BALLOT BY MAIL

Security. Transparency. Tracking. Verification.

1 ONLY REGISTERED VOTERS CAN REQUEST A BALLOT

The law requires that the Election Department check the voter registration, located against real records and government systems prior to mailing a ballot to a voter.

3 100% SIGNATURE VERIFIED

All signatures are checked against a known signature on the official voter registration file and past affidavit signatures. Our signature verification process has multi-level checks to ensure only valid signatures are counted.

2 TRACK YOUR BALLOT. TEXT 'JOIN' TO 628-683

Every single mailed ballot is tracked upon delivery and receipt with an intelligent mail barcode so voters can have peace of mind knowing it was counted. Track your ballot by texting "JOIN" to 628-683 or online at BeBallotReady.Vote

4 ONLY VERIFIED BALLOTS ARE COUNTED

Once the signature is verified on the affidavit envelope, it is opened by a bipartisan board and sent to be counted. All uncounted ballots are tracked and reported in the official canvass for each election.

1 VOTED

10

EARLY VOTING DIVISION

SIX UNIQUE TEAMS

- The Uniformed And Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)-Military and Overseas
- Special Election Boards (SEB)
- Signature Verification
- Ballot Flagging
- Ballot Processing
- Mailroom

11

EARLY BALLOT SECURITY AND TRACKING

Increased Visibility for Voters

UOCAVA (Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act)

Military and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)

UOCAVA (Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act)

UOCAVA (Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act)

Maryland County Election Administration

Maryland County Election Administration

Maryland County Election Administration

Maryland County Election Administration

Track your ballot by texting "JOIN" to 628-683 or online at BeBallotReady.Vote.

12

MILITARY AND OVERSEAS VOTERS

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)

SERVING MARICOPA VOTERS

- ✓ Eligible to register to vote in Arizona
- ✓ Uniformed personnel on active duty and eligible family members and must be stationed Out of County to utilize the request method
- ✓ United States Citizens residing outside the U.S.

IMPORTANT DATES

- ✓ Ballots are sent to voters 15 days prior to Election Day
- ✓ Verbal ballot and signed affidavit must be received by Elections no later than 7:00PM on Election Day (in person vote)

VOTER OPTIONS FOR RECEIVING VOTING MATERIALS

- ✓ Email
- ✓ Fax
- ✓ Mail



Email: Milos@risc.Maricopa.gov

MilitaryOverseas.Maricopa.Vote

13



SPECIAL ELECTIONS BOARD (SEB)

- Facilitating voting for those confined due to illness or disability
- Large Print
- Braille





14


SEB OUTREACH-SOCIAL MEDIA


15



16



17



18


ENVELOPE SIGNATURES

VERIFIED. REVIEWED. CHECKED.

VERIFIED
All mail-in ballot signatures are reviewed by trained staff.

REVIEWED
A manager reviews 100% of all questioned signatures or unsigned envelopes.

DOUBLE CHECKED
A 2% daily audit is performed on all confirmed signatures before ballots are counted.



BeBallotReady.Vote

19

SIGNATURE VERIFICATION

Training & System

Maricopa County has a robust, multiple tiered system to review 100% of the signatures on early voting packets.

Letterform

- Ascenders, Descenders, Dots & Counters

Six Broad Characteristics

- Type & Speed of Writing
- Overall Spacing, size and proportion
- Position of Signature
- Spelling


Five Local Characteristics

- Internal Spacing
- Size and Proportion of letters/combo of letters
- Curves, loops, and cross points
- Presence or absence of pen lifts
- Beginning and Ending Stroke


20

COMMON TERMINOLOGY


Letterforms




Stem




Ascender




Eye




Descender



Terminal Stroke



Initial Stroke




Counter


21

BROAD CHARACTERISTICS

Overall Spacing




Overall Size Proportion



22

BROAD CHARACTERISTICS


Position (Slant)




23

LOCAL CHARACTERISTICS

Curves, Loops, Cross-points



Pen lifts




24

BI PARTISAN PROCESSING BOARDS

General Flow

1. Materials Checked-Board confirms materials received
2. Complete Paperwork-Board completes required paperwork
3. Process Tray-Paperwork is checked for completeness and accuracy
4. Package Materials Trays go through quality control (QC) and are moved to the BTC




28

SET UP-BALLOT PROCESSING


What should be on the table?

- Clear Board Bin – Board #
- Red Ink Pens (2)
- Rubber Bands - Thin (1 tray) & Thick (1 tray)
- Paperclips (1 tray)
- Stampers
- Sticky notes
- Small Mail Tray
- Plastic Cone



29


COUNT STACKS OF 10



30


CONFIRM BALLOT MATCHES AFFIDAVIT

- Pull the ballot out of the affidavit envelope to view the ballot header
- Check that the following items match on the ballot header and affidavit:
 - Precinct/Jurisdiction #
 - Color
- Place checked and separated ballots in offset stacks of 10s. Place affidavits in clear bin.



31


UNFOLD BALLOTS, STACK IN 10S & REVERSE FOLD



32

DUPLICATIONS

- Duplications—or any item going to duplication must be tied back to the source.
- Stamp the ballot
- Fill in the required information.
- List on EV Ballot Report




33

ASSEMBLE WORK

- Separate Early Ballot Report sheets
 - PINK copy goes with ballots
 - WHITE copy goes with affidavits
 - YELLOW copy goes with tray report


Assembled tray should look like this:



34


TRANSFER OF CUSTODY

All processed ballot trays, ballots requiring duplication, and documentation go through a Quality Control (QC) control check before transferred to the Ballot Tabulation Center (BTC)




35

POST ELECTION




- ✓ Complete signature verification on early voting packets received on Election Day by 7PM
- ✓ Complete ballot processing on packets with a good signature
- ✓ Curing of questionable signatures until November 16 (5:00PM)


36




37



38




39




IMPROVED TABULATION PROCEDURES

- ✓ Certified: Equipment is EAC (Federal) & SOS (State) Certified
- ✓ Fast: Counts ballots faster 6-8K per hour
- ✓ Accurate: Confirmed by hand counts performed by the political parties, audits, and accuracy tests
- ✓ Secure:
 - No Internet Connections
 - 24/7 Live Video Streams
 - Physical and Logical access restrictions
 - Strict Chain of Custody and Logging



40




SECURITY & INTEGRITY

Security

- Hardwired isolated air-gapped network
- 24-7 Live camera feed
- Restricted access
- Encrypted data & memory cards
- External PC secured within a locked cage
- Port Blockers used for all USB ports
- Original hardcopy ballots are stored under camera
- Vault - Restricted access

Integrity


- Logic & Accuracy Testing performed before and after every election
- Independent hand count verification performed by political parties (over 12,000 votes verified 2016)
- Political Party Observers present throughout the process




41

SiteBooks & the Command Center


In Person Voting




42



43





44



45

TIME & PAYROLL



- Business hours
- Lunch time
- Breaks
- Call-In policy: Contact your supervisor at least 30 minutes before the start of your work shift if you will be running late or absent. (480) 492-3087

46

FOOD & DRINK



- Drinks can be at workspace in a sealed container and spill proof
- Access to the water and ice machine
- No food or snacks left overnight
- Encouraged insulated bag with ice pack
- Coffee

47

CODE OF CONDUCT



- Employees shall be honest, fair, and courteous while working or identified as Employees of Maricopa County.
- No political or religious discussions
- While in our official capacity, all employees are expected to remain nonpartisan
- Front page of newspaper test
- Social Media

48

SECURITY-SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

- See Something, Say Something
- Security Onsite
- Be aware of your environment
- Pay attention to what's going on around you. Look for things that seem odd or out of place, or that could be dangerous






49

VIDEO SURVEILLIANCE

- Live Feed on Maricopa Elections webpage
 - 60 cameras
 - Security Purposes and Arizona Revised Statutes



Live Feed

50

TECHNOLOGY



- Password protection
- Access to systems for business reasons only
- Public Record Requests (PRR)
- Phishing

51

TECHNOLOGY



- Using county technology resources for illegal, inappropriate, obscene, political or personal gain is prohibited
- All USB drives are deactivated
 - No device charging



52

TECHNOLOGY



- No technology used at workspace (i.e., cell phones)
- No headphones
- Cell phones are on silent and stored away in storage container
- Taking photos, texting, or recording in the work area are prohibited



53

SUPPLIES

- Clorox Wipes
- Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is available
- Red Pens



54

DRESS CODE & OTHER PRACTICES

- Fragrance and perfume free environment

Shedule: Adults on dress code	Adults: Adults - Report to the Security Department if you see a child who is not dressed appropriately.
Shedule: Adults on dress code	Children: Children - Report to the Security Department if you see a child who is not dressed appropriately.
Shedule: Adults on dress code	Children: Children - Report to the Security Department if you see a child who is not dressed appropriately.
Shedule: Adults on dress code	Children: Children - Report to the Security Department if you see a child who is not dressed appropriately.
Shedule: Adults on dress code	Children: Children - Report to the Security Department if you see a child who is not dressed appropriately.
Shedule: Adults on dress code	Children: Children - Report to the Security Department if you see a child who is not dressed appropriately.
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Shedule: Adults on dress code	Children: Children - Report to the Security Department if you see a child who is not dressed appropriately.
Shedule: Adults on dress code	Children: Children - Report to the Security Department if you see a child who is not dressed appropriately.
Shedule: Adults on dress code	Children: Children - Report to the Security Department if you see a child who is not dressed appropriately.

55

FIRE ESCAPE AND PLAN*



56

OTHER EMERGENCY CONTACTS

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

EMERGENCY Phone - Fire - Personnel	Phone
Security Services	402-508-3440
Shedule's Office	402-508-4111
Shedule's Office	402-508-4111
Shedule's Office	402-508-4111
Shedule's Office	402-508-4111
Shedule's Office	402-508-4111
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
57

PARKING AND ACCESS TO THE BUILDING

- First come, first serve parking
- Announce yourself at gate and hold badge to the camera
- Enter at the front lobby
- Temporary staff may not enter the workspace more than five min early
- Restricted areas in the building-remain in your designated area


58

PARKING AND ACCESS TO THE BUILDING



59



MEDICAL EMERGENCY



60

DRUG FREE/SMOKE FREE



Employees may smoke or vape only in the designated smoking areas at each facility and during their assigned break and lunch times. Extra smoking/vaping breaks are prohibited. Please be advised that smoking is prohibited on all county property.



61

POLITICAL OBSERVERS



- Political observer per room (per party) in signature verification, ballot processing and ballot tabulation center
- Designated spots in the room
- All questions are directed to the Ambassadors in the space.



62

INCIDENT REPORTING

- Immediately report any incident that occurs on the to your supervisor.
 - Injuries
 - Falls
 - Accidents
 - Vehicle Accidents



63

BONUS


- Combined hours and weeks worked during Primary AND/OR General Elections
- Two tiers
 - 240 hours AND four weeks=\$1,000
 - 400 hours AND eight weeks=\$1,750
- MCTEC temps only
- Paid in December 2022 *

* temporary agencies


64

QUESTIONS?


65



1



2



3

FUNDAMENTALS

SIGNATURE ON EARLY VOTING AFFIDAVIT/IDENTIFICATION

- ✓ Compare the signature on affidavit/envelope with the voter's signature in the record
- ✓ Previous attempts (prior registration forms and early voting affidavit/envelopes, AENV, requests)

VERIFIED SIGNATURES

- ✓ Indicate a distinguishing mark
- ✓ Prepare for processing and official transfer to ballot tabulation center

UNVERIFIED SIGNATURES (NO SIGNATURES)

- ✓ A meaningful attempt to conceal voter
- ✓ Packet remains sealed and secured

CURING

- ✓ No signature (Election Help Mail/Answer Card)
- ✓ Occasional signature-November 16th PM (Arizona limit)

UNCURED PACKETS

- ✓ Reject or correct (no signature and bad signature)
- ✓ Remain sealed and ballots not counted

4

GENERAL ELECTION TIMELINE

Important Election Dates

SEPT. 24 Mail-in and Overseas Ballots Mailed	OCT. 11 Voter Registration Deadline	OCT. 12 Ballots Mailed, Drop Boxes Available
OCT. 28 Last Day to Request a Ballot in the Mail	NOV. 1 Last Day to Mail Back Your Ballot	NOV. 8 Election Day!


5

VOTING OPTIONS

November General Election

- By Mail**
 - November's last recommended day to mail back an early ballot
- Drop it Off**
 - Secure Ballot Drop Boxes
 - <https://www.maricopa.gov/elections/secure-ballot-drop-boxes>
- In Person**
 - 27-days of early voting
 - On Election Day

6




WHAT IS A VOTE CENTER
Increasing Access to Vote In-Person

225

Locations.Maricopa.Vote

7




VOTE CENTER LOCATION INFORMATION
Find Out Where You Can Vote

WHAT VOTERS NEED TO KNOW

- Find Hours and Locations
- Sort by Shortest Wait-times
- Call at 602-506-1511 with questions or to find a location

Locations.Maricopa.Vote


8




EARLY VOTING PACKETS

- General Election Ballot
- Early Voting Instructions and sticker
- Green Affidavit Envelope
- Full Text Insert
- Yellow Carrier Envelope


9



10



11





12

BROAD CHARACTERISTICS

Evaluating the entire signature

- Type of writing
- Speed of writing
- Style of the writing
- Overall spacing

- Overall size & Proportion
- Slant
- Spelling
- Alignment



13

BROAD CHARACTERISTICS



- Type of writing
 - Hand printed, cursive, or a mix of the two
- Generational

Hand printed

Cursive

John Doe

John Doe



14

BROAD CHARACTERISTICS

- Speed of writing/Pressure
 - Dynamic due to repulsion
 - Ink line (thick vs. natural)
 - Assess the appearance of the terminal stroke
 - Natural strokes tapered or blunt

Speed of writing



Pressure

John Doe

John Doe

John Doe


John Doe



15

BROAD CHARACTERISTICS


- Style of writing
 - Letterform
 - Style can vary but large shifts can happen over time
- Overall spacing
 - Space between the names



16

BROAD CHARACTERISTICS


- Overall size & Proportion
 - The size of the signature in relation to the space available
 - Telescoping
 - Height of the uppercase to lowercase
 - Heights and widths of the strokes



17

BROAD CHARACTERISTICS

- Slant
 - Left, Upright, and Right



18

BROAD CHARACTERISTICS

- Spelling
 - Is the name wrong (John vs. Jon, Sarah vs. Sara)

John Adams

Jon Adams



19

BROAD CHARACTERISTICS

- Alignment
 - Placement of the signature relative to signature line or baseline
 - Middle, left justified, right justified

Phil the Ballot

Phil the Ballot

Phil the Ballot

Phil the Ballot



20

BROAD CHARACTERISTICS

If the broad characteristics are clearly consistent you may accept the signature (marked as good). If not, move on to review the local characteristics.



21

LOCAL CHARACTERISTICS

Evaluating the specific letter or combination of letters.

- Internal Spacing
- Size and Proportion of letters/combo of letters
- Curves, loops, and cross points
- Presence or absence of pen lifts



22

LOCAL CHARACTERISTICS

- Internal Spacing
 - Relationship between successive letters should be reasonably similar.

<small>Internal Spacing</small> 	<small>Internal Spacing</small>
---	---



23

LOCAL CHARACTERISTICS

- Curves, loops and cross points


<small>Curves, loops and cross points</small> 	<small>Curves, loops and cross points</small>
---	---



24

LOCAL CHARACTERISTICS


- Size and proportion of letters/combo of letters
- Space between the letters



25

LOCAL CHARACTERISTICS


- Pen lifts
- May be subtle or dramatic
- Found in both genuine and fraudulent signatures



26

LOCAL CHARACTERISTICS

- Beginning and ending stroke



27

CAUSES FOR INCONSISTENT SIGNATURES

- ☐ Natural shifts and changes overtime
- ☐ Maturing (18 years old versus 40 years old)
- ☐ Deterioration with age
- ☐ Intentionally altering
- ☐ Professional versus personal signature
- ☐ Writing surface
- ☐ Writing instrument
- ☐ Medical diagnosis

28

SIGNATURE VERIFICATION

work of signature records reviewed by humans

User Level

- ✓ One does an post-Good or Success
- ✓ Compare current affiant image against a historical signature (up to three most recent in chronological order)
- ✓ Affidavit includes voter registration forms and permits early voting affidavit envelopes
- ✓ All exceptions are tagged to the manager queue for further review

Manager Level

- ✓ Access to extra history of affidavits with a good signature
- ✓ Verifiable signatures are deemed good
- ✓ Signatures that can't be verified are deprecated, will be physically reviewed and follow the curing process

Audit

- ✓ A randomized audit is performed on every batch (approximately 12k records)
- ✓ Audit is required before the batch can be completed
- ✓ Includes records marked as good and exceptions

29

SCENARIOS (EXCEPTIONS)

VOTER DID NOT SIGN IN THE SIGNATURE BOX

CAN NOT VERIFY SIGNATURE WHEN COMPARING TO HISTORICAL AFFIDAVITS

SIGNED BY A DIFFERENT PERSON

MARKING NOT ON HISTORICAL RECORD

✓ Fingerprint

✓ If the other marks

NOTIFICATION NOT ON HISTORICAL RECORD

✓ Unable to sign due to disability

SIGNATURE IS UPSIDE DOWN

30

SCENARIOS (EXCEPTIONS)



WRITTEN NOTES

- ✓ Deceased
- ✓ Mowed
- ✓ Power of Attorney (POA)
- ✓ Signed on behalf of
- ✓ Inapplicable

31

SCENARIOS (GOOD)

SIGNATURE CAN BE VERIFIED WITH A HISTORICAL SIGNATURE
CURED PACKETS (WITH A STAMP)



32

SIGNATURE VERIFICATION DEMO STANDARD WORK DOCUMENT

Arizona County Election Operations | November 3, 2020 | Page 10

33

PHYSICAL REVIEW OF PACKETS & SIGNATURES

- No signature
- Preliminary questionable signature
- Need Packets
- Household Exchange
- Deceased

34

SIGNATURE VERIFICATION

Curing


The County has a standardized process for contacting voters to notify them of questionable signatures and unsigned affidavit envelopes.

Questionable Signature

- Deadline is November 15 (5:00 PM)
- Voter must provide information to verify their identity and confirm they signed the affidavit envelope
- Cured signatures are stamped with "Verified and Approved NCTEC" stamp
- Uncured packets will remain sealed and reported on the canvass as a bad signature (reject)

No Signature

- Deadline is Election night at 7:00 PM
- Voter must provide signature on the affidavit envelope or vote in person
- Uncured packets will remain sealed and reported on the canvass as a no signature (reject)



35

TXT2CURE

ALABAMA COUNTY
Elections Department

2022 General Election
Voter Signature Affidavit
Please follow these steps to complete a Signature Affidavit by 5:00 PM November 15, 2022.

Enter First Name:

Enter Last Name:

Enter Date of Birth:


Enter Phone Number:

MAQUOKETA COUNTY
Elections Department

2022 General Election
Voter Signature Affidavit


☒ Yes, I signed and returned my ballot.

☐ No, I did not sign or return my ballot.




PLEASE NOTIFY YOUR SERVICE PROVIDER


36



37



38



39

VOTER CONTACT LABEL & STAMP

Contact label

- ✓ Placed on the signature side with the barcode
- ✓ Do not cover signatures or notes from the voter
- ✓ One label per contact
- ✓ Label only when action has been completed
- ✓ RED PEN ONLY
- ✓ Verified & approved stamp
- ✓ Contact signature

40

AUDITING


Audit trail is completed to capture all activity on a pad/st

41


POLITICAL OBSERVERS

- ✓ Political observer per room (signature verification, ballot processing and ballot tabulation center)
- ✓ All questions are directed to the ambassadors


42



43



44



45

"Verified and Approved
MCTEC" Stamp

Good
✓
Good

46

Mark, such as an X (Not on
Historical Record being
Compared) with a "Verified
and Approved MCTEC"
Stamp

X

Good
✓
Good

47

No Signature

Exception
✓
Exception

48

Signature Cannot be Verified
with the Historical Record being
Compared

Phil the Baller

Exception

Exception

49

Part of the Signature Missing
Not on Historical Record being
Compared)

Phil

Exception

Exception

50


Printed Name (Not on Historical
Record being Compared)

Phil the Baller


Exception

Exception


51




52




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
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
55




56




57



58



59



60

The Name Printed on the Affidavit does not Match the Signature or Historical Record



Exception
to system

61



[illegible]

62

"Unable to Sign due to
Disability" (not on the historical
record)

Exception
SECURITY


 

63

RECAP



- FUNDAMENTALS
- ANATOMY OF THE EARLY VOTING PACKET
- REVIEW CHARACTERISTICS
 - ✓ Broad and local
- COMPUTER SYSTEM-Early Voting Return (EVR)
- ✓ Rules & Navigation
- CUBING
 - ✓ verified
 - ✓ Not verified
 - ✓ Investigations
- VOTER CONTACT LABEL
- AUDITING
- SCENARIOS

64



QUESTIONS?

Celia Nabor
Assistant Director of Early Voting
Maricopa County Elections Department



[@MaricopaRecorder](#)

65



MARICOPA COUNTY

Elections Department



Signature Verification Script-General Election 2022

LEAVING A VOICE MESSAGE

Hello, this message is for *(Voter's Full Name)*, this is *(staff first name)*, I am calling from Maricopa County Elections about the ballot and green envelope we received from you. Unfortunately, we cannot verify your signature. In order for us to count your ballot, you must contact us directly to verify your signature. Please call us back at (602) 506-1511, Monday-Friday 8AM-5PM. Again that phone number is (602) 506-1511. It is important we hear back from you by Wednesday, November 16, 5PM (Arizona time). Thank you.

SPEAKING TO VOTER

Hello, this is *(staff first name)* calling from Maricopa County Elections about your ballot for the General Election. May I speak with *(voter's full name)*. During our signature verification process we were unable to verify the signature on your green envelope. In order for us to count your ballot, we must first have you verify your full name, residential address and receive confirmation you did or did not sign the green envelope.

- Voter confirms **YES**.

Thank you for your time. I will update the status and your ballot will be processed.

- Voter responds **NO**

I will immediately escalate this to the supervisor for review. What is the best phone number for us to contact you *(write on voter contact label)*? You still have time to vote in person. Would you like the website to find a site?

Provide website Locations.Maricopa.Vote

- Voter doesn't want to provide information on the phone

Can I provide you information for our TXT2Cure app or our call center? If you have a pen and paper, I can provide you with the information.

- **TXT2Cure-** Text the word "Maricopa" to 28683. Click on the link you receive and follow the instructions on the screens. You must provide a photo of your government issued ID.

- **Call Center-**The number is (602) 506-1511. Staff will answer the line Monday-Friday 8AM-5PM. The deadline to cure your signature is Wednesday, November 16, 5PM (Arizona time).

- Voter wants to know more about why they are getting called.

We have a team that reviewed the signature on your green envelope and compared it to historical signatures we have on file. The signatures did not have similar characteristics. We are required to contact voters to verify you signed the envelope.



MARICOPA COUNTY

Elections Department



NO SIGNATURE SCRIPT

LEAVING A VOICE MESSAGE-(Beginning November 2, 2022)

Hello this message is for (Voter's Full Name), this is (staff first name), I am calling from Maricopa County Elections about your ballot and green envelope we received from you. Unfortunately, the affidavit was not signed. We are not able to process the ballot without your signature. You may vote in person at a vote center by November 8 at 7PM. Visit Locations.Maricopa.Vote to find a location near you. Again that is Locations.Maricopa.Vote. If you have questions, please call us back at (602) 506-1511.

SPEAKING TO VOTER

Good morning, may I speak with (voter's first name), my name is (Staff first name). I am calling from Maricopa County Elections about your ballot and green envelope we received from you. Unfortunately, the affidavit was not signed. We are not able to process the ballot without your signature. If you have a pen and paper, I can share what the options are for resolving this by Election Day, November 8th 7PM.

OPTION 1:

You can vote in person at a vote center. Can I provide you the website to find a location near you?

- The website is Locations.Maricopa.Vote
- You will need to bring your photo ID to vote in person.

OPTION 2:

If you are not able to vote in person, you can make an appointment with us to sign your original packet.

- What day and time would you like to schedule an appointment?
- The address is 510 S. 3rd Ave, Phoenix 85003 (Lincoln and 3rd Ave)
- Please park in spot #46 it is marked with a white and Orange MCED sign. When you arrive call (480) 492-3087.
- You will need to bring your photo ID.

DATES	HOURS
Wednesday, November 2	8:30AM-5:00PM
Thursday, November 3	8:30AM-5:00PM
Friday, November 4	8:30AM-5:00PM
Monday, November 7	8:30AM-5:00PM
Tuesday, November 8	8:00AM-7:00PM

VOTER CONTACT LABEL GUIDE

Label	Definition	Description
LS	Letter Sent	Action selected when the EV staff send the signature verification letter to the voter.
LM	Left message	Action selected when the EV staff leave a voice message on an automated voicemail for the voter to hear later or left message with another person. Only a voter can cure their own signature.
PD	Phone Disconnected	Action selected when the EV staff attempt to call the voter using the number on the affidavit or voter file and it is disconnected/not in working order.
WN	Wrong Number	Action selected when the EV staff attempt to call the voter using the number on the affidavit or voter file and the individual answering indicates it is the wrong phone number.
NA	Not Answered	Action selected when the EV staff attempt to call the voter using the number on the affidavit or voter file and the line is not answered, does not have a voice message set up, or the voice mail box is full.
EM	Email	Action selected when the EV staff attempt to contact the voter using an email on their voter file.
NCI	No Contact Information	Action selected when the EV staff reviewed the voter's file and there is no contact information for them.
NVS	Not Voter's Signature	Action selected when the voter indicates they did not sign the packet for the election. This requires immediate notification to supervisor.
WV	Won't Verify	Action selected when staff reach the voter, but the voter does not verify the signature. Examples include the voter is unable to talk at that time, voter refuses to verify the signature or voter indicates they will call back.
VNA	Voter Not Available	Action selected when the EV staff attempt to call the voter using the number on the affidavit or voter file and the individual indicates the voter is not available to verify the signature (i.e., in the hospital for extended stay and will not be reachable before deadline).
SR	Shell Review	Action selected when the staff review history of voter signatures
VER	Verified	Action selected when the voter verifies their signature

Voter Contact Label Example

ACTIONS (CIRCLE)

LS, LM, PD, WN, NA, EM, NCI

NVS, WV, VNA, SR, VER

DATE:

Electronic Adjudication Board Procedures




The electronic adjudications board's role is to review and process specific ballots and votes when our central count scanners cannot determine a voter's intent because the ballot may have incomplete ovals, marginal marks (e.g., ambiguous mark), over votes, corrected or crossed-out votes, or unfilled ovals.

SECTION A – ELECTION BOARD PROCEDURES

1. Attend electronic adjudication training prior to performing any adjudication tasks.
2. For each shift, sign an attendance log identifying your assigned adjudication station and the timeframe you were performing adjudication tasks while logged into the station.
3. Participate as a member of a bi-partisan adjudication board as assigned by the Maricopa County Ballot Tabulation Center's Adjudication Manager. The board consists of 2 judges and an inspector.
 - Judges' Role - As a Democrat and Republican, their role is to use an electronic adjudication workstation (computer) to adjudicate each contest the system presents for review.
 - Inspector's Role - The inspector oversees multiple boards providing guidance and serves as a tiebreaker if the judges cannot agree on how a mark should be voted.
4. For questions, raise your hand to alert the inspector or adjudication manager that you need assistance.
5. As a board, log-into the adjudication computer terminal with a unique log-in ID and password
6. Open the adjudication application. The application will automatically present users with ballot contests that need to be adjudicated.
7. On a paper log, write down the candidate's last name or for a measure, the "Yes", "No", "For" or "Against" that was accepted or removed for each adjudication action reviewed. (Note: If a true over vote, do not write the candidate's last name)
8. Sign the Dominion System generated log at each break and at the end of your shift to verify: (1) the Board's name reflects the work station you are logged into; (2) The start and end date/time are accurately listed; (3) The log of adjudicated actions is complete and accurate.

SECTION B – HOW TO PERFORM ELECTRONIC ADJUDICATION: The board will be automatically presented with a specific contest(s) on a ballot that needs to be reviewed. As shown below, the system uses an overlay to identify the contest(s) that need to be reviewed by placing a red box around the contest(s) in question.

Table B.1 - Electronic Adjudication System Overlay(s)

Contests Outlined in Red	Contests Highlighted Green	Contests Highlighted Yellow
 <p>Contest with a red box require the adjudication board's review</p>	 <p>Marks with a green highlight were counted by the system</p>	 <p>Marks with a yellow highlight were not counted by the system</p>

System Overlay – To clearly view the marks on the ballot, the adjudication board will need to remove the overlay by clicking on the Show/Hide toggle button on the top right corner.


Electronic Adjudication Board Procedures

SECTION C – COMMON ISSUES REQUIRING ELECTRONIC ADJUDICATION TO DETERMINE VOTER INTENT


C.1 MARGINAL (AMBIGUOUS) MARKS: Marks (e.g., smudges, pen rests, small marks, and bleed through) that are highlighted in yellow by the system's overlay are considered "ambiguous" and have not been counted. **To resolve this issue:**

1. Remove the overlay by clicking "Hide" to get a clearer view of the mark to determine if it is intentional.
 - a. If the board agrees that the voter intended to make a mark and vote for a given candidate or measure, reapply the overlay by clicking "Show". Click on the target area to add the vote to the system. At the top of the screen you will see "Vote added for choice *candidate name*".
 - b. If the board cannot agree or agrees that the voter did not intend to make a mark, do not click on the mark. Proceed to step 2 to ensure the vote is not counted by the system.
2. Click "Continue" to proceed to the next contest.

Table C.1 - Examples of Ambiguous Marks



The above photos (smudge – left, bleed through - middle, and extraneous marks - right) will likely be presented to the board with yellow highlights. These would not constitute a mark that should be counted as a vote.



The above photos (partial mark – left and check mark – middle) may be presented to the board with yellow or green highlights. Depending on how other contests on the ballot were voted, these types of situations may need to be resolved to add a vote for the candidate.

Electronic Adjudication Board Procedures

C.2 CORRECTED OR CROSSED OUT MARK: If a voter has filled in or marked an oval, but crosses out the mark or indicates the mark is in error, the ballot must be reviewed to determine voter intent. This situation may be highlighted yellow or green. **To resolve this issue:**

C.2.A For Items highlighted in Yellow:

1. Remove the overlay by clicking SHOW/HIDE to determine if the voter corrected their choice.
 - a. If the board agrees that the voter corrected their vote and can determine the candidate that the voter intended to select, reapply the overlay by clicking SHOW/HIDE. Click on the target area to add the vote to the system. At the top of the screen you will see "Vote added for choice *candidate name*".
 - b. If the voter's intent is not clear or if board cannot agree, do not click on the mark. Proceed to step 2 to ensure the vote is not counted by the system.
2. Click CONTINUE to proceed to the next contest.

C.2.B For items highlighted in Green:

1. Remove the overlay by clicking HIDE to determine if the voter corrected their choice.
 - a. If the board agrees the voter corrected their vote and can determine that one or more candidates were NOT intended to be selected by the voter, reapply the overlay by clicking SHOW. Click on the oval for the candidate that has the incorrect vote (e.g., crossed-out vote). At the top of the screen you will see "Vote removed for choice *candidate name*".
 - b. For the candidate the board determines that the vote should be counted, do not click the mark. Proceed to step 2 to ensure the vote is counted by the system.
 - c. If the voter's intent is not clear or the board cannot agree that the voter corrected their vote. Proceed to step 2 to ensure the vote is not counted for any candidate by the system in this contest. Note: This will be recorded as an over vote by the system.
2. Click CONTINUE to proceed to the next contest.

Table C.2 - Examples of Corrected Votes

Mary Bailey Educator Educatore <i>Yes → •</i>	Howard Hughes Aerospace Engineer Ingeniero Aeroespacial <i>•</i>	Mary Bailey Educator Educatore <i>This one ← •</i>
Kent Brockman News Anchor Presentador de Noticias <i>○</i>	Charles Lindbergh Explorer Explorador <i>→ X</i>	Kent Brockman News Anchor Presentador de Noticias <i>MMT → •</i>
Roy Snyder Judge of the Supreme Court Juez de la Corte Suprema <i>No → X</i>	Write In Por Escrito <i>○</i>	

The above photos will be presented to the board with a green highlight (indicating an overvote). Depending on how other contests on the ballot were voted, these types of situations may need to be resolved to remove a vote for the candidate that is crossed-out.

Electronic Adjudication Board Procedures

C.3 OVALS NOT FILLED – If a voter has consistently marked their ballot by circling their choices, pointing to an arrow, marking a checkmark, or some other way of making their choice, the system will not count these votes if they missed the oval or only partially filled the oval. These situation may be highlighted yellow or green depending on how much of the oval was filled in by the voter's mark.
















C.3.A For items highlighted in Yellow:

1. Remove the overlay by clicking SHOW/HIDE to determine if the voter made their choice but did not fill in the oval.
 - a. If the board agrees the voter made a choice and can determine the candidate the voter intended to select, reapply the overlay by clicking SHOW/HIDE. Click on the target area to add the vote to the system. At the top of the screen you will see "Vote added for choice *candidate name*".
 - b. If the board cannot agree or agrees that the voter did not make a selection, do not click on the mark. Proceed to step 2 to ensure the vote is not counted by the system.
2. Click CONTINUE to proceed to the next contest.

C.3.B For items highlighted in Green:

1. Remove the overlay by clicking HIDE to determine if the voter corrected their choice.
 - a. If the board agrees the voter intended to vote for this candidate, reapply the overlay by clicking SHOW. Proceed to step 2 to ensure the vote is counted by the system.
 - b. Click on the target area to remove the vote from the system.
 - c. If the board cannot agree or agrees that the voter did intend to vote for this candidate, click on the mark to remove the vote. At the top of the screen you will see "Vote removed for choice *candidate name*".
2. Click CONTINUE to proceed to the next contest.

Table C.3 - Examples of Ovals Not Filled-In

Governor Gobernador					
Amelia Earhart Pilot Píloto	Vote for One Vote por Uno	Vote for One Vote por Uno	Vote for One Vote por Uno	Vote for One Vote por Uno	Vote for One Vote por Uno
Howard Hughes Aerospace Engineer Ingeniero Aeroespacial					
					
					

The above photos above will be presented to the board with either a yellow or green highlight. Depending on how other contests on the ballot were voted, these types of situations may need to be resolved to add a vote for the candidate that is crossed-out.

Electronic Adjudication Board Procedures

C.4 BLANK BALLOT – If presented with a ballot that is entirely blank, remove the overlay and zoom out to determine if the ballot has any intentional marks. If so, click continue to accept the ballot as blank and move to the next ballot. If the ballot is not blank, and the voter used another method of marking their choices, see “C.3 OVALS NOT FILLED” above.

C.5 VOTED FOR MORE THAN ALLOWED (OVER VOTES) – If a voter has made selections for more than the office allows, this is an overvote. These situation may be high-lighted yellow or green depending on how much of the oval was filled by the voters mark. Remove the overlay to determine if there are more intentional selections made than the contest allows. If so, accept the mark by clicking continue to move to the next contest.

Table C.5 Example of an Over Vote

Supervisor, District 1
Supervisor, Distrito 1

Vote for One
Vote por Uno

Alfred Hitchcock
Film Director
Director de Cine

Vincent Price
Actor / Writer / Gourmet
Actor / Escritor / Gastrónomo

The above photos above represents an overvote and would be presented to the board with either a yellow or green highlight depending on how much of each oval are filled in. Since this contest is a “vote for one” it is not possible to determine the voter’s intent. These types of situations may need to be resolved by leaving the votes as-is to be counted as an overvote. Neither candidate will be awarded a vote.

Electronic Adjudication Board Procedures

SECTION D - REVIEWING THE ENTIRE BALLOT TO DETERMINE VOTER INTENT: It may be necessary for a board to view an entire ballot to determine voter intent. The following ballot provides a good example of ballot that may need to be reviewed in its entirety. If the board only reviews the single contest (image D1), they may not realize the voter is voting all contests with a squigly line. However, if the board views the entire ballot (image D2) this squigly line voting pattern can be observed.






Image D2



The following example (Image D3) shows a voter that is consistently filling in only the lower right section of the oval. If the adjudication board only looks at a single contest, they may not realize that the voter is voting all contests in this manner.

Image D3



Electronic Adjudication Board Procedures

The following example (Image D4) shows a voter that is consistently circling the oval rather than filling each oval. If the adjudication board only looks at a one single contest, they may not realize that the voter is voting all contests in this manner.

Image D4

Governor Gobernador		Mayor of Central City Alcalde de Ciudad Central		County Unified School District Distrito Escolar Unificado del Condado	
Vote for One Vote por Uno		Vote for One Vote por Uno		Governing Board Member Miembro de la Junta Directiva	
Amelia Earhart Pilot Piloto	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	Mary Bailey Educator Educatora	<input type="radio"/>	Vote for Three Vote por Tres	
Howard Hughes Aerospace Engineer Ingeniero Aeroespacial	<input type="radio"/>	Kent Brockman News Anchor Presentador de Noticias	<input type="radio"/>	Thomas Edison inventor / Entrepreneur inventor / Empresario	
Charles Lindbergh Explorer Explorador	<input type="radio"/>	Roy Snyder Judge of the Superior Court Juez de la Corte Suprema	<input type="radio"/>	Albert Einstein Theoretical Physicist Físico Teórico	
Write-In Por Escrito	<input type="radio"/>	Patty Bouvier DMV Administrator Administrador del DMV	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	Nikola Tesla Engineer / Inventor Ingeniero / Inventor	
Supervisor District 1 Supervisor Distrito 1		Write-In Por Escrito	<input type="radio"/>	Carl Sagan Astrophysicist Astrofísico	
Vote for One Vote por Uno				James Watt Mechanical Engineer Ingeniero Mecánico	
Ansel Adams Photographer / Environmentalist Fotógrafo / Ecologista	<input type="radio"/>			Write-In Por Escrito	
Irving Penn Photographer Fotógrafo	<input checked="" type="radio"/>			Write-In Por Escrito	
Edward Weston Photographer / Author Fotógrafo / Autor	<input type="radio"/>			Write-In Por Escrito	

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Vote for One

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input type="radio"/>



Overvote

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input checked="" type="radio"/>



Undervote

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input type="radio"/>



Vote for Two

Councilmembers At-Large Concejales en General (Vote for Two / Vote por Dos)	
Robin Kniech	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Jose G. Silva	<input type="radio"/>
Jeffery Washington	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Deborah "Debbie" Ortega	<input type="radio"/>
Kayvan Khalatbari	<input type="radio"/>



Overvote – Vote for Two

Councilmembers At-Large Concejales en General (Vote for Two / Vote por Dos)	
Robin Kniech	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Jose G. Silva	<input type="radio"/>
Jeffery Washington	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Deborah "Debbie" Ortega	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Kayvan Khalatbari	<input type="radio"/>



Undervote – Vote for Two

Councilmembers At-Large Concejales en General (Vote for Two / Vote por Dos)	
Robin Kniech	<input type="radio"/>
Jose G. Silva	<input type="radio"/>
Jeffery Washington	<input type="radio"/>
Deborah "Debbie" Ortega	<input type="radio"/>
Kayvan Khalatbari	<input type="radio"/>



Ambiguous Marks

Incomplete Mark

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input type="radio"/>



If this is the only mark on the ballot, or the voter consistently used similar marks in all contests, then these votes should be accepted and counted.

If the voter was inconsistent in their marks or in other contests properly filled the ovals, then this mark would be ignored.



An ambiguous mark will be displayed with a yellow overlay and the contest will have a red box around it. This indicates that while a mark was seen, it was not sufficient for the system to count it automatically and the board needs to review it. Only take action if the board determines a change is needed so that the vote will be accepted.

Hesitation Mark

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input type="radio"/>



In some cases, the voter may rest their pen in an oval while considering the option but then fill a different oval. In this case no action is necessary since the ambiguous mark is not being counted.

Stray Mark Examples – Entering Target Area

Causing an Ambiguous Mark

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input type="radio"/>



If the stray mark barely goes through the oval, the system may detect it as an ambiguous mark, the contest will have a red outline and the candidate will be highlighted in yellow. If the board agrees this is an accidental mark, then no action is necessary since ambiguous marks are not counted.

Causing a Vote Counted

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input checked="" type="radio"/>



If the stray mark fills enough of the oval, the system may record it as a vote cast. If the board agrees this was an accidental mark and it is not consistent with the voter's other marks, then the board should remove the vote by clicking the oval.

Wide Mark

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input checked="" type="radio"/>



Occasionally, a voter's mark for one candidate will stray into another oval. If this results in an ambiguous mark being shown, then no action is needed since ambiguous marks highlighted in yellow are not counted.



- Accept



- Reject



- See Note



- Do Nothing



ADJUDICATION QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE

Corrected Vote Examples

Sometimes a voter will make a mistake or change their mind while voting the ballot and will add marks to the ballot in a way to show their intent. When the adjudication board agree that a voter clearly intended for a mark to not be counted, they will click the oval and remove the unintended vote.

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno) Joan Poston ● Debra A. Johnson ●	X	Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno) Joan Poston- ● Debra A. Johnson ●	X	Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno) <i>Take One</i> → Joan Poston ● Debra A. Johnson ●	X
Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno) NO Joan Poston ● YES Debra A. Johnson ●	X	Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno) (Joan Poston) ● Debra A. Johnson ●	X		

Written Notes in Target Area

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno) HAVE THEM ALL!! Joan Poston ○ Debra A. Johnson ○	X	Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno) Joan Poston NO Debra A. Johnson ○	X	Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno) Joan Poston NO Debra A. Johnson YES	X
--	---	--	---	--	---

Even though the contest does not have a red border, if the board sees an issue where the voter wrote a note that accidentally filled an oval enough that it was counted, then the board should remove the vote.

In this case, the voter wrote a note indicating they do not want to vote for a candidate, but did it in a way that filled an oval. If the board sees this, they should remove the vote.

The voter wrote a note for both candidates indicating which one they wanted and which one they did not want. This resulted in an overvoted contest. The board should remove the vote for the candidate marked with "NO".



- Accept



- Reject



- See Note



- Do Nothing



ADJUDICATION QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE

Consistent Pattern Examples

The board may be presented with a ballot that the system interpreted as being "unvoted" or "blank" because the voter did not properly fill the ovals, but the voter did mark the candidates with an identifiable and consistent pattern showing their intent. The board should accept the votes for these candidates. The board should also pay attention to how the voter regularly marks the candidates to ensure their form of marking is counted correctly.

Mayor Alcalde (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Sekú <input type="radio"/>	✓
Paul Noël Fiorino <input type="radio"/>	
Michael B. Hancock <input type="radio"/>	
Marcus Giavanni <input type="radio"/>	
Auditor Auditor (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Timothy M. O'Brien <input type="radio"/>	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Chris Nevitt <input type="radio"/>	✓
Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston <input type="radio"/>	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Debra A. Johnson <input type="radio"/>	✓

The "X" next to the name can be identified as the voter's intended choice.

Mayor Alcalde (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Sekú <input type="radio"/>	
Paul Noël Fiorino <input type="radio"/>	
<u>Michael B. Hancock</u> <input type="radio"/>	✓
Marcus Giavanni <input type="radio"/>	
Auditor Auditor (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
<u>Timothy M. O'Brien</u> <input type="radio"/>	✓
Chris Nevitt <input type="radio"/>	
Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
<u>Joan Poston</u> <input type="radio"/>	✓
Debra A. Johnson <input type="radio"/>	

The circled candidate names can be identified as the voter's intended choice

Mayor Alcalde (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Sekú <input type="radio"/>	
Paul Noël Fiorino <input checked="" type="radio"/>	✓
Michael B. Hancock <input type="radio"/>	
Marcus Giavanni <input type="radio"/>	
Auditor Auditor (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Timothy M. O'Brien <input type="radio"/>	
Chris Nevitt <input checked="" type="radio"/>	✓
Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston <input type="radio"/>	
Debra A. Johnson <input checked="" type="radio"/>	✓

The circled ovals can be identified as the voter's intended choice.

Mayor Alcalde (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Sekú <input type="radio"/>	
Paul Noël Fiorino <input checked="" type="radio"/>	⊗
Michael B. Hancock <input type="radio"/>	
Marcus Giavanni <input type="radio"/>	
Auditor Auditor (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Timothy M. O'Brien <input checked="" type="radio"/>	✓
Chris Nevitt <input type="radio"/>	
Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston <input type="radio"/>	
Debra A. Johnson <input checked="" type="radio"/>	⊗



The voter is consistently voting with an "X", but in one contest missed most of the oval and the system recorded it as an ambiguous mark. The board should accept the vote for the candidate with the ambiguous mark.

Mayor Alcalde (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Sekú <input type="radio"/>	
Paul Noël Fiorino <input type="radio"/>	
Michael B. Hancock <input checked="" type="radio"/>	⊗
Marcus Giavanni <input type="radio"/>	
Auditor Auditor (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Timothy M. O'Brien <input checked="" type="radio"/>	⊗
Chris Nevitt <input type="radio"/>	
Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston <input type="radio"/>	
Debra A. Johnson <input checked="" type="radio"/>	✓

The voter is consistently voting with a check mark but missed the oval on one candidate and only an ambiguous mark was recorded. The board should accept the vote.

Mayor Alcalde (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Sekú <input checked="" type="radio"/>	⊗
Paul Noël Fiorino <input checked="" type="radio"/>	X
Michael B. Hancock <input checked="" type="radio"/>	X
Marcus Giavanni <input checked="" type="radio"/>	X
Auditor Auditor (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Timothy M. O'Brien <input checked="" type="radio"/>	X
Chris Nevitt <input checked="" type="radio"/>	⊗
Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston <input checked="" type="radio"/>	⊗
Debra A. Johnson <input checked="" type="radio"/>	X

In this case, the voter is filling the oval correctly for the candidate they want but is crossing out all the candidates they do not want. The board should remove the votes for the candidates where the oval was crossed out.



ADJUDICATION QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE

Inconsistent Pattern Examples

If the voter made inconsistent marks near the candidate name and the board cannot determine a pattern clearly showing the voter's intent, then no action should be taken.

Mayor Alcalde (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Sekú	<input type="radio"/>
Paul Noël Fiorino	<input type="radio"/>
Michael B. Hancock	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Marcus Giavanni	<input type="radio"/>
Auditor Auditor (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Timothy M. O'Brien	<input type="radio"/>
Chris Nevitt	<input type="radio"/>
Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input type="radio"/>

The voter used a mix of an "X" in some ovals and circled names in other contests. Because of this inconsistent pattern, the board should take no action.

Mayor Alcalde (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Sekú	<input type="radio"/>
Paul Noël Fiorino	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Michael B. Hancock	<input type="radio"/>
Marcus Giavanni	<input type="radio"/>
Auditor Auditor (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Timothy M. O'Brien	<input type="radio"/>
Chris Nevitt	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input checked="" type="radio"/>

While check marks were always used, they were not consistently used in the oval or to the left of the name, so the board should take no action.

Mayor Alcalde (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Sekú	<input type="radio"/>
Paul Noël Fiorino	<input type="radio"/>
Michael B. Hancock	<input type="radio"/>
Marcus Giavanni	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Auditor Auditor (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Timothy M. O'Brien	<input type="radio"/>
Chris Nevitt	<input type="radio"/>
Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input type="radio"/>

A mix of check marks and circled names makes the voter's intent unclear and the board should take no action.



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Write-in Examples

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input type="radio"/>
(Write in / Por escrito)	John Doe <input checked="" type="radio"/>

A write-in position that is marked correctly with a contest outlined in red indicates that a qualified write-in exists. The write-in position must be resolved to either a qualified write-in candidate (if one exists with a matching name) or to a "Not Qualified" record.

Auditor Auditor (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Timothy M. O'Brien	<input type="radio"/>
Chris Nevitt	<input type="radio"/>
(Write in / Por escrito)	John Doe <input checked="" type="radio"/>

A write-in position that is marked correctly with a contest that is **not outlined in red** indicates that there is no qualified write-in. Regardless of what is entered on the write-in line, no action is required in this situation.

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input type="radio"/>
(Write in / Por escrito)	<input checked="" type="radio"/>

If the contest is outlined in red and the voter filled in the oval on a write-in line but did not enter a candidate name, then resolve the write-in to a "Not Qualified" record.

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input type="radio"/>
(Write in / Por escrito)	John Doe <input type="radio"/>

A write-in position with a name written-in but without a filled oval or some other sort of voter intent consistent with other votes on the ballot is not counted. **No action is allowed**, even if the name entered is known to be a qualified name.

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input type="radio"/>
(Write in / Por escrito)	John Doe <input checked="" type="radio"/>

A write-in position with a name written-in and without a filled oval but with some other intent consistent with other votes on the ballot **may** need resolved. Click the oval so that the write-in resolution screen appears and look to see if any names exist in the qualified write-in drop-down. If there are names, then either resolve to the matching name or to "Not Qualified". If there are no names in the qualified write-in list, then use the "X" in the corner of the screen to close it and take no further action.

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input type="radio"/>
(Write in / Por escrito)	D. Duck <input checked="" type="radio"/>

If the contest is outlined in red and the voter filled in the oval on a write-in line and entered an obviously made up name like "Donald Duck" or "Mickey Mouse" then resolve the write-in to a "Not Qualified" record.

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input type="radio"/>
(Write in / Por escrito)	D. Duck <input type="radio"/>

If the voter marked a regular candidate and also entered a name on the write-in line but did not fill in the oval or provide some other sort of voter intent consistent with other votes on the ballot, then the write-in line is ignored and no action is taken.

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
(Write in / Por escrito)	John Doe <input checked="" type="radio"/>

If the voter clearly overvoted the contest and it includes a vote on the write-in line and there is no clear voter intent to remove one of the votes then no action is necessary. The contest should be left overvoted and there is no need to resolve the write-in.
Note: There is one exception, and that is if the name written-in is the same name as the other regular candidate that was voted for. If so, then refer to the example below.

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input type="radio"/>
(Write in / Por escrito)	D. Duck <input checked="" type="radio"/>

If the voter clearly overvoted the contest and it includes a vote on the write-in line and there is no clear voter intent to remove one of the votes then no action is necessary. The contest would be left overvoted and there is no need to resolve the write-in. Even if the name written-in is obviously made up, **no action is allowed**.
Note: There is one exception, and that is if the name written-in is the same name as the other regular candidate that was voted for. If so, then refer to the example below.



- Accept



- Reject



- See Note



- Do Nothing



ADJUDICATION QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Write in (Escriba)	

If the voter clearly overvoted the contest and it includes an oval marked on the write-in line and there is no clear voter intent to remove one of the votes and the write-in line has no name written-in, then **no action is allowed**. The contest must be left overvoted.



Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input type="radio"/>
Write in (Escriba)	

A write-in position that is marked correctly with a contest outlined in red where the name was filled in but then crossed out should be resolved to a "Not Qualified" record even if the written name matches one of the qualified write-in names.



It's up to the two board member judges, with the assistance of the inspector, to determine when a written name matches one of the qualified write-ins. An exact name is not required. State statute provides the following guide: "Any abbreviation, misspelling, common nickname, or other minor variation in the name of a candidate" is allowed when determining the intent of the voter. Note: The oval must also be completed or some other mark showing intent that is consistent with other votes on the ballot, for the write-in to be counted.

In all the write-in examples above, the only options covered were either to leave the write-in unchanged or resolving them to a qualified name or "Not Qualified". The other possible option for the write-in is to "reject" it. Rejecting a write-in removes the vote completely and is only allowed in the following very limited situations.

Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input type="radio"/>
Write in (Escriba)	

If the voter marked a regular candidate and also entered that same candidate's name on the write-in line and marked that oval then the state procedures allow us to reject the vote on the write-in line and allow the regular vote to be counted. The write-in should be "rejected" and the "Remove Overvote" reason should be selected.



Clerk and Recorder Secretario y Registrador (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Joan Poston	<input type="radio"/>
Debra A. Johnson	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Write in (Escriba)	

If the voter overvoted the contest but clearly included voter intent indicating that they do not want the write-in to be counted, then the write-in should be "rejected" and the "Remove Overvote" reason should be selected.



Auditor Auditor (Vote for One / Vote por Uno)	
Timothy M. O'Brien	<input type="radio"/>
Chris Nevitt	<input type="radio"/>
Write in (Escriba)	

If the ballot contains a stray mark of some kind that passes through the oval and the vote was counted (the line is highlighted in green), then the write-in should be "rejected" and the "Stray Mark" reason should be selected.



- Accept



- Reject



- See Note



- Do Nothing








MARICOPA COUNTY

Elections Department



ELECTRONIC ADJUDICATION BOARD DAILY QUICK REFERENCE




<p>1. Before you begin, make sure you have the following supplies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a. Red Pen. (No other color ink is allowed in the BTC)b. Paper Adjudication Logs. (you may want to have several sheets.)c. Adjudication Abbreviation List.	
<p>2. At the start of each shift, once both members of the adjudication board are present, sign the attendance log identifying your assigned adjudication station and the start time you began performing adjudication tasks while logged into the station.</p> <p>This Log is located in a sheet protector hanging on the plexiglass divider on the left hand side of your station.</p>	
<p>3. As a board, log-into the adjudication computer terminal with a unique log-in ID and password.</p>	
<p>4. Open the adjudication application.</p>	



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<p>1. The application will automatically present you with ballot contests that need to be adjudicated.</p>		
<p>2. Follow procedures in the Adjudication training as you proceed. If you have any questions refer to the Adjudication Quick Reference Guide, the hand out from training or ask an inspector / manager for assistance.</p>		
<p>3. As you work, fill out the paper log with the contest, and action taken (mark removed, accepted) for each adjudication action reviewed. Please refer to the Adjudication Abbreviation List for abbreviations of offices, localities, etc.</p>		




MARICOPA COUNTY

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4. At each break and at the end of your shift compare your handwritten paper log to the printed Dominion System Generated log to verify: (1) the Board's name reflects the work station you are logged into; (2) The start and end date/time are accurately listed; (3) The log of adjudicated actions is complete and accurate. When the check is completed, each board member will sign the log and have an inspector sign it as well.

If there are discrepancies between the Board's Log and the Dominion Log: mark those contests, then complete going through the log. Once you have finished, go back to the contest with a discrepancy and work with Adjudication Managers to resolve the issue before signing the Printed Log.

5. Before you leave for break or at the end of your shift, be sure to note the end time on the attendance log at your station.




1

RESEARCHING A VOTER

SEARCHING

1. Double click on the VMNE subsystem. Click on the VM07 button to open the inquiry screen
2. Click on the Inquire By drop down arrow scroll to select the appropriate field based on what is provided on the affidavit



Inquire By:

2

RESEARCHING A VOTER


SEARCHING

✓m07

3. Enter the voter's last name and first name, select the Open button on the task bar.

VM07 - (Address - Affidavit - Driver License - Name - Predict - Social Security - Voter ID - State ID - Email - Phone Number Inquiry)

File	Grid	Print	Window
Open	Clear	Select	VM08
ID Card	Image	Up	Down
Scroll	Print Screen	Print ID Card	Print Harass ID
Exit			

Inquire By: Name  Transfer Results Page 0 of 0 Show All Affidavits For Selected Voter


Last Name: VOTER First Name: TEST Middle Name: DOB:

3

RESEARCHING A VOTER

SEARCHING

3. You may use an asterisk (*) to replace a single letter, number, or series of characters. Ex: "JOHN*" may return "JOHN, JOHNS, JOHNSEN, JOHNSON, JOHNSONN, ETC"
4. There may be more results on the next page. Click on the Up and Down arrows to review more results



4

RESEARCHING A VOTER COMPARING INFORMATION

5. Once you locate the correct voter, click their name in the results grid.
6. The VMo8 screen opens with additional details on the voter
7. Write the voter ID on the document you are researching if it is not already included. Follow guidance from team lead on location to write the number.

5

REVIEWING VOTER INFORMATION JMO8

VMo8 - Voter Model Inquiry - Vote Information Database - VRA-PROD

File Commands Help

Open Clear Voter Info Affidavit History Print Info Print Page Print Screen VM14 Exit

Voter ID: 3617320

Status: A User ID: Federal: -

Name: State ID: Fed EV Eligibility: N

Phone: Drivers License No:

Residential:

Mailing:

Conversion:

Email Address:

Affidavit: Change Date: 03/18/2021 Receive Type: R Harassment:

DOR: 12/27/2010 Party: PND Pc Date: - PPV: N Expiration Date: -

Bp State: AZ Country: U.S.A. DOB: 05/19/1980 12 yrs. Code Class: Not Harassed

Last 4 SSN: Occupation: 24

Precinct: 0398-IVANHOE CPC: -

City Limits: GI-GILBERT

Con: 5 Leg: 14 Sup: 1 Jp: 16 Sch: 060 HSch: 60

MCCD: 1 Special: V07, Q2215, Q100

Perm EV: Y OPT-OUT: N Alternative Ballot Type: N Active Board Worker: N

6



MARICOPA COUNTY


Elections Department

Maricopa County Elections Department-Early Voting Division-Standard Work-Signature Verification in Early Voting Returns (EVRT) Module

Purpose: This document outlines accessing and navigating the user queue of the EVRT module.


1. Access the Early Voting Returns (VB10) (32) module. This system is referred to as the EVRT system.

- Open the ShortCutsVRAS folder on your desktop
- Double click the EVRT shortcut
- The EVRT system will open, and the screen will appear with a navigation bar



2. Select the 'AFF returns' button

- A pop-up screen will appear allowing you to open a batch



3. Selecting the mode

- The mode includes three options: User, Manager and Audit
- Select the file option at the top of the screen
- Navigate to mode, hover the mouse over the mode
- Select the user mode




MARICOPA COUNTY

Elections Department

4. Open a signature verification batch


- Select the 'New' folder (yellow folder icon)
- Selecting this button will assign a batch of signatures to the user for verification

EV26 - Early Voting Signature Verification | LAPUSER101106 | 10.23.115.54



5. Viewing the batch screens

- The batch screen contains two sections (current affidavit and historical affidavits)
- The larger image includes up to three historical affidavits with a known approved signature in chronological order
- The smaller image is a clipping of the signature on the green affidavit envelope (current election)





MARICOPA COUNTY

Elections Department



6. Verifying the voter

- Review four key (or available) points on the screen to ensure the historical affidavit and the current affidavit belong to the same person.
- Use the check mark method in the following order: preprinted name on the current affidavit envelope (lower left), signature on the current affidavit envelope, signature on the historical affidavit, and name on the historical affidavit.
- If the points do not match, click the exception button at the top
- Be aware of family members in the same household signing the other family members affidavit envelope. This is an exception.

7. Comparing the signatures

- Analyze the broad characteristics, local characteristics, and letterforms
- If a signature on the historical affidavit and the signature on the current affidavit envelope can be verified, click the good button.
- If the signatures cannot be verified click the exception button.
- If the affidavit is not signed by the voter click the exception button.
- Refer to the signature verification job aid for scenarios.
- NOTE: All signatures that cannot be verified at the user level will go through a second level review in the manager queue.




MARICOPA COUNTY
Elections Department

8. Mandatory Review of the batch before ending

- Use the **PREV** and **NEXT** buttons to review signature dispositions. You can change the disposition if necessary BEFORE you complete the batch.
- This review step is critical to ensure the correct disposition was selected.


EV26 - Early Voting Signature Verification | LAPUSER101106 | 10.23.115.54



9. Closing a batch before completing all signatures

- If you cannot complete the full batch of all signatures, review the records you have dispositioned, and select the 'End' folder (Yellow Folder) the close batch. This is critical to ensure batches do not prevent a file from being completed.


EV26 - Early Voting Signature Verification | LAPUSER01106 | 10.23.115.54



10. End the batch after successfully dispositioning all signatures

- Once the review process is complete, select the 'End' folder (Yellow Folder).
- Select the 'New' folder (yellow folder icon) to begin working on another batch.

EV26 - Early Voting Signature Verification | LAPUSER101106 | 10.23.11 5:54



RESEARCH PROCEDURES

I. Purpose

- A. To determine if the affidavit received is for a new registrant, or if the voter record in VRAS needs to be modified (record can have a status of Active (A), Deactive (D), or Restored (R))
- B. To confirm that affidavits that are going to be scanned into VRAS have a residential address that is in Maricopa County, a received date, a source code, and for Modifications, a voter ID and evidence of signature verification.

II. Process

- A. Check all forms for:
 - 1. Address in Maricopa County (use USPS, Assessor Sites, or other resources)
 - a) *If the residential address is not in Maricopa County, make a notation on a Post It that says 'OOC' along with the VOTER ID or 'NR' (not registered) and attach it to the affidavit. Put it on top of the completed research batch along with any other OOC forms.*
 - b) *Queen Creek, Wickenburg, Apache Junction, and others could have addresses in more than one county.*
 - 2. Received Date Stamp is on right edge of form
 - a) *If there is no Received Date, or the Received Date is incorrect, make a notation on a Post It that says, 'Incorrect Received Date' and attach it to the affidavit. Put it on top of the completed research batch along with any other Incorrect Received Dates.*
 - 3. If postmark date is present, it is same as or before received date.
 - a) *If postmark date is incorrect, make a notation on a Post It that says, 'Incorrect Postmark Date' and attach it to the affidavit. Put it on top of completed research batch with any other Incorrect Postmark Dates.*
- B. Using the Source Code Procedures, notate the source code next to each form's affidavit number **ONLY ON OLD REGISTRATION FORMS.**

1. Old Form:

- a) *Alpha Code plus Numerical Code and Affidavit Number*

BOX FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
AREA SÓLO PARA EL USO DE LA OFICINA
G 14 -19 0131022



- b) *Light Tone Numerical Alpha Code Only*


-16 0221988

2. New Form:

RESEARCH PROCEDURES

- a) 2022 forms have Alpha Source Code and Affidavit number only.




C. Using the mouse, click on the Windows icon in bottom Taskbar . Scroll to "VRAS Production" and click. Then scroll to "VMNI- Voter Inquiry System" and click to open. VMNI Task Bar will open on the top of the screen. Click on



VM07 to open inquiry screen from which you will perform Research.

D. To begin Research, click the dropdown menu in the "Inquire By" field and scroll to select the appropriate field based on what is provided on the affidavit. While searching in VM07:

1. You may use an asterisk ("*") to replace a single letter, number, or series of characters. Ex: "JOHN*" may return "JOHN, JOHNS, JOHNSEN, JOHNSON, JOHNSONN, ETC"
2. You may use an asterisk ("*") to replace any spaces or special characters. Ex: "O*BRIEN" may return "O'BRIEN, OBRIEN, O BRIEN, O-BRIEN, ETC"
3. You may use an asterisk ("*") to replace any illegible or uncertain characters. Ex: Here is a name that is challenging to read:  Identify the letters you can see clearly and replace others with an asterisk ("*"). You can enter "A*ND*O" to return possible matches to include ARMANDO, ALEJANDRO, ALEXANDRO, ETC.
4. YOU WILL BE CREATING TWO PILES OF AFFIDVIT FORMS: NEWS (VOTERS THAT ARE NOT FOUND IN THE SYSTEM OR HAVE BEEN CANCELLED), AND MODS (VOTERS THAT ARE FOUND WITH STATUS A, D, OR R.)
5. IF YOU DON'T FIND A VOTER BY ONE INQUIRY CATEGORY, RESEARCH BY THE NEXT CATEGORY.
6. THERE MAY BE MORE RESULTS ON THE NEXT PAGE. CLICK ON UP AND DOWN ARROWS TO VIEW MORE RESULTS.



- a) DRIVER LICENSE NUMBER (DLN): must be valid AZ DLN (any letter plus 8 digits), or full social security number. CANNOT BE DLN FROM OTHER STATE

- b) NAME:

(1) Enter Date of Birth, first or last name, and various combinations of name and DOB,

RESEARCH PROCEDURES

- (2) Allow for:
 - (a) Records or affidavits with spelling variations of their name (Ex: Kelly could be Kellie, Kellee, etc. or Jordan could be Jorden, Jordyn, etc.)
 - (b) Records or affidavits with an abbreviated name or nickname (Ex: James could be Jim, Jimmy, Jamie, etc. William could be Will, Billy, Bill, etc. Joseph could be Joey, Joe, Jo, etc.)

c) **SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER:**

- (1) For best results, research using the last 4 digits of the voter's SSN, along with the first 3 letters of the voter's last name or first name, followed by an asterisk '*'. (Ex: Enter "1234" in the Social Security No. field and "Doe*" in the Last Name field).

d) **RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS:**

- (1) Research using only House No., plus 3-5 letters of the Street Name, plus an asterisk '*'. (Ex: 123 E Main St, Apt 1, 85000 would be researched by entering '123' in House No field and 'MAI*' in the Street Name field, then press 'Enter')
- (2) Numerical Street Names can be accompanied by an asterisk '*'. (Ex: 3rd can be entered as '3*'; 152nd can be entered as '152*')
- (3) If you must narrow your search even more:
 - (a) Enter first 3 letters of voter's Last Name.
 - (b) Enter first 3 letters of voter's First Name.
 - (c) Enter Zip Code.
 - (d) Enter Unit #

e) **MAILING ADDRESS**

f) **PHONE NUMBER**

E. **NEW** – A Voter will be processed as a New Voter **IF**:

1. The voter is not found in VM07, or the voter is found with a Status of C (CANCELLED).
 - a) If the voter is found with a Status of C, and Sign Date is before Cancellation Change Date, make a notation on a Post It that says 'Cancelled after Signing' and place on top of completed research pile.
2. Place affidavit in the pile of NEWS. Group affidavits with attachments together and place on top of the NEWS pile.

F. **MOD**- A Voter will be processed as a Modification or MOD **IF**:

1. The voter is found in VM07 with a Status of A (active), R (restored) or D (de-active).

RESEARCH PROCEDURES

- a) *If your research returns a voter that has a Protected record (most data is REDACTED), make a notation on a Post It that says, 'Address Protected' and attach it to the affidavit. Put it on top of the completed research batch along with any other Address Protected forms.*
 - b) *Check voter data on previous affidavits to verify the voter is the same.*
 - c) *Write the Voter ID # (VID) in the Map Box field (bottom right corner of the affidavit).*
 - d) *Perform SIGNATURE VERIFICATION through VRAS PRODUCTION>VRAS-Shell>Voter Signatures.*
 - (1) *If the signature on the affidavit matches a signature on file, put a ✓ check mark left of the signature box (DO NOT INTERFERE WITH THE VOTER SIGNATURE).*
 - (2) *If the signature is missing, does not match, or is signed by POA, do not put a check mark next to signature.*
 - (3) *If the voter has signed the affidavit in the box for 'Person Assisting', and the signature matches a signature on file, put a checkmark left of the signature*
 - (4) *In case of physical disability, a person who helped complete the form on the registrant's behalf may write the words, "Voter Unable to sign due to disability," in place of voter's signature. Put a ✓ check mark left of the signature box (DO NOT INTERFERE WITH THE VOTER SIGNATURE).*
2. Place affidavit in the pile of MODS. Group affidavits with attachments together and place on top of the MODS pile.
- G. When research is complete, place initials on the back of the forms near the postmark stamps (if present) or upper third of the forms.
- H. IF YOU SEE SOMETHING ODD ON A VOTER REGISTRATION FORM, PLEASE SEEK GUIDANCE FROM YOUR SUPERVISOR. *(Examples: two registrants using a single form, forms that have been crossed out, voters unable to sign yet having no assistance, people using the form to express opinions, etc.)*

8

DECLARATION OF JACQUELINE ONIGKEIT

I, Jacqueline Onigkeit, hereby declare as follows under penalty of perjury:

1. I am over the age of 18 and competent to make this declaration.
2. I am a citizen of the United States and of the State of Arizona.
3. I reside in Phoenix, Arizona.
4. From October 14, 2022, through November 16, 2022, I served as a part-time employee of the County working as a level one signature verification worker. It was my job to, among other things, perform signature verification on ballots.
5. At my location, there were a total of about 24 people reviewing and verifying signatures. We were divided into two rooms. In addition, there was also a night crew of about six to eight people working 3 p.m. until about 7:30 p.m.
6. The process for signature verification of ballots was composed of three levels. Level one was composed of part-time employees of the county who compared an image of the ballot envelope against three images of a signature in the voter file which are normally the three most recent images of voter forms. I performed level 1 review.
7. Ballot signatures at level one review were either approved or rejected; another way to describe rejected ballots was that they were marked "exception."
8. If a ballot signature was rejected, then it was automatically reviewed at level 2. Level 2 signature verification was composed of managers who were longer term part-time employees of the county. Review at level 2 allowed the managers to view the same three images as level 1, but level 2 was also allowed to see additional images of the signatures in the entire voter file and were allowed to zoom in on signature images.

9. There was a level 3 review of signatures as well, but it is unclear whether this third level was simply part of level two or a truly additional level. In any event, I worked at level 1, and it was my clear understanding that functionally, there were three levels of review, and that each of the above levels had the sole ability to reverse a rejection of a ballot signature. Level 2 could reverse level 1. Level 3 could reverse level 1 and/or 2.
10. Level 2 managers were William, Jeff, and Andrew. I do not know their last names. Level 3 managers were Aloma, Michelle, Tony, Celia, and Bill Gates. I do not know their last names except for Bill Gates.
11. At times when the workload was high, level 2 and 3 managers sent some of their work – which was to review our level 1 work – back to level 1 to re-review the work we had already done.
12. There were observers watching the review of level 1, but there were not any observers watching all of the review of levels 2 and 3. Sometimes the observers were able to watch some of the work of Andrew (a level 2 manager) but were not able to observe any of the work of the other level 2 managers: Jeff and William.
13. After the above signature review, the approved signature ballots were counted, and the rejected signature ballots were sent into a process whereby the ballots could be cured.
14. There were two major problems with the curing process. First, there was inadequate personally identifiable information (“PII”) that was necessary to truly confirm the identity of the alleged voter. Second, when the alleged voter was on the phone, they did not have the ability to actually see and verify that the signature on the ballot

matched their signature. The curing worker was able to see the signature, but the alleged voter was not.

15. the process for curing included a person who would call the voter at the number listed by the person who filled out the ballot envelope. In many cases, the person calling the alleged voter only had the pre-printed name and address on the ballot, and the phone number which was written on the ballot envelope by the alleged voter. However, the person who sent the ballot was able to give a phone number that could be different from the one listed in the voter file; this did occur a number of times. I performed curing work and there were many times that the phone number written on the ballot by the alleged voter was different than the number or numbers in the voter file. Sometimes the number written by the alleged voter on the ballot was not found anywhere among the multiple number listed in the voter file.
16. Observers were allowed to watch and listen to my curing work.
17. In order to perform the curing process, we were given a batch of stickers to place on a ballot, which included stickers with abbreviations. Some, but not all, of the ballot stickers and abbreviations were as follows: "VER" meant that we verified the voter's information, and their ballot was approved to be counted, "WV" meant that a voter did not want to verify their ballot over the phone, and "LM" meant that we called the voter and left a message.
18. One of the problems with the stickers was that nothing prevented a level 1, 2 or 3 worker from requesting a massive amount of "approved" stickers and placing them on ballots. Again, observers did not watch any level 3 work and did not watch most of level 2 work. Once stickers were placed on ballots, there was no record on the ballot

or elsewhere to determine who placed the sticker there. We were told to not sign or initial the sticker, but to only date it. Accordingly, there was no way to know who placed “verified” stickers on ballots. The system was wide open to abuse and allowed for potential false placement of “verified” stickers without accountability.


19. The first week I worked about thirty-five (35) hours over five days. I processed about 1,500 ballots per day, and about 7,500 ballots the first week. The rejection rate was about 25-30%, so about 1,875 to 2,250 ballots were rejected by me this first week.
20. The second week I worked about sixty (60) hours per week for six days. I processed about 1,750 ballots per day, and about 10,500 ballots the second week. The rejection rate was about 25-30%, so about 2,625 to 3,150 ballots were rejected by me this second week.
21. The third week I worked about sixty (60) hours per week for seven days. I processed about 1,750 ballots per day, and about 12,250 ballots the third week. The rejection rate was about 35-40%, so about 4,287 to 4,900 ballots were rejected by me this third week.
22. The fourth week I worked about sixty (60) hours per week for seven days. I processed about 1,750 ballots per day, and about 12,250 ballots the fourth week. The rejection rate was about 35-40%, so about 4,287 to 4,900 ballots were rejected by me this fourth week.
23. The total ballots I processed for signature verification over four weeks was about 42,500, and the total ballots I rejected was about 13,074 to 15,200.
24. The fifth week we only worked Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday but I only cured ballots and did not perform signature verification the fifth week.

25. The other workers in my room had similar complaints about bad signatures resulting in the rejection of ballots. I believe the rejection rates for their ballots were similar to my rejection rates.
26. There were times that Tony and/or Michelle would make us leave at about 7:30 – 8:30 p.m. and they would be there later than us working on signature verification – not curing – but just signature verification. When we would come in the next day, we would ask them how late they were there, and they would tell us they were there until 9:30 or 10:00.
27. One example of the above occurred on November 15th. Before we left for the day, Yvonne and I asked Aloma about the remaining ballots because there were still several bins with about two to three thousand ballots. I did not know whether these ballots required original signature verification or curing work, but we did both types of work. Aloma told us we were free to go and to not worry about those thousands of ballots since they were only for the managers to handle. However, it is my understanding that no observers monitored the work of the managers on those ballots.
28. The computer records show the number of signature rejections by me and the managers. Tony said this information can be accessed from the computers by IT workers. I do not know how many times the managers reversed my rejection of the signatures. I was not able to see that information. I do know that observers were not watching most of the work of the level 2 managers above me who had the ability to change my rejection of signatures. Observers were not watching any of the work of the level 3 managers above me who had the ability to change my rejection of signatures. I do know that if one of the managers changed my rejection, then that

should be recorded under their name in the computer records. I know this because Andrew told me that all of our actions for level 1, 2 and 3 workers were recorded in the computer system under each of our names.

29. There were times that the curing workers called voters with rejected signatures and those alleged voters they told them that they never voted. For example, we had some college students who said they never voted and did not sign the ballots submitted in their names. Obviously, we voided those ballots, but as long as the person on the phone said they were the voter, and was able to give some PII, it is my understanding that those ballots were approved, even if the signature was previously rejected.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct.

Signed: 
Jacqueline Onigkeit

Date: 12/6/22

9

DECLARATION

STATE OF: Arizona

COUNTY OF: Maricopa

I, Denise Marie, a resident of Gilbert, AZ state the following as my declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746. I am an employee of Runbeck Election Services. I have been employed by Runbeck Election Services as a sorter operator since February 2022.

While working at Runbeck on Maricopa County Elections, I witnessed the following:

Ballot Chain of Custody Issues

Election Night Ballot Receiving Process Changed

Prior to Election Day, November 8, 2022, mail-in ballots were delivered in red bins with a chain of custody form from MCTEC noting how many bins and the quantity received. That form is called the "Maricopa County Delivery Receipt." The top of the form was filled out to include the total number of ballot packets including Regular MOB (green envelope), early in-person CTR (white envelope) and out of specification ballots.

On Election Night, instead of receiving the ballots in red bins, the ballots from the drop boxes had been placed in mail trays and loaded onto mail cages. MCTEC did not include the Maricopa County Delivery Receipt forms with any of the Election Day drop box ballot deliveries. There were no chain of custody forms with the ballots and no count of the number of ballots that were delivered.

Again, no paperwork accompanied the ballots from the MCTEC on Election Night. Instead, Runbeck created a document with an estimate of the ballots received that was calculated by counting the number of trays and multiplying by 350 or 400 (estimated number of ballots per tray - this number varied by operator). These estimates were created by Runbeck employees and were recorded on a form called MC INBOUND - RECEIPT OF DELIVERY.

At 6:47am on 11/8, a delivery was made by MTEC that included 33,994 regular MOBs, 7,844 CTRs and 1041 needs packet ballots. Maricopa County provided delivery receipts for this part of the delivery that showed these numbers. There were also an estimated 5,600 ballots that came from the post office. No paperwork included on the post office ballots (see below).

The next delivery from MCTEC came at 7:15pm. While it is not referenced as such on the receipt of delivery form generated by Runbeck, the delivery driver's helper indicated that it came from the post office. I could also tell that it came from the post office because there was non-election mail and blue envelopes mixed in. One of the sorter operators estimated the number of ballots for this delivery to be 1,750.

The next delivery from MCTEC did not come until 10pm. I was told by my lead and other staff members that it was unusual that we did not have multiple deliveries throughout the day or that another delivery had not been made prior to me leaving at 9pm. Several drops were made throughout the night after 10 pm and when I arrived at 6am the next morning, there was a line of cages waiting to be run through the inbound process.

Total count of the ballots received and scanned by Runbeck on Election Day was:

Inbound: 290,735
Provisionals: 6,978
Overs: 123
Under: 3
Invalid App ID (wrong election envelope): 1,016
Unreadables: 41
Counter reissue: 46
Total: 298,942

On 11/9, at approximately 5:30PM, my lead asked me to get a count of all of the ballots received by Runbeck on Election Day. Using the Incoming Scan forms, I manually calculated the total numbers above. When I gave the information to my lead, he mentioned that it was “close” to what Celia (Nabors) of MCTEC had estimated. I believe he either texted or emailed her with the count from his phone.

As described above, prior to Election Day, mail-in ballots from the drop boxes that came from the county were transported in red bins with security seals and brought to Runbeck. The delivery included a 3 part half sheet that had the total count of Mail-in Ballots (MOBs), early in-person (CTR) ballots and out of specification ballots. This form is initialed off by the person who counted them at MCTEC and then initialed off by a Runbeck operator and security upon delivery.

Before the 2022 primary, a change was made to the way the paperwork was done for the red bins. Instead of a form for each bin with its own place to notate the security seal number, it was changed to one form for all the red bins received. Instead of listing the seal numbers, it had a count of the number of bins. For example, it would say “62 bins secured.” Each bin did have a security seal, but the seal numbers were NOT notated on any of the paperwork unless only one bin was received. Therefore, there was no way for Runbeck employees or security to verify the seal numbers.

It also appeared that the bins had been consolidated from the different drop-off locations. Early in person (CTR) ballots were separated from the mail-in ballots (regular MOB) and placed in their own bins. During the primary, the red bins were mostly dropped off in the morning. For the general election they were mostly dropped off in the evening.

USPS Post Office - Lack of Inbound Ballot Chain of Custody

When mail-in ballots are brought from the post office to Runbeck, the postal receipts that are with them are NOT used as part of the chain of custody. Estimates are used instead.

On the Runbeck incoming paperwork, (MC Inbound Receipt of Delivery) an estimate is made of the number USPS (post office inbound) ballots received by counting the number of trays and multiplying by 350 or 400 (the estimated amount per tray) This number varied by operator. Despite the fact that the post office typically

included a postal receipt with the USPS ballots identifying the number of ballots being delivered, the postal receipts were not used. When I questioned why the postal receipts were not used on a smaller election last spring, I was told that they did not use it, it was never correct, and it was usually just thrown out.

I realized that the reason the receipt from the post office was “never correct,” was because they were not adding the ballots brought from MTEC to the ones from the post office – and then reconciling it with the number counted by the sorting machine. When I brought that to my lead’s attention (and showed him how they did balance out), he reiterated that they do not use the receipts, they take too much time to find when it’s a big election and we cannot slow down the process. (To be fair, the receipts are hard to find when there are a lot of cages dropped off).

Not being able to throw away what I considered to be an important part of chain of custody, I did ask the Maricopa driver if they needed the postal receipts. He took them, but my recollection was that he was unsure and needed to check. I started sending them with pickups after that. Sometime later, a group of Maricopa County employees came over for a tour. The postal receipts came up in conversation and one of them mentioned that they didn’t even know that the receipts existed. This is how the change was made to send postal receipts back to Maricopa.

But they still were not used to track the incoming number of ballots from the post office. My lead told me that I could try to use them, however if it slowed things down, he would pull me from the inbound process. I brought the issue up to him several times trying to get the change made as part of our process. The last time I asked him about it, he reiterated that I could try to use them as long as I did not slow down the process, but if I brought the subject up again, he would not have me do the inbound process at all. He did not want me to do something that I wasn’t comfortable with. This last conversation occurred just before we got busy with outbound. I didn’t bring it up again.

No Chain of Custody for Runbeck Employee Ballots

Runbeck employees are allowed to bring in their ballots and give them to the sorting department to be inserted into the batches at Runbeck. Typically, they are run in the next batch of incoming. This is permitted by management. Runbeck employees, are also permitted to bring family members ballots in for insertion into batches. (See attached sample of my family member’s ballot on the sorting feeder just prior to being run through the inbound process during the primary.)

I estimated that I personally saw about 50 ballots given to the sorting department by employees to be inserted into the next inbound batch during the general election. There is no formal tracking of these ballots, nor is there any kind of check that the ballot is for the employee or family member (privacy issues is cited as the reason for not checking). Maricopa County would have no record of these ballots until they are scanned by Runbeck because they were never in possession of Maricopa County. They are simply added to the next incoming ballot batch run. (Note: From what I saw, the ballots were legitimately employee or employee family’s ballots, however I did not see all of them. Allowing this practice to occur, opens the door to potential problems.)

Maricopa Security Coverage

To my knowledge, the security provided by Maricopa has limited hours. A security officer provided by Maricopa is on location from I believe 8a-4p. Prior to election day, ballot deliveries were made at about 6:30am in the morning and then often at 6:30pm. The two busiest times for drop offs and I don't recall seeing their security officer on site.

During the primary, the Maricopa Security Guard came down and signed the paperwork. During the general election, Runbeck Security came to sign the paperwork. To my knowledge, there was not a Maricopa Security Guard on duty for night crew.

No Chain of Custody for Duplicate Ballots


Throughout the 2022 election cycle for both the primary and general elections, Runbeck printed duplicate ballots. These are duplicates of ballots that had been damaged in some way or the tabulator could not read them. The selections from the voter were filled in and a new, duplicate ballot was printed. To my knowledge, there were at least 9,530 duplicate ballots printed. When these ballots were picked up by Maricopa, there was no paper trail. No delivery/shipping receipt, no chain of custody document, no one signs for them. They are simply handed over to the delivery driver.

During the 2022 primary, I was able to track down one receipt to send with the duplicated ballots. There was no place for a signature and Runbeck did not keep a copy. It came from the shipping department and was generated by the CSM. For next couple of orders, the receipt was not available before pickup and eventually I stopped asking for it.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Signed on the 7th day of December 2022.

Signed by:


Denise Marie

10

I, Leslie White, state the following as my declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746:

1. I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Arizona.
2. On November 8, 2022, I was a credentialed Prop 309 observer at Maricopa County Tabulation and Election Center (MCTEC) located at 510 S 3rd Ave, Phoenix, AZ 85003. I first arrived at approximately 8:00AM. Throughout the day, I observed various areas at MCTEC including adjudication, duplication, signature verification and processing. At approximately 4:00PM, all activities at MCTEC were completed and I was told to go home.
3. I returned to MCTEC at approximately 7:30PM and went to the warehouse to observe the receipt of the incoming ballots from the vote centers and drop boxes. When I first arrived, Stephen Richer, Maricopa County Recorder, greeted me and asked why I was there. There was a Republican poll observer in the warehouse when I arrived, and he remained there after I left.
4. Between approximately 9:00PM and 9:30PM, the first delivery of ballots arrived. Some ballots arrived in personal vehicles and others arrived in the large Penske trucks.
5. The receiving dock has several bays. I was assigned to a specific location of the warehouse near the 100+ video monitors, near the location of the security / police officer. I was given a chair in my assigned location. From my location, I could see the dock receiving team and I could hear them talk to the drivers.
6. There was one person who was responsible for retrieving the memory cards and the tabulator result tapes from the vote centers delivery. He was a young male, approximately mid-20s. He would remove the memory cards, walk right past me into the tabulator room. He would give the memory card to a team of two people in the tabulator room. The team would scan it as received and would give to another man who would take it to his computer and upload the data from the memory card.
7. Scott Jarret, Director of Maricopa Elections, would take the memory card and place it on one of two ten foot tables. The tables were laid out in grids with a specific location for each vote center. As he received the memory cards, he would place them on the grid.
8. From my assigned location, I did not have a clear view of the activities on the truck or on the dock. I could not see exact location or and documentation associated with the removal of the memory cards. During the BoS meeting on 11/28/2022, Scott Jarrett said that seals were scanned. If scanning was done on the truck on the dock, I likely would not have seen that.
9. The other supplies that came back from the vote center included a black bag, blue top plastic container, red top plastic container. The black bag contained tabulated ballots. There were a group of people who were responsible for receiving the black ballot bags.

They took the black bags to a desk. I was told that those ballots were going to be put into the caged area in a designated location for each vote center.

10. The red top plastic containers were removed from the delivery vehicle and taken directly to the "red line" (designation location called for red top plastic containers) which was a table. These containers sometimes contained a large white envelope with misfed/misread ballots inside. Some of the large envelopes had labels printed and others were handwritten. I walked over to the red line to get a closer look and saw at least one red top container that was nearly full of misfed/misread ballots.
11. Also in the red top plastic container were the spoiled ballots in clear plastic bags. Other miscellaneous materials such as signs, posters, training manuals. This container also included the poll worker sign in sheets.
12. The blue top containers were removed from the delivery vehicles and either hand carried or pushed on metal carts to the blue line (designation location called for blue top plastic containers). The blue line area was right in front of my assigned location for observing. From my location I was within 10 to 15 feet of the blue top containers and I would have definitely seen if any counting or auditing was taking place.
13. Workers would cut off the plastic seals. There were two workers who were cutting off the plastic seals on the blue top containers. One was Stephen Richer and the other was Celia Nabor. As they cut the seals, the seals would drop on the floor. Nobody looked at the seals, nobody recorded the seal numbers. All were just left on the floor.
14. Richer and Nabor were opening the containers. In some cases, the blue top containers would have white envelopes with misfed/misread ballots. When these envelopes were removed from the container, they were placed on a table in a pile.
15. These blue top containers mostly held large numbers of the Early Voting Ballots. These were ballots with green envelopes and possibly some provisional ballots as well. There were no documents or paperwork on the outside of the containers.
16. I was flabbergasted that they were just opening the containers and just sliding the open containers down the aisle. At the end of the aisle, there were temporary employees who were removing the envelopes from the containers and loading them onto trays.
17. I did not see any person count any ballots or record any information on documents. The temporary employees were just working quickly to place all of the ballots into trays. The trays were large plastic USPS mail trays. They are approximately 2ft X 1 ½ ft wide with USPS on the side. They would fill a tray and then they would load the tray onto a metal rolling cage with a solid back but open front.
18. The staff referred to location where the blue plastic top containers were put as the "blue line". In the blue line they were collecting the envelopes of misfed/misread ballots and there were also envelopes with misfed/misread ballots on the red line. There was

no discernable process to account for these ballots. I was concerned with the disorganized way that the ballots were handled.

19. I asked one of the employees how many ballots were on each metal cart. I was told that each cart held approximately 13,500 ballots. It is my understanding that the EPM requires the county to count and record the exact number of ballots that were inside each container.
20. On three different occasions, I saw people carrying 3 tabulators. It was unclear where the tabulators were coming from. These appeared to be 3 tabulators from vote centers. These are the same type of tabulators in which a voter would put a ballot thru when casting a vote at a Vote Center.
21. When a cart was filled, the temporary employee or Maricopa Election Staffer, would roll the unsecured metal cart into a hall for storage. There was no security and no personnel monitoring the carts. When I questioned the employees, they said that the cameras were sufficient for monitoring the ballots on the carts. I was also told that those carts were going to be delivered to Runbeck where they would be scanned in to allow for signature verification the next day.
22. I asked the officer monitoring the cameras if he was a county employee. He said that he did not work for Maricopa County—he said he was a contractor.
23. At approximately 1:00AM, I went into the tabulator room. Scott Jarret was inside, and all of the trucks had been received and all of the memory cards/tabulation tapes had been received. All grid boxes on Scotts Vote Center Table had memory cards in their designated box. Each box on the grid represented a Vote Center and each Vote Center had 2 Memory Cards, which meant, 2 tabulators were at each Vote Center. All trucks had been received in from the Vote Centers. So, I asked Scott if he was going to upload the Election Day results to share with the people / voters in AZ and he said no.
24. I left the warehouse at approximately 1:30AM on November 9th, 2022.
25. On November 28, 2022, I was at the Maricopa County Board of Election Meeting I heard Scott Jarret talking about ballot chain of custody. I was surprised to hear him claim that they had chain of custody because that is not what I saw while I was observing.
26. Specifically, Scott Jarrett said:

"Mr. Chairman, if I could just interject. We had a couple of questions from some of the members of the audience about those 292,000 that Mr. Valenzuela just mentioned, um, and so those were dropped off throughout the entire day on Election Day. So, state statute does not allow us to go and retrieve those until the polls close and those are transported from those voting locations by poll workers of different parties. They are actually transport containers they all have blue lids on them. They all have tamper evident seals all of those are logged and they're scanned in as they're received. Then we send those over once they come back to the elections department we organize all of them and we send them in

bipartisan teams over to our vendor Runbeck to scan those in to get that digital image so we can start that signature verification process. We had bipartisan team, actually, Republican there appointed by the county chair observing and participating in that process as we are scanning those so we maintain chain of custody over them through that entire process.

27. The claim that Republican observers were “participating” in the process is false. I did not participate, and the other observers did not participate at any time while I was there. We only observed. We were not able to touch ballots or cut tamper evident seals. We were only able to observe, take notes and ask questions.

28. The claim that Republican observers saw all scanning, logging or properly maintaining chain of custody is false. Jarrett said that the tamper evident seals were “logged and scanned as they are received” -- it was not done under my observation, and I did not participate in any process.

29. I did, however, observe the entire process from the time the seals were cut off of the containers and dropped on the floor and at no time did any person count or record any information about the seals removal or the number or type of ballots inside the blue top containers. This did not happen.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Signed on the 29th day of November, 2022.

Leslie D. White

Leslie D. White

11

Declaration of Richard Baris Regarding the 2022 Midterm Elections
in Maricopa County, Arizona

December 8, 2022

Background

I, Rich Baris, have served as the Director of Big Data Poll for six years and as the chief pollster for The Epoch Times. Our polling, election forecast modeling and analysis have been cited in outlets ranging from Bloomberg to Fox News. I have also served as an expert and voir dire researcher in both state and federal court cases with subject matter ranging from elections to civil rights.

Big Data Poll conducted an exit poll in the state of Arizona from November 1 to November 8, 2022. Participants were recruited using a targeted random sample from the Aristotle National Voter File Database. Beginning on October 24, 2022, invitations were sent to the resulting list of N=155,000 subjecting potential participants to traditional voter screens consisting of questions designed to gauge likelihood to vote and 4-cycle vote history. Participants were instructed to conduct the interview at such time depending on vote method, i.e. after voting by mail, after voting early in-person, dropping off an absentee ballot at a polling location or dropbox, or after voting on Election Day. In total, the sampling size was N=1,299 to include N=813 (62.6%) in Maricopa County.

The following voter file parameter represents the query used to pull a targeted random sample from the National Voter File Database:

State Select State is (Arizona) and (Exclude Deceased AND Exclude Movers) and (((Include Only Records with Mobiles AND (Validated Mobile Number)) AND (Exclude Numbers Ported to Landline)) AND (Mobile Number Code is (1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5))) AND (Mobile Confidence Level is (High or Medium High)))))

By design, even unweighted results aimed for representation, though interviews were first conducted with voters who cast absentee ballots early and dropped them off in-person, and with a small share of voters who cast ballots early and in-person. At no time during these interviews did respondents report issues casting ballots.

On the morning of Tuesday, November 8, 2022, approximately 11 minutes after the polls opened on Election Day, a voter and expected exit poll participant made us aware that they were unable to complete the interview due to prolonged wait times resulting in various—and at the time, unclear issues—with printing and recording ballots at a particular precinct. That interview concluded approximately 16 minutes after polls closed.

After relaying this information, we were made aware of fairly widespread issues with “tabulators” on Election Day. and we suggested quickly amending the exit poll questionnaire to include asking whether participants had “any issues or complications when trying to vote in person” and listed various scenarios detailed later in this report.

Summary of Findings

Our findings support the conclusion that issues at polling stations concerning tabulators, toners and other challenges presented to voters who sought to cast a ballot on Election Day disproportionately and negatively impacted voters who intended to cast votes in support of Republican candidates. Further, our findings indicate that conservative estimates of suppressed voters would put the overall result of the Arizona gubernatorial election in doubt.

Those conclusions are based on the following:

1. Registered Republicans represent the majority of votes cast on Election Day.
2. All voters who cast votes on Election Day were significantly more likely to vote straight Republican, regardless of demographics to include party registration.
3. Issues resulting in long wait times and challenges to casting votes were exclusive to Maricopa County, and heavily Republican areas were disproportionately and negatively impacted.
4. These and several other contributing data points support the conclusion with a reasonable degree of mathematical certainty that turnout depression occurred on Election Day, and that a relatively small percentage did put the overall result of the gubernatorial election in question.

Our exit polling indicated that a low of 10 percent to a high of 17 percent of total turnout would consist of Election Day Drop Offs, or "Late Early". To be clear, that is defined by a voter who physically delivered their mail-in ballot to a polling station on Election Day. While historic, the publicly available figures now indicate that our exit polling is correct, at roughly 13%.


Election Day in-person voting in Maricopa County was also projected to be significantly higher than expected as a percentage of the overall electorate relative to prior elections, approximately 20%. That share is currently at roughly 16% of the actual total vote countywide. Our findings conclusively show that voters in Maricopa County were exclusively impacted and that these voters heavily favored Republican candidates.

I conclude based on standard data analysis that these issues disadvantaged Republican candidates, to have been most prevalent in Republican congressional districts and strongholds.

Republicans Are the Majority on Election Day

Maricopa Election Day Returns Per Hour By Party

Source: Maricopa County Recorder Hourly Updates



While percentages vary throughout the day—which is particularly consequential when considering the impact of likely voter suppression in this case—Republicans are the majority on Election Day. Voter registration by party tracked by the Maricopa County Recorder shows registered Republicans made up 52.7% of total votes cast on Election Day, followed by 30.7% of non-two party voters and only 16.6% of registered Democrats. (A link to the graphic above to view in more detail is provided, [here](#).)

These figures are not in dispute. Political parties employ various “get out the vote” or “GOTV” strategies and Republicans encouraged their voters to vote on Election Day. Long delays and wait times would have unduly burdened two demographics that heavily favored Republican candidates—seniors and working class voters attempting to cast a ballot before the workday.

Voters Who Vote on Election Day Are More Likely to Vote Straight Republican, Regardless of Demographics, to Include Partisan Registration

The impact from the issues that arose on Election Day—which we will further address in more detail in subsequent sections of this analysis—cannot be fully understood or appreciated without understanding voting preference cross tabulated against voting behavior and vote method.

The evidence is clear that voting behavior by vote method strongly impacts vote preference. Voters who cast ballots on Election Day were significantly more likely to support Republican candidates, up and down the ballot, regardless of self-reported party affiliation or even party registration.


As previously stated, parties each implement different strategies to turn out voters for elections. That being said, it is also true that even voters registered as Democrats and non-two party voters are significantly more likely to support Republican candidates than those who cast their ballots early through vote-by-mail or in-person early vote.

For example, 16.7% of Democrats in Maricopa County who reported voting on Election Day in our exit polling also reported to have voted for Republican Kari Lake. That compares to only 0.6% of Democrats who participated in the exit poll and voted early by absentee ballot. When including Democratic voters who also dropped their ballots off on Election Day that percentage rises to 1.0% flat, but nowhere near the significant crossover reported among Democrats who voted on Election Day.

The same is true of Republicans who cast ballots early by absentee ballot. Slightly less Republicans (13.6%) who cast early mail-in ballots reported crossing over to vote for Katie Hobbs than Democrats who voted on Election Day reported voting for Republican Kari Lake. That compares to only 1.2% of Election Day Republican voters who reported casting ballots for Democrat Katie Hobbs.

The pattern of behavior is extremely noteworthy when looking at the percentage of non-two party voters who voted or may have been suppressed from voting on Election Day. Non-two party voters who voted early by absentee ballot backed Democrat Katie Hobbs 63.4% to 36.0%. However, those non-two party voters who voted in-person or drop-off their mail-in ballots on Election Day backed Republican Kari Lake 65.3% to 31.4%.

The Republican candidate for governor often won more than 70% of the vote cast on Election Day in impacted areas, while losing the total vote by mail by roughly 16 points on the initial county report, or 58% to 42%. That actual vote tabulation has also proven the exit polling to be highly accurate, if anything even more favorable to the Democratic candidate for governor (as seen in the chart below). The exit poll projected the early vote in Maricopa County to favor the Democratic candidate 59.2% to 40.8%.



In Maricopa, Republicans to include the candidate for governor won the Election Day vote by a roughly 20- to 50-point margin, location depending, also a result we very clearly projected. In the more Democratic areas in downtown Phoenix delivered 60/40 margins for the Republican candidate, while Republican strongholds to include areas plagued by voting machine breakdowns met and even exceeded 50-point margins. In several "Box 3" tabulations, Republican candidates exceeded 70% of the vote, to include one in which 75.8% of votes tallied supported the Republican candidate for attorney general.

Self-Reported Issues Casting Ballots on Election Day Were Exclusive to Maricopa

If a voter indicated that they had cast their ballot on Election Day, they were immediately asked a follow-up question that was worded as follows:

Q6. Did you have any issues or complications when trying to vote in person, such as tabulators rejecting the ballot or voting locations running out of ballots?

As a share of each party, 58.6% of those identifying as Republican reported having issues while trying to cast a ballot on Election Day. That compares to just 15.5% of Democrats and another 39.7% of voters who identify as "independent" or some "other" party. Partisan data reported hourly and throughout the day by the Maricopa County Recorder confirms our projected partisan affiliation was extremely accurate, within the sampling error.

Those who indicated there was a problem casting a ballot on Election Day were exclusive to Maricopa County, with responses by congressional districts verifying our findings. The

vote centers—at least 31% as reported by Maricopa County—which account for sampling error and air on the side of caution, the results conclude a figure as little as 2.5% would have altered the outcome of the gubernatorial election.

For instance, a conservative 2.5% addition to the total 1,560,372 votes cast in Maricopa County would increase the Election Day share from 16.1% to 18.6%. That's still less than the projected 1 in 5, or roughly 20%, but results in an additional 39,009 votes. Modeling projected slightly over 300,000 total juxtaposed to 251.6k.

Considering 1) the issues occurred disproportionately in the most loyal Republican strongholds that delivered the gubernatorial candidate in excess of 70% of the vote, and 2) Election Day voters were more likely to vote straight ticket, even such a seemingly insignificant projection would have a significant impact.


If the current 70% vote share held, it would result in 27,306 votes for the Republican gubernatorial candidate, and 11,703 votes for the Democratic candidate, a net gain of 15,603 votes for the Republican candidate, decreasing the overall lead for Katie Hobbs to under 2,000 votes. A 75% margin would result in an additional 29,257 votes for the Republican candidate, erasing the advantage held by the current leader, altogether.

Worth noting, hourly vote totals reported by the Maricopa County Recorder on Election Day showed more than 60,000 votes were cast by 9:45 am local time despite the long wait times, and Republicans requested polls to stay open for an additional three hours on Election Day.

Conclusion

No single data point discussed here is decisive on its own. But considering them in totality makes for a compelling argument. Voters who cast votes on Election Day were significantly more likely to vote straight Republican, thus supporting the higher margin scenario. Issues resulting in long wait times and challenges to casting votes were exclusive to Maricopa County, and they disproportionately and negatively impacted heavily Republican areas. Further, I conclude with a reasonable degree of mathematical certainty that a modest depression in turnout on Election Day would be significant enough to cast doubt on the overall result of the gubernatorial election in Arizona. It is my conclusion that it did alter the outcome of the gubernatorial race.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.



Executed on the 8th day of December, 2022.

12

DECLARATION OF SHELBY BUSCH

I, Shelby Busch, hereby declare as follows under penalty of perjury:

1. I am a citizen of the United States and competent to make this declaration.
2. I am a citizen of the United States of the State of Arizona.
3. I reside in the City of Phoenix, in the State of Arizona.
4. I am the Chairman of We the People AZ Alliance an Arizona PAC whose purpose is to provide oversight of and transparency for government to the public. We accomplish this through a robust public records department and a highly skilled staff of data analysts, cybersecurity experts and investigative team.
5. Chris Handsel is our Data Director and one of our data analysts. He currently holds a bachelor's degree in electronic engineering and has a collective 30 years of experience in computer hardware design, applications, database, and software design as a contractor. He has worked for clients in the commercial, government and military supply industries.
6. On April 15th, 2021, Steve Robinson, Co-Founder and Director of Operations for We the People AZ Alliance, and I were appointed by Former Arizona Secretary of State and Senate Liaison, Ken Bennett, as Deputy Senate Liaisons to the 2020 Senate Election Audit. We have continued to work on our research using information gathered during that audit. In addition, our existing research team gathers and assesses information from public records requests.
7. Our data analysts assessed and confirmed multiple instances of voters reporting that their voter record had been changed, or that they were registered to vote without the voter knowing and without the voter requesting that they be registered to vote.

Thereafter, on June 20, 2022, we contacted Senator Fann with this information and presented our findings to her on or around June 28th, 2022.

8. We explained to Senator Fann that evidence of the above unauthorized changes to Arizona citizens' voting records are contained in the voter registration files. We requested access to this data which had previously been delivered from the Maricopa County external drive to the Senate under subpoena and court order.
9. Senator Fann agreed to provide a copy of the contents of this Maricopa drive to allow us to evaluate any issues or concerns regarding the validity of voters, their corresponding signatures, and any potential voter registrations thought to be contained on the drive.
10. We received a copy of the drive with this data on July 20th, 2022. Our Data Director Chris Handsel subsequently reviewed the files, and we began manual review of the 160,000 voter registrations.
11. On or about September 10th, our Data Director was in the process of building a tool to review the records on the drive and to isolate common issues. During that process he located multiple hidden files and a cross-reference document that could be used to link ballot envelopes and registration forms. Upon initial review, he located a lower grouping of folders in the bottom part of the directory that appeared to be a duplicate of other upper folders because the upper and lower folders had the same name. Upon further review, he discovered that the lower folders contained a far greater number of unique files than those contained in the upper folders that were not duplicates. The lower folder also contained a word document with instructions of how to cross reference the ballot signatures images with the voter registration files.

12. Steve, Chris, and I began to analyze each one of these files manually based on reports we received from voters or from the data analytic team. Our analysis led to the discovery of many anomalies in the signatures and voter registration forms, which are detailed as follows:
- a. Voters that were canceled in the AZSOS voter rolls as deceased, yet they cast a vote postmortem.
 - b. Voters that voted more than once under two different voter IDs and yet both votes were counted. Some of these were merged and both ballots were housed under only one voter ID, thus concealing the evidence of this duplicate vote.
 - c. Voters that cast a ballot in the election that were associated with voter IDs issued after the election and, therefore, do not show up in the pre-election voter rolls.
 - d. Voters had multiple AFFSEQ voter registration forms on file that did not match the ballot envelope, but had new registrations put on file after the election, on February 3rd, 2021.
 - e. Voters had several AFFSEQ voter registrations entered into their file numerous times in one day with different time stamps, or numerous times in brief periods; none of these registrations made any notable changes made to their core information.
 - f. Blank ballot envelopes that were illegally cured in violation of A.R.S.16-550.
 - g. Ballot envelopes signed by another individual that were cured or passed through without curing with signatures of names of voters that did not match the name of the alleged voter (e.g., the alleged voter name was “John Smith,” but the name signed was “Fred Johnson”).

- h. Ballot envelopes that were modified using a sticker to change the voter information on the external ballot envelope to match another voter name, presumably in the same household (e.g., the alleged voter name was “John Smith,” but the name signed was “Suzy Smith”).
 - i. Ballots that were cured or passed without curing that appear to fail to meet Special Election Board guidelines and policy.
 - j. Thousands of ballot envelopes with signatures that failed to match the numerous signature records in the voters’ files, as required by the Arizona Secretary of State standards and training.
 - k. Thousands of signatures that were egregious mismatches to all reference signatures on file.
- 13. Accordingly, we requested an ad-hoc hearing with the Arizona Senate and House and, on November 2nd, 2022, presented the above findings to them.
- 14. In response, Senate leaders authorized us to expand our efforts and begin a full analysis of the 2020 ballot envelope images.
- 15. Our Data Director, Chris Handsel created a computer program to allow our team to perform the function of manual signature verification process in a secure environment that is similar to how it is performed during an election. Our verification is ongoing, and we are presently using our system to analyze the 1.9 million ballot envelope images provide by the Arizona Senate. Within our process, a worker is provided with the scanned image of the ballot envelope sent by Runbeck. Upon this ballot envelope there is an actual signature of the alleged voter. We compare these alleged voter signatures with images of signatures of the same alleged voter which are found in

their actual voter file. The signatures on file come from different sources, including: a signed voter registration form, a previously signed ballot envelope, a signed provisional ballot, and/or signed letters requesting a voter change.


16. We recruited a team of workers and trained them using the Arizona Secretary of State Signature Verification Manual, July 2020 Edition. This is the same manual that is used for Maricopa County election signature verification training. Our Data Director was briefly employed by Maricopa County Elections department and received the official Maricopa County Elections training. We have also brought three additional workers onto our team that have been trained by Maricopa County Elections and had them review our processes, training, and implementation. They affirmed that our system is an equivalent model of the Maricopa County Election signature verification system. Moreover, our review tools are more comprehensive than those used by Maricopa County Elections level 1 workers, as it allows for zooming into images and provides more reference options for many of the voters.
17. We created manuals for each worker and provided them with training videos. We require our workers to sign a data protection agreement and non-disclosure agreement and to complete all training before they are provided with authorized access to the voter records system.
18. To date, our team of workers have manually reviewed 230,339 randomly selected ballot envelopes and the same corresponding official signatures on file with them Maricopa County Elections Department during their administration of elections.
19. We have found that:

- a. 22,964 signatures had egregious mismatches as compared to the reference signatures, meaning they have no similarity or common characteristics with the reference signatures on file. This equates to 9.97% of the ballot envelopes reviewed. Applying this same audit percentage to the total number of 1.9 million 2020 ballot envelopes, means that approximately 184,300 ballots should have been rejected for improper signature verification due to egregious signature mismatches.
 - b. 29,406 signatures failed the Arizona Secretary of State standards which means that of the 1.9 million 2020 ballot envelopes, approximately 12.77% or 242,630 are likely to have questionable signature mismatches that fail the Arizona Secretary of State standards.
20. We ran the voter files associated with the above mismatched signatures against the record of alleged voters who voted in the 2022 elections and found:
- a. 5,481 of the names associated with the above 22,964 egregious signature mismatches voted in 2022 general election. If we apply this audit percentage, we can expect that 130,520 ballots would be rejected for improper signature verification due to egregious signature mismatches.
 - b. 14,695 the of names associated with the above 29,406 egregious signature mismatches under the AZSOS standard failures voted in the 2022 general election. If we apply this audit percentage, we can expect that 167,176 ballots would be rejected due to questionable signature mismatches that fail the Arizona Secretary of State standards.


21. Without even applying audit percentages across the entire voter file, it is an unequivocal fact that 20,176 alleged voters who voted in the 2022 election, were the same alleged voters from 2020 whose ballots failed signature verification standards.
22. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the 5,481 egregious signature mismatches who names also appear as having voted in the 2022 general election comparing the signatures as they appear on the 2020 general election ballot envelope to the official voter signature on file with Maricopa County Election Department.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct.

Signed: _____


Shelby Busch

Date: _____


12/7/22

13

Declaration of Clay U. Parikh

I, CLAY U. PARIKH, declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct:

1. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth below and would testify competently to them if called upon to do so.

2. I have a Master of Science in Cyber Security, Computer Science from the University of Alabama in Huntsville. I have a Bachelor of Science in Computer Science, Systems Major from the University of North Carolina at Wilmington. In February 2007 I obtained the Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) certification and have continually maintained good standing. I also hold the following certifications: Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH) and Certified Hacking Forensic Investigator (CHFI).

3. Since December of 2003, I have continually worked in the areas of Information Assurance (IA), Information Security and Cyber Security. I have performed and led teams in Vulnerability Management, Security Test and Evaluation (ST&E) and system accreditation. I have supported both civil and Department of Defense agencies within the U.S. government as well as international customers, such as NATO. I have served as the Information Security Manager for enterprise operations at Marshall Space Flight Center, where I ensured all NASA programs and projects aboard the center met NASA enterprise security standards. I was also responsible in part for ensuring the Marshall Space Flight Center maintained its Authority To Operate (ATO) within the NASA agency. I have also served as the Deputy Cyber Manager for the Army Corps of Engineers where I led and managed several teams directly in: Vulnerability Management, Assessment and Authorization (A&A), Vulnerability Scanning, Host Based Security System (HBSS), Ports Protocols and Service Management, and an Information System Security Manager (ISSM) team for cloud projects. I also have performed internal digital forensic audits. During this time span, I also worked at the Army Threat Systems Management Office

(TSMO) as a member of the Threat Computer Network Operations Team (TCNOT). I provided key Computer Network Operations (CNO) support by performing validated threat CNO penetration testing and systems security analysis. TCNOT is the highest level of implementation of the CNO Team concept.

4. I also have a ITILv3 certification. ITIL stands for the IT Infrastructure Library, an internationally accepted IT service delivery framework. The ITIL recommends best practices for IT service management (ITSM) to support the standardization of various processes and stages in the IT lifecycle.¹ ITIL is a global framework of best practices for IT service management focused on reducing risk, improving customer relations, and supporting IT environments. I have received recognition for process improvements that I implemented from several of my employers. This recognition was usually in the way of financial bonuses. Lockheed Martin's was based on "work smarter not harder" my team improvements greatly improved the overall performance of the entire program which I worked on. Leidos's recognition came from repeated praise from the government customer on how I and my team's changes to their process and workflow helped them complete an incredible amount of work, which had to be accomplished in a very short timeframe.

5. From 2008 to 2017, I also worked through a professional staffing company for several testing laboratories that tested electronic voting machines. These laboratories included Wyle Laboratories, which later turned into National Technical Systems (NTS), and Pro V&V. My duties were to perform security tests on vendor voting systems for certification. Certification was either to be obtained from the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) or a specific state's Secretary of State's requirements.

¹ <https://www.cio.com/article/272361/infrastructure-it-infrastructure-library-til-definition-and-solutions.html>

6. I have read multiple affidavits and statements made from poll workers, poll observers and voters of Maricopa County concerning this past Arizona General election of 2022. I have read numerous news articles and watched online Maricopa meetings and viewed Maricopa County Twitter statements on the election, election process and the technical machine issues. I have also reviewed the certification and test reports for the electronic voting systems used in Arizona, as well as read Arizona statutes pertaining to elections and electronic voting systems. I make the following observations.

7. **Executive Summary.** Some components of the voting system used in the election were not certified thus endangering the entire voting process. The use of one of these uncertified components violates Arizona law. There were numerous procedural violations that can only be categorized as *intentional*. Maricopa County experienced a widespread technical breakdown across a significant portion of their vote centers. They reported 70 sites out of 223 (31.8%) voting centers were affected. Other reports list as high as 132 sites out of 223 (59.2%) were affected. Whichever figure is correct, given the required standards and procedures involved with the election process, a widespread failure of this magnitude occurring could not arise absent intentional misconduct. The explanations given to the public and media for what caused the technical issues were not correct. The county also did not sufficiently provide the affected voters with instructions nor the poll workers with procedures for the contingency plan or “back up plan”², let alone ensure the plan and the mitigation was implemented effectively and efficiently.

8. **Components are NOT certified.** Arizona law, A.R.S. § 16-442 (B.) states “Machines or devices used at any election for federal, state or county offices may only be certified for use in this state and may only be used in this state if they comply with the help America vote act of

² Term used by Maricopa County Board of Supervisors Chairman Bill Gates on multiple occasions.

2002 and if those machines or devices have been tested and approved by a laboratory that is accredited pursuant to the help America vote act of 2002.” The state plan for the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA)³ Section 1 states “Certify new and existing voting systems according to national standards;” Section 4 of the plan states “The secretary of state will adopt voting systems guidelines and processes consistent with the Voting Systems Standards identified in section 301.” Performance Goal 2: Voting Accessibility of the plan states it will follow Title III, Section 301 of HAVA.

9. HAVA Title III Sec. 301. Voting Systems Standards, subtitle (a) Requirements, section (6)(b) defines what a voting system is. Printers which create ballots are considered part of the voting system under the HAVA definition. HAVA established the roles and responsibilities for the U.S. Elections Assistance Commission (EAC), which include establishing Federal voting system standards. These standards are known as the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG). Maricopa County uses Dominion Voting System (DVS) Democracy Suite 5.5-B for all its elections. Democracy Suite 5.5-B does have an EAC certificate and scope of conformance (see Exhibit 1). Suite 5.5-B is tested and certified to VVSG 1.0⁴. VVSG 1.0 volume 1 section 5.1.2 “Management of Software and Hardware” states “The requirements of this section apply to all software used in any manner to support any voting-related activities, regardless of the ownership of the software or the ownership and location of the hardware on which the software is installed or operates.” This section also states that the requirements apply to “Software that operates on ballot printers, vote counting devices, and other hardware typically installed at central or precinct locations (including contractor facilities)”. Section 7 “Security Requirements” subsection 7.1 “Scope” states that these requirements apply to software that operates on “Ballot

³ <https://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/nodes/view/102506>

⁴ https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/VVSG.1.0_Volume_1.PDF

printers, vote counting devices, and other hardware typically installed at central or precinct locations (including contractor facilities)". A.R.S. § 16-444 (A)(2) defines "Computer program" "includes all programs and documentation adequate to process the ballots at an equivalent counting center." This definition would also include the printer drivers installed on computers within the voting system.

10. While Democracy Suite 5.5-B may be certified, Maricopa County uses uncertified components to interact Suite 5.5-B causing it to malfunction at levels that nullify the Suite's certification. According to Arizona law "A person who knowingly modifies the software, hardware, or source code for voting equipment without receiving approval or certification pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-442 is guilty of a class 5 felony. A.R.S. § 16-1004(B)."⁵ There were printers used in the 2022 General election that are not included as part of the Suite 5.5-B certification. The uncertified printers used were retrofitted OKI B432 and Lexmark C4150 models⁶. These printers are referred to as Ballot-On-Demand (BOD) printers and were deployed to the voting centers. Neither printer is listed within the scope of certification for Suite 5.5-B, see Exhibit 1 "Hardware Components:" table (pages 5-7), nor is either of the printers listed with the Arizona's Secretary of State's office⁷ as a certified voting component. These printers were not tested by Voting System Test Lab (VSTL) as part of the Democracy Suite 5.5-B Federal certification. The VSTL Test Report (Exhibit 2) doesn't list either of them in Table 1-20. "D-Suite 5.5 Voting System Equipment" or Table 4-28. "D-Suite 5.5-B Voting System Equipment".

⁵ https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/2019_ELECTIONS_PROCEDURES_MANUAL_APPROVED.pdf CHAPTER 4: Voting Equipment — III. Security Measures for Electronic Voting Systems

⁶ Maricopa County 2022 Elections Plan, page 51.

⁷ https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/2020.07.22_Official_List.pdf,
https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/2022_Election_Cycle_Voting_Equipment_Aug.pdf

11. Maricopa has about 760 printers for printing ballots. Approximately 600 of those are the OKI model and 160 the Lexmark model. The mini BOD printer setup incorporates the OKI model. The majority of voting centers with issues were equipped with the mini BOD printers. Because the OKI model makes up over 78% of the printer inventory and is the most widely dispersed printer during election day, proper vetting, testing and certification of the system should have been done before implementing its use. Ballot printers are considered part of the voting system; therefore, they are considered critical infrastructure⁸. Critical infrastructure should always have a secure supply chain with reliable servicing. As of March 31st, 2021, OKI Data Americas, Inc. no longer distributes printer hardware under the OKI brand to the North, Central and South American markets (see Exhibit 3). OKI also announced that global Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) arrangements and the distribution of specific value-added product lines, that impact the Americas, will be directly managed by OKI Data Corporation in Japan (Exhibit 3). This means that supplies and support for a component considered critical infrastructure are controlled by a foreign entity.

12. As to the specific model, OKI B432 it has a core feature “OKI smart PrintSuperVision” (sPSV) which allows remote configuration (see Exhibit 4). This feature allows for administrative remote access. The mini BOD configuration has the OKI printer cabled to a control laptop. This laptop is connected to the SiteBook via the MoFi router. The SiteBook which is utilized for voter check in is also connected to the MoFi router. The MoFi router is a mobile cellular device used to allow the SiteBook to communicate with the Elections Department⁹. This configuration means that the sPSV feature has the capability of being executed. There is at least one known vulnerability with the sPSV feature. The exploit, OKI sPSV Port Manager Unquoted Service

⁸ <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/IF10677.pdf>

⁹ 2022 Training Manual Poll Workers August Primary & November General, pg. 29

Path¹⁰ deals with executing malware within the working directory of the untrusted application. In the past, while conducting testing in the VSTL, I have personally executed this unquoted service path type exploit on voting systems. This type of exploit is relatively easy to execute.

13. Voters use the SiteBook which is a touch screen terminal to check in. Once checked-in, the SiteBook will determine the correct ballot for each voter and will send this to the printer where the ballot is printed. For the SiteBook to send the ballot print job it must have at least one of two things, either the ballot style or the ballot ID that corresponds to the voter. The SiteBook is also networked to the ballot printer. Given these two facts the SiteBook must be considered part of the voting system. The SiteBook uses a mobile cellular device to connect to the Election department VPN through the public internet. With this connection the SiteBook is performing other tasks that are not directly related to the voting system's function. Some of these non-related tasks include automatically updating the voter registration system when a voter's new name or new address can be entered in the SiteBook. SiteBooks are also used for clocking in and out and reporting wait times¹¹. The Elections department's computer network resides outside of the local area network for the voting system. Suite 5.5-B is only allowed to be used on a local area network with no wireless network connections (Exhibit 1, pages 11 and 12). The local area network is only for wired client server connections. The MoFi router improperly allows for a connection outside of this closed network.

14. There are those who take a position that pollbooks and printers aren't considered part of the voting system. If this is true, why does the EAC already certify electronic poll books, printers and ballot on demand printers? Although, the EAC is hesitant to certify electronic poll books because the majority tend to utilize wireless technology. Wireless is highly insecure and the EAC

¹⁰ <https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/49005>

¹¹ 2022 Training Manual Poll Workers August Primary & November General, pages 11 and 29

tends to steer clear of certifying systems that utilize this technology. The VSTLs, Pro V&V and SLI share the EAC's concerns on wireless technology and electronic poll books¹². The EAC currently only has four states listed with electronic poll books that have been certified as a component of the voting system¹³. Arizona is not one of them. Additionally, the fact that the ballot printers are also cabled directly into the MoFi means they also have the capability of external access.

15. The requirements in VVSG 1.0 volume 1 section 5.1.2 and 7.1 apply to all software used in any manner to support any voting-related activities, regardless of the ownership of the software or the ownership and location of the hardware on which the software is installed or operates. It includes hardware typically installed at central or precinct locations to include *contractor facilities*. This would apply to any election related contracts or leasing contracts a county or state may have, including the current contract between Maricopa County and Runbeck¹⁴ for the printing and distribution of election ballots. There are pieces of hardware listed in the contract, other than those previously mentioned, that are not on either the EAC or SOS certification listings. These include the Lexmark CS923 printer and the Oki 9650HDN printer. There is also a "Novus Ballot Duplication System" which has software and hardware license and maintenance fees. There appears to be no associated hardware or software title list for this system. I therefore assume this duplication system is uncertified as well, as there is no listing on the EAC website for any such certification. The contract does state for existing invoicing purposes, of the Novus Ballot Duplication System, the annualized date will be June through May. There is also an election set up fee for this duplication system. In one section of

¹² "HAVA at 20: Panel 3: Current Issues in Election Administration" Zoom meeting 8/19/2020

¹³ <https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/e-pollbook-requirements>

¹⁴ CONTRACT PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTION BALLOTS 220121-IGA

the contract, "4. Inbound Mail Processing" "Scanning, Sorting, and Packaging of Returned Early Ballots" and in another section "2.15.3 The Contractor will scan the returned early ballots to capture the signatures..." There is no mention of these activities being overseen or observed by county employees or nonpartisan observers within the contract. My review of this contract indicates that Runbeck is involved in more than just printing the ballots. The Novus ballot duplication system is the most concerning as its role deals with ballot adjudication. The ballot adjudication function clearly falls under the requirements set forth by the EAC. There is no evidence of the Novus system being certified as part of the electronic voting system.

16. Contradictory and Incorrect statements. On election day at 8:53 A.M. during a televised press conference, Board of Supervisors Chairman Bill Gates stated "We are very excited about how things are going today on election day"¹⁵. He then states he wants to "discuss one issue". The issue was the rejection rate of the tabulators. He said the issue only affects about 20% of the voting centers. He then downplayed the issue by giving the total number of voting centers across the county, 223. So, 20% is only about 44 or 45 centers, depending on whether you round up or down, not a big number. However, voting centers opened at 6:00 A.M. so in less than 3 hours the county was operating at 80% functionality with the tabulation of votes? This level of degradation within such a short amount of time would be considered a failure in any objective performance evaluation. The EAC recommends that when a voting system or one of its components isn't functioning properly and doesn't meet the required standards that it be suspended until the root cause is found and the issue is remediated. This course of action on an election day is not the best option. However, the election official should go to the courts and or legislature and request an extended voting period to allow voters an equal opportunity to vote

¹⁵ <https://rumble.com/v1smg78-an-incredible-20-of-polling-places-are-experiencing-problems-with-machines-.html>

while remediation and or mitigation efforts take place. Gates also stated that about “1 out of every 5 or so don’t go through” referring to ballots being accepted by the tabulator. Note that 1 out of 5 is .2 (20%) the EAC requirement for ballot acceptance and certification of the tabulator is .002 (.2%). The rejection rate that Gates states is 100 times higher than the certification performance requirement, and thus *highly* unacceptable and should have resulted in the decertification of the tabulators. Had the tabulators exhibited this same error/rejection rate during the course of the certification process they would not have been certified.

17. In Anthem, Arizona around 8:22 A.M. a poll worker while explaining to a long line of voters about the rejection issue with the tabulators and using box 3, states "One tabulator is not working, okay, the other tabulator is taking about 75% successful"¹⁶. The 75% is misleading as there are two tabulators at the site. That voting center actually has a 37.5% tabulation success rate. In the video he claps his hands and shrugs his shoulders a couple of times while talking, like it's no big deal, even as a frustrated voter walks off. This demeanor of nothing is really wrong is reflected in several written affidavits submitted by poll workers, citing that their Inspector acted like it was no big deal. They also state that those Inspectors, who basically ran the voting centers, made no attempt to try and find out what was causing the issue. The fact that the Board of Supervisors Chairman and other officials downplayed the severity of the issue, made incorrect statements, and then kept vital pieces of information from the voters and the public leads one to conclude that these actions must be intentional. In the previously mentioned press conference, Gates states that all tabulators at a site aren't going down¹⁷. This is not correct, as proven at the beginning of this paragraph. He also states, around 9:30 A.M. local time, that they had remedied the issue. This is also incorrect. The biggest incorrect statement was that this technical issue

¹⁶ <https://twitter.com/tylerbowyer/status/1589986706744578048>

¹⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=299uRjhBn3w>


wasn't causing the long lines at the voting centers. I think there are hundreds if not thousands of Maricopa residents who would disagree, voters who spent two to three hours at these vote centers.

18. Probably the most vital piece of information that the county withheld from the public were the options available for a voter and details on those options. The first being that voters could use the ICX Accessible Voting Device to cast their vote. This device has its own printer. The device has an uninterrupted back-up power source. "The device is loaded with all ballot styles and available to use as a vote anywhere model in case of an emergency."¹⁸ The second piece of information would be the steps involved if you decided to go to another vote center to cast your vote. They were not told that if checked in at the current center, that they would have to checkout of the SiteBook before going to another voting center. At 6:31 A.M. on November 8th Recorder Stephen Richer acknowledges publicly "the small issue"¹⁹. From that point on there were multiple press conferences and video Tweets with and made by Maricopa officials. None of these videos include informing voters of checking out first before going to another voting center. Gates and Richer even created a video Tweet at 9:52 A.M. to explain the options available for a voter if they encountered the tabulator issue²⁰. This video didn't include either the checkout procedure or the use of the ICX. The first information put out informing voters to first check out at the SiteBook before going to a new voting center was a text Tweet made by @MaricopaVote at 1:38 P.M. That was re-Tweeted by @maricopacounty at 3:04 P.M. These were the only two pieces of information put out by the county on checking out first. The screen captures below show these two Tweets.

¹⁸ 2022 ELECTIONS PLAN August Primary & November General, pg. 64

¹⁹ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_SnMDFXJ8-g


²⁰ <https://twitter.com/MaricopaVote/status/1590009384377384961>



19. One other piece of information that was incorrect concerned the technical issue itself. Early election day Maricopa officials stated it was a tabulator issue. As it was early in the investigative process, this is acceptable as the identifier / result of the issue was ballots being rejected. After some time, they started saying that it was a printer issue not the tabulators. The printer issue was with toner and toner setting. Again, this was incorrect. The print media weight setting they claim to have adjusted affects the heat setting for the printer fusers²¹. The fusers heat up the paper so that the ink/toner will bond properly. Varying paper stock weights require a different amount of heat to accomplish this.

²¹ <https://okiprinting-en-us.custhelp.com/app/answers/list/st/5/kw/weight%20setting%20for%20media/p/5495/page/1>

20. County officials announced sometime during the day that the remedy or temporary fix for the issue was to set all the tray settings or profiles on the printers to “Heavy”. Aside from a massive amount of defective hardware, this makes no sense to me. As a computer scientist and programmer who has done hundreds if not thousands of Root Cause Analysis (RCA) this defies all programming logic. Probably the reason this was announced as the fix would be due to the spotty ballots that were printed. This however was probably not the sole cause of the tabulators rejecting the ballots. One site claims to have had two printers set to print in draft mode (see Exhibit 6). This would cause the same spotty effect, due to the reduced amount of toner used for that setting. The other possible cause for the rejection rate is an improper ballot style image causing a skewed or a shrunken down image to be printed. Dominion claims to make over two to three hundred checks on a ballot inserted into one of their tabulators. A ballot could be rejected for failing any one of those checks. One of the checks is the length of the ballot paper inserted into the tabulator. The picture below shows a spoiled ballot and the reprint of the ballot beside it. Note that the paper size of the ballots is the same.




However, the timing marks are at different lengths to the paper's edge. This is because the spoiled ballot on the left was shrunken down to 19 inches and printed on 20-inch paper. This is

apparent in the picture above by the light bounding marks (90° angle marks) outside of the ballot timing marks. These represent the corners of the page for the original ballot image before it was reduced. This difference of space between the beginning of the paper and the timing marks could mislead the tabulator. The tabulator could think that there was a paper jam when there is not. This false jam error was observed by one of the troubleshooters when he responded to tabulator issues. He states when opening the tabulator some of the paper jams had no paper in them (see Exhibit 7).

21. County officials stated that a voter could just place their ballot in bin 3 and it would be tabulated back at Central. That the big high-speed tabulators would process them. Maricopa County's purported solution of scanning the defective ballots on ImageCast Central (ICC) tabulators defies logic. The ICC is loaded with exactly the same ballot definition file as that of the ImageCast Precinct (ICP). If the ballots were rejected by the ICP tabulators, then the ICC would reject the same ballots for the same deficiency. Absent a defective tabulator, there is absolutely no reason that the same ballot could be rejected by an ICP but read by an ICC. Maricopa's claim that the ballots were successfully scanned using an ICC is either false or an anomaly exists that is indicative of malfunction, malfeasance, or malware.

22. Both tabulator types ICP and ICC are programmed to look for the same reference points (timing marks). These markings are used for the scanner to determine the X and Y coordinates of everything inside the timing-mark perimeter. The tabulator does not look for a bubble, rather it looks at where it is told the bubble should be (x and y position). It then determines if that position and the area immediately surrounding that position (bounding box) is filled.

23. The following image is the product of a Dominion ImageCast Central troubleshooting tool which shows what the tabulator looks for by putting a square around it. As can be seen, there is a square around each timing mark which shows each was successfully located:



24. Before the scanner reads anything “inside the wire”, it first must establish the perimeter. All points inside the perimeter that it must find are precisely measured from the reference points of the timing marks. Therefore, if it cannot establish a complete perimeter, the ballot cannot be read – no matter if it’s an ICP or an ICC. Exhibit 5 is an example of a ballot image, using the same tool on an ICC, that shows the timing marks were all successfully established. In contrast, the ballot image below is from an ICC using the same tool, but does not find one timing mark as expected and rejects the ballot:

Write-in	
For U.S. Representative in 117th Congress From the 2nd Congressional District of Georgia (Vote for One)	
Don Cole Republican	
Sanford Bishop (Incumbent) Democrat	
Write-in	
For State Senator From 26th District (Vote for One)	
David E. Lucas, Sr. (Incumbent) Democrat	
Write-in	
For State Representative In the General Assembly From 143rd District (Vote for One)	
James Beverly (Incumbent) Democrat	

The ballot was rejected because one timing mark (the first one without a successful bounding box) was irregular in shape and the ballot was rejected on an ICC. These machines are very precise. No matter what type of scanner, the measurements and the requirements are the same. Short of a paper jam or other rare instance, if a scanner reverses a ballot for some type of deficiency, then that same ballot will be rejected by a different type of scanner for the same deficiency.

25. Maricopa county claims to utilize over 13,000 ballot styles. *Utilizing more than Certified system limit (3,000) and not tracking ballots.*

26. **Plans and Procedures NOT followed.** Maricopa County developed a detailed 69 page election plan “Maricopa County Elections Department 2022 ELECTIONS PLAN August Primary & November General”. The county also created a very detailed 174 page poll workers manual “Maricopa County Elections Department 2022 TRAINING MANUAL POLL

WORKERS August Primary & November General”. The state of Arizona has a 544 page election manual for the counties to follow “2019 ELECTIONS PROCEDURES MANUAL”. These plans, manuals and procedures cover every aspect of the election process. The Maricopa County 2022 Election Plan describes how the county did modeling and forecasting using data going back as far as 1946. The county used heat maps for planning voting center locations and supply locations. Section 1.2 states "The Elections Department began planning for the 2022 August Primary and November General elections over twelve months in advance of the elections." Section 9 of the plan states "The Elections Department’s Risk Management and Contingency Plan for the 2022 August Primary and November General elections establishes the procedures that will be followed in the event that a polling location or the central count center becomes temporarily or permanently inoperable on Election Day due to equipment failures, a power outage, or other unforeseen disruption."

27. The County officials failed to follow the published and approved procedures. The county had established five regional supply depots for Trouble Shooters to have access to five regionally located supply depots to obtain back-up precinct-based tabulators. Yet when one center called before the polls even opened, they were told it would be several hours before a tech could bring a replacement (Exhibit 7). This is the site that had a 37.5% tabulation success rate, less than 30 minutes after the polls opened. The published and approved plan states that these pre-staged regional depots can respond quickly. Several hours does not seem quick. In section 9.1 “Risk Management and Contingency Planning Methodology and Approach” the plan states “In the event that a single or small number of voting location(s) experiences an emergency, the Elections Communications Officer will use social media, traditional media, and other means where possible to advise voters of the emergency and the nearest Vote Center location until the

emergency is resolved.” A site functioning at 37.5% would clearly warrant an emergency. There were other sites which reported tabulator battery issues. One site reported a breaker tripped and they had to recharge the tabulators. Another site stated they had to charge a tabulator for about 30 minutes before they could start using it again. The poll worker’s manual section on “Set Up Tabulators” page 65 states the tabulator is to be plugged in. I have personally seen various vendor’s setup and read their Technical Data Packages (TDP) and in each case batteries are for back up power only, as this is a VVSG requirement. Why were these tabulators unable to operate, even if plugged in, until the battery was charged or at of percentage of charge? One would assume a voting system component being down at a voting center is reported. Once reported, technical support teams adjust plan, communications / reminders are sent to all voting centers so that type of incident doesn’t happen again.

28. There are questions concerning the plan and procedures. Section 7.2 (page 53) states "Set up crews confirm set up completion with Vote Center manager and provide a second set of onsite test prints that further confirm BOD functionality on site." Were these tests prints checked for the spottiness caused by BOD printers? Clearly opening inspections and physical security aren’t being followed if you have 200 or more ballots than voters who checked in at the voting center. An experienced poll watcher stated that the voting center had 1,018 voters check in, that they transported 1,218 ballots and of those 1,218, 406 were from door number 3²². It is well known that all plans change with time as things are learned, issues happen, adjustments to the plan are made to account for them. You investigate see what caused the issue and correct it. However, to ignore an issue discovered well in advance of the execution of the plan is inexcusable. During poll worker training the tabulators were incorrectly rejecting ballots. An

²² <https://twitter.com/TalkMullins/status/1593273664656523264>

Election Marshall testified at a public Election Board meeting that the rejection issues were known²³.

29. Another procedural violation was county officials directed poll workers not to follow their procedures. Page 115 of the Poll Workers Manual gives direction on how to spoil a ballot. County officials directed poll workers they were not spoil the ballots but to give the ballots to them and they would mark them. The county officials then were not properly spoiling the ballots as directed, per the manual (see Exhibits 8, 9 and 10). Some voting centers reported voters spoiling two or three ballots. Also mentioned on page 115 of those instructions is to offer the voter the use of the “Accessible Voting Device” (the ICX). Poll workers were not only directed not to follow procedures, but they were also stymied from providing a solution or work around to resolve the rejection issue. A poll worker who was assigned to work the tabulators at one voting center began to conduct Root Cause Analysis (RCA) on what was causing the ballot rejections at his center. He correctly analyzed the problem, developed a test theory that would not affect or harm the current situation at the voting center, then executed it with success. He had deduced that two of the BOD printers were the cause and had them shut off. This worked as the rejection issue resolved (see Exhibit 11). He also, suggested voters spoiling their ballots to request to use the Accessible Voting Device that was successful as well (see Exhibit 6). The Inspector for that site did not want to hear his solution. She had turned the two bad printers back on. She told him not to recommend the Accessible Voting Device to voters and that she had written him up. To make matters worse tech support never showed up to that center (see Exhibit 6).

30. One procedural issue is with tech support and the BOD printers and who made the changes on the printers. There were voting centers that reported techs showed up but didn’t do

²³ <https://rumble.com/v1xzcylu-an-election-marshall-in-az-says-the-tabulators-didnt-even-work-during-the-b.html>

anything (see Exhibit 10). The poll worker stated that Runbeck showed up and changed the settings. Runbeck isn't responsible for field set up or support. Page 25 of the ballot printing contract states "4. Election setup for each Sentio is the responsibility of the County. 5. Field support during an election is provided by the County." Sentio is the name for the BOD printing systems. Contracting issue aside, the question remains why with 70 sites affected with this issue didn't the county issue instructions to the voting centers or at least their troubleshooters to implement the fix? One troubleshooter stated he couldn't understand why they didn't tell or send him instructions, changing those settings are easy (see Exhibit 7).

31. In my professional opinion as a certified forensic investigator, the most serious violation by a county official was breaking the chain of custody. In a chain of custody whenever someone transfers possession of material within that chain to another person and they sign the transfer they shall retain a copy for their records. This even holds true for classified carriers as well. One poll worker had their receipt snatched away by a county official. During this same incident the poll worker also saw someone cut the seal on one of the bags they just transferred (see Exhibit 9).

32. **Logic and Accuracy Testing NOT testing all equipment.** The pre-election Logic and Accuracy (L&A) tests were invalid because changes made to the BOD printers during the "Maricopa 2022 General Election Prep" by updating firmware and drivers as Maricopa did (see Exhibit 12) that requires more than L&A and stress testing. There is also an MCTEC employee that participated the pre-L&A testing who admitted that none of the test ballots came from BOD printers. The EAC's Election Management Guideline, Chapter 6 states "Pre-election testing, also called Logic and Accuracy testing (L&A testing), is the act of testing *every* ballot style and *every*

component of the voting system prior to the election.”²⁴ The EAC Logic and Accuracy Quick Start Guide states “Use a separate checklist for EACH piece of equipment to document its functionality and note any issues. Include all equipment planned to be used and all backup equipment.”²⁵ ARS § 16-443 requires both the Secretary of State and the county to each perform Logic and Accuracy testing on all voting equipment prior to each election.

33. When voters have multiple choices on the way they can vote, which day they can vote and show up to vote at a voting center on election day they chose to see their ballot tabulated there in front of them. I have viewed and read hundreds of personal testimonies, sadly the majority of them were from poll workers and observers who gave their time to support the election process. I have read and reviewed: county and state plans, manuals and Arizona statutes pertaining to elections and the election process. There were many disenfranchised Maricopa County voters. Equipment issues were known prior to the election and not fixed. Poll workers were almost kicked out of training for asking questions. County and State procedures were not followed by county officials. Uncertified components of the voting system were not certified and malfunctioned on a large scale the day of the election. Logic and Accuracy testing was not properly conducted. Incomplete and incorrect information was given to the public, the poll workers and even worse not given to the voter. Based on these observations and my professional experience, I find the causes for a majority of these issues to be intentional. A full forensic audit should be conducted on all the voting system components involved with this past General

²⁴ https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/Chapter_6__Pre-Election_and_Parallel_Testing.pdf

²⁵






https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/QuickStartGuides/Logic_and_Accuracy_Testing_EAC_Quick_Start_Guide_508.pdf

election, to include the SiteBooks and BOD printers to conduct a proper analysis and root cause of these issues.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this 8 day of December 2022.

s/ Clay U. Parikh
Clay U. Parikh

	<p>United States Election Assistance Commission</p> <hr/> <p>Certificate of Conformance</p> <hr/> <p>Dominion Voting Systems Democracy Suite 5.5-B</p>			
<p>The voting system identified on this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited voting system testing laboratory for conformance to the <i>Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Version 1.0 (VVSG 1.0)</i>. Components evaluated for this certification are detailed in the attached Scope of Certification document. This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been verified by the EAC in accordance with the provisions of the <i>EAC Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual</i> and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the test report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the product by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the product is either expressed or implied.</p>				
<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> <p>Product Name: <u>Democracy Suite</u></p> <p>Model or Version: <u>5.5-B</u></p> <p>Name of VSTL: <u>Pro V&V</u></p> <p>EAC Certification Number: <u>DVS-DemSuite5.5-B</u></p> <p>Date Issued: <u>September 11, 2019</u></p> </td> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top; text-align: center;">  <hr style="width: 100%;"/> <p><i>Executive Director</i> U.S. Election Assistance Commission</p> <p>Scope of Certification Attached</p> </td> </tr> </table>			<p>Product Name: <u>Democracy Suite</u></p> <p>Model or Version: <u>5.5-B</u></p> <p>Name of VSTL: <u>Pro V&V</u></p> <p>EAC Certification Number: <u>DVS-DemSuite5.5-B</u></p> <p>Date Issued: <u>September 11, 2019</u></p>	 <hr style="width: 100%;"/> <p><i>Executive Director</i> U.S. Election Assistance Commission</p> <p>Scope of Certification Attached</p>
<p>Product Name: <u>Democracy Suite</u></p> <p>Model or Version: <u>5.5-B</u></p> <p>Name of VSTL: <u>Pro V&V</u></p> <p>EAC Certification Number: <u>DVS-DemSuite5.5-B</u></p> <p>Date Issued: <u>September 11, 2019</u></p>	 <hr style="width: 100%;"/> <p><i>Executive Director</i> U.S. Election Assistance Commission</p> <p>Scope of Certification Attached</p>			

Manufacturer: *Dominion Voting Systems (DVS)*
System Name: *Democracy Suite 5.5-B*
Certificate: *DVS-DemSuite5.5-B*

Laboratory: *Pro V&V*
Standard: *VVSG 1.0 (2005)*
Date: *September 11, 2019*



Scope of Certification

This document describes the scope of the validation and certification of the system defined above. Any use, configuration changes, revision changes, additions or subtractions from the described system are not included in this evaluation.

Significance of EAC Certification

An EAC certification is an official recognition that a voting system (in a specific configuration or configurations) has been tested to and has met an identified set of Federal voting system standards. An EAC certification is **not**:

- An endorsement of a Manufacturer, voting system, or any of the system's components.
- A Federal warranty of the voting system or any of its components.
- A determination that a voting system, when fielded, will be operated in a manner that meets all HAVA requirements.
- A substitute for State or local certification and testing.
- A determination that the system is ready for use in an election.
- A determination that any particular component of a certified system is itself certified for use outside the certified configuration.

Representation of EAC Certification

Manufacturers may not represent or imply that a voting system is certified unless it has received a Certificate of Conformance for that system. Statements regarding EAC certification in brochures, on Web sites, on displays, and in advertising/sales literature must be made solely in reference to specific systems. Any action by a Manufacturer to suggest EAC endorsement of its product or organization is strictly prohibited and may result in a Manufacturer's suspension or other action pursuant to Federal civil and criminal law.

System Overview:

The D-Suite 5.5-B Voting System is a paper-based optical scan voting system with a hybrid paper/DRE option consisting of the following major components: The Election Management System (EMS), the ImageCast Central (ICC), the ImageCast Precinct (ICP and ICP2), the ImageCast Evolution (ICE), the ImageCast X (ICX) DRE w/ Reports Printer, ImageCast X (ICX) DRE w/ voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT), and the ImageCast X ballot marking device (BMD). The D-Suite 5.5-B Voting System configuration is a modification from the EAC approved D-Suite 5.5 system configuration.

Exhibit 1

Language capability:

System supports Alaska Native, Apache, Bengali, Chinese, English, Eskimo, Filipino, French, Hindi, Japanese, Jicarilla, Keres, Khmer, Korean, Navajo, Seminole, Spanish, Thai, Towa, Ute, Vietnamese, and Yuman.

Democracy Suite 5.5-B System Diagram




Exhibit 1

Components Included:

This section provides information describing the components and revision level of the primary components included in this Certification.

Voting System Software Components:

System Component	Software or Firmware Version	Operating System or COTS	Comments
EMS Election Event Designer (EED)	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
EMS Results Tally and Reporting (RTR)	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
EMS Application Server	5.5.32.4	Windows Server 2012 R2 Windows 10 Pro	EMS
EMS File System Service (FSS)	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
EMS Audio Studio (AS)	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
EMS Data Center Manager (DCM)	5.5.32.4	Windows Server 2012 R2 Windows 10 Pro	EMS
EMS Election Data Translator (EDT)	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
ImageCast Voter Activation (ICVA)	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
EMS Adjudication (ADJ)	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
EMS Adjudication Services	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
Smart Card Helper Service (SCHS)	5.5.32.4	Windows 10 Pro	EMS
Election Firmware	5.5.31.1	uClinux	ICP
Firmware Updater	5.5.31.1	uClinux	ICP
Firmware Extractor	5.5.31.1	uClinux	ICP
Kernel (uClinux)	5.5.31.1	Modified COTS	ICP
Boot Loader (COLILO)	20040221	Modified COTS	ICP
Asymmetric Key Generator	5.5.31.1	uClinux	ICP
Asymmetric Key Exchange Utility	5.5.31.1	uClinux	ICP
Firmware Extractor (Technician Key)	5.5.31.1	uClinux	ICP
ICP2 Application	5.5.1.8	uClinux	ICP2
ICP2 Update Card	5.5.1.8	uClinux	ICP2
Voting Machine	5.5.6.5	Ubuntu Linux	ICE
Election Application	5.5.6.5	Ubuntu Linux	ICE
ImageCast Central Application	5.5.32.5	Windows 10 Pro	ICC
ICX Application	5.5.13.2	Android 5.1.1 (ICX Prime) Android 4.4.4 (ICX Classic)	ICX

Voting System Platform:

System Component	Version	Operating System or COTS	Comments
Microsoft Windows Server	2012 R2 Standard	Unmodified COTS	EMS Server SW Component
Microsoft Windows	10 Professional	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
.NET Framework	3.5	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Microsoft Visual J#	2.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Microsoft Visual C++ 2013 Redistributable	2013	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Microsoft Visual C++ 2015 Redistributable	2015	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component

Exhibit 1

System Component	Version	Operating System or COTS	Comments
Java Runtime Environment	7u80	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Java Runtime Environment	8u144	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Microsoft SQL Server 2016Standard	2016 Standard	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Microsoft SQL Server 2016 Service Pack 1	2016 SP1	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Microsoft SQL Server 2016 SP1 Express	2016 SP1	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Cepstral Voices	6.2.3.801	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Arial Narrow Fonts	2.37a	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Maxim iButton Driver	4.05	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Adobe Reader DC	AcrobatDC	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Microsoft Access Database Engine	2010	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Open XML SDK 2.0 for Microsoft Office	2.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Infragistics NetAdvantage Win Forms 2011.1	2011 Vol. 1	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Infragistics NetAdvantage WPF 2012.1	2012 Vol. 1	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
TX Text Control Library for .NET	16.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
SOX	14.3.1	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
NLog	1.0.0.505	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
iTextSharp	5.0.5	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
OpenSSL	1.0.2K	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
OpenSSL FIPS Object Module	2.0.14 (Cert 1747)	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
SQLite	1.0.103.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Lame	3.99.4	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Speex	1.0.4	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Ghostsript	9.04	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
One Wire API for .NET	4.0.2.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Avalon-framework-cvs-20020806	20020806	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Batik	0.20-5	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Fop	0.20-5	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Microsoft Visual J# 2.0 Redistributable Package – Second Edition (x64)	2.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Entity framework	6.1.3	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Spreadsheetlight	3.4.3	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Open XML SDK 2.0 for Microsoft Office	2.0.5022.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Open SSL	1.0.2K	Unmodified COTS	ICP
OpenSSL FIPS Object Module	2.0.10 (Cert 1747)	Unmodified COTS	ICP
Zlib	1.2.3	Unmodified COTS	ICP
uClinux	20070130	Modified COTS	ICP
Kernel (Linux)	2.6.30.9-dvs-36	Modified COTS	ICE

Exhibit 1

System Component	Version	Operating System or COTS	Comments
U-Boot	1.3.4	Modified COTS	ICE
Google Text-to-Speech Engine	3.11.12	Unmodified COTS	ICX SW
Kernel	4.9.11	Modified COTS	ICP2
U-Boot	2017.03	Modified COTS	ICP2
Zxing Barcode Scanner	4.7.5	Modified COTS	ICX SW
SoundTouch	1.9.2	Modified COTS	ICX SW
ICX Prime Android 5.1.1 Image	0405	Modified COTS	ICX SW
ICX Classic Android 4.4.4 Image	0.0.98	Modified COTS	ICX SW
OpenSSL FIPS Object Module	2.0.10 (Cert 2473)	Unmodified COTS	ICX SW Build Library
OpenSSL	1.0.2K	Unmodified COTS	ICC SW Build Library
OpenSSL FIPS Object Module	2.0.10 (Cert 1747)	Unmodified COTS	ICC SW Build Library
1-Wire Driver (x86)	4.05	Unmodified COTS	ICC Runtime SW
1-Wire Driver (x64)	4.05	Unmodified COTS	ICC Runtime SW
Canon DR-G1130 TWAIN Driver	1.2 SP6	Unmodified COTS	ICC Runtime SW
Canon DR-G160II TWAIN Driver	1.2 SP6	Unmodified COTS	ICC Runtime SW
Canon DR-M260 TWAIN Driver,	1.1 SP2	Unmodified COTS	ICC Runtime SW
InoTec HiPro 821 TWAIN Driver	1.2.3.17	Unmodified COTS	ICC Runtime SW
Visual C++ 2013 Redistributable (x86)	12.0.30501	Unmodified COTS	ICC Runtime SW
Machine Configuration File (MCF)	5.5.12.1_20190510	Proprietary	ICX Configuration File
Device Configuration File (DCF)	5.5.31_20190423	Proprietary	ICP and ICC Configuration File
ICE Machine Behavior Settings	5.5.6.3 20190512	Proprietary	ICE Configuration
ICP2 Machine Behavior Settings	5.5.1.4 20190510	Proprietary	ICP2 Configuration

Hardware Components:

System Component	Hardware Version	Proprietary or COTS	Comments
ImageCast Precinct (ICP)	PCOS-320C	Proprietary	Precinct Scanner
ImageCast Precinct (ICP)	PCOS-320A	Proprietary	Precinct Scanner
ImageCast 2 Precinct (ICP2)	PCOS-330A	Proprietary	Precinct Scanner
ImageCast Evolution (ICE)	PCOS-410A	Proprietary	Precinct Scanner
ICP Ballot Box	BOX-330A	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP Ballot Box	BOX-340C	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP Ballot Box	BOX-341C	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP Ballot Box	ElectionSource IM-COLLAPSIBLE	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICE Ballot Box	BOX-410A	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICE Ballot Box	BOX-420A	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP2 Ballot Box	BOX-350A	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP2 Ballot Box	BOX-340C	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP2 Ballot Box	BOX-341C	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP2 Ballot Box	ElectionSource IM-COLLAPSIBLE	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICX UPS Inline EMI Filter	1.0	Proprietary	EMI Filter
ICX Tablet (Classic)	aValue 15" Tablet (SID-15V)	COTS	Ballot Marking Device
ICX Tablet (Classic)	aValue 21" Tablet (SID-21V) (Steel or Aluminum chassis)	COTS	Ballot Marking Device
ICX Tablet (Prime)	aValue 21" Tablet (HID-21V) (Steel or Aluminum chassis)	COTS	Ballot Marking Device or Direct Recording Electronic
Thermal Printer	SII RP-D10	COTS	Report Printer

Exhibit 1

System Component	Hardware Version	Proprietary or COTS	Comments
Thermal Printer	KFI VRP3	COTS	Voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT)
Server	Dell PowerEdge R620	COTS	Standard Server
Server	Dell PowerEdge R630	COTS	Standard Server
Server	Dell PowerEdge R640	COTS	Standard Server
ICC Workstation HW	Dell OptiPlex 7440 All in One	COTS	
ICC Workstation HW	Dell OptiPlex 3050 All in One	COTS	
ICC Workstation HW	Dell OptiPlex 9030 All in One	COTS	
ICC Workstation HW	Dell OptiPlex 9020 All in One	COTS	
ICC Workstation HW	Dell OptiPlex 9010 All in One	COTS	
ICC Scanner	Canon imageFormula DR-G1130	COTS	Central Count Scanner
ICC Scanner	Canon ImageFormula DR-M160II	COTS	Central Count Scanner
ICC Scanner	Canon imageFormula DR-M260	COTS	Central Count Scanner
ICC Scanner	InoTec HiPro 821	COTS	Central Count Scanner
ICC Scanner	Dell Optiplex 7050	COTS	
ICC Scanner	Dell 2418HT Monitor	COTS	
Client Workstation HW and Express Server	Dell Precision 3430	COTS	
Client Workstation HW and Express Server	Dell Precision 3431	COTS	
Client Workstation HW and Express Server	Dell Precision T3420	COTS	
Client Workstation HW	Dell Precision T1700	COTS	
Client Workstation HW	Dell Latitude 3400	COTS	
Client Workstation HW	Dell Latitude 3490	COTS	
Client Workstation HW	Dell Latitude E3480	COTS	
Client Workstation HW	Dell Latitude E3470	COTS	
Client Workstation HW	Dell Latitude E7450	COTS	
ICX Printer	HP LaserJet Pro Printer M402dn	COTS	
ICX Printer	HP LaserJet Pro Printer M402dne	COTS	
Monitor	Dell Monitor KM632	COTS	
Monitor	Dell Monitor P2414Hb	COTS	
Monitor	P2419H	COTS	
Monitor	P2417H	COTS	
Monitor	Dell Ultrasharp 24" Monitor U2414H	COTS	
CD/DVD Reader	Dell DVD Multi Recorder GP60NB60	COTS	
iButton Programmer	Maxim iButton Programmer DS9490R# with DS1402-RP8+	COTS	
UPS	Tripp Lite SMART1500RML2U	COTS	
UPS	APC SMT1500C Smart-UPS	COTS	
UPS	APC SMT1500 Smart-UPS	COTS	
UPS	APC BE600M1	COTS	
UPS	APC BR1000G	COTS	
Network Switch	Dell X1008	COTS	
Network Switch	Dell X1018	COTS	
Network Switch	Dell X1026	COTS	
Network Switch	Dell PowerConnect 2808	COTS	
Sip and Puff	Enabling Devices #972	COTS	
Headphones	Cyber Acoustics ACM-70 and ACM-70B	COTS	
4-way Joystick Controller	S26	Modified COTS	

Exhibit 1

System Component	Hardware Version	Proprietary or COTS	Comments
Rocker (Paddle) Switch	Enabling Device #971	COTS	
Rocker (Paddle) Switch	AbleNet 10033400 (2x)	COTS	
CF Card Reader	IOGEAR SDHC/microSDHC OU51USC410	COTS	
CF Card Dual-Slot Reader	Lexar USB 3.0	COTS	
CF Card Reader	Hoodman Steel USB 3.0 102015	COTS	
CF Card Reader	Lexar Professional CFR1	COTS	
CF Card Reader	Kingston FCR-HS4	COTS	
ATI	ATI handset	Proprietary	
ATI	ATI-USB handset	Proprietary	
ACS PC-Linked Smart Card Reader	ACR38	COTS	
ACS PC-Linked Smart Card Reader	ACR39	COTS	

System Limitations

This table depicts the limits the system has been tested and certified to meet.

Characteristic	Limiting Component	Limit	Comment
Ballot positions	Ballot	292*/462**	Landscape Ballot: 240 candidates + 24 write-ins + 28 Yes/No choices.
Precincts in an election	EMS	1000; 250	Standard; Express
Contests in an election	EMS	1000; 250	Standard; Express
Candidates/Counters in an election	EMS	10000; 2500	Standard; Express
Candidates/Counters in a precinct	Ballot	240*/462**	Both
Candidates/Counters in a tabulator	Tabulator	10000; 2500	Standard; Express
Ballot Styles in an election	Tabulator	3000; 750	Standard; Express
Ballot IDs in a tabulator	Tabulator	200	Both
Contests in a ballot style	Ballot	38*/156**	Both
Candidates in a contest	Ballot	240*/231**	Both
Ballot styles in a precinct	Tabulator	5	Both
Number of political parties	Tabulator	30	Both
"vote for" in a contest	Ballot	24*/30**	Both
Supported languages in an election	Tabulator	5	Both
Number of write-ins	Ballot	24*/462**	Both

* Reflects the system limit for a ballot printed in landscape.

** Reflects the system limit for a ballot printed in portrait.

Exhibit 1

Functionality

2005 VVSG Supported Functionality Declaration

Feature/Characteristic	Yes/No	Comment
Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails		
VVPAT	YES	
Accessibility		
Forward Approach	YES	
Parallel (Side) Approach	YES	
Closed Primary		
Primary: Closed	YES	
Open Primary		
Primary: Open Standard (provide definition of how supported)	YES	
Primary: Open Blanket (provide definition of how supported)	YES	
Partisan & Non-Partisan:		
Partisan & Non-Partisan: Vote for 1 of N race	YES	
Partisan & Non-Partisan: Multi-member ("vote for N of M") board races	YES	
Partisan & Non-Partisan: "vote for 1" race with a single candidate and write-in voting	YES	
Partisan & Non-Partisan "vote for 1" race with no declared candidates and write-in voting	YES	
Write-In Voting:		
Write-in Voting: System default is a voting position identified for write-ins.	YES	
Write-in Voting: Without selecting a write in position.	NO	
Write-in: With No Declared Candidates	YES	
Write-in: Identification of write-ins for resolution at central count	YES	
Primary Presidential Delegation Nominations & Slates:		
Primary Presidential Delegation Nominations: Displayed delegate slates for each presidential party	YES	
Slate & Group Voting: one selection votes the slate.	YES	
Ballot Rotation:		
Rotation of Names within an Office; define all supported rotation methods for location on the ballot and vote tabulation/reporting	YES	Equal time rotation
Straight Party Voting:		
Straight Party: A single selection for partisan races in a general election	YES	
Straight Party: Vote for each candidate individually	YES	
Straight Party: Modify straight party selections with crossover votes	YES	
Straight Party: A race without a candidate for one party	YES	
Straight Party: "N of M race (where "N">1)	YES	
Straight Party: Excludes a partisan contest from the straight party selection	YES	

Exhibit 1

Feature/Characteristic	Yes/No	Comment
Cross-Party Endorsement:		
Cross party endorsements, multiple parties endorse one candidate.	YES	
Split Precincts:		
Split Precincts: Multiple ballot styles	YES	
Split Precincts: P & M system support splits with correct contests and ballot identification of each split	YES	
Split Precincts: DRE matches voter to all applicable races.	YES	
Split Precincts: Reporting of voter counts (# of voters) to the precinct split level; Reporting of vote totals is to the precinct level	YES	
Vote N of M:		
Vote for N of M: Counts each selected candidate, if the maximum is not exceeded.	YES	
Vote for N of M: Invalidates all candidates in an overvote (paper)	YES	
Recall Issues, with options:		
Recall Issues with Options: Simple Yes/No with separate race/election. (Vote Yes or No Question)	YES	
Recall Issues with Options: Retain is the first option, Replacement candidate for the second or more options (Vote 1 of M)	NO	
Recall Issues with Options: Two contests with access to a second contest conditional upon a specific vote in contest one. (Must vote Yes to vote in 2nd contest.)	NO	
Recall Issues with Options: Two contests with access to a second contest conditional upon any vote in contest one. (Must vote Yes to vote in 2nd contest.)	NO	
Cumulative Voting		
Cumulative Voting: Voters are permitted to cast, as many votes as there are seats to be filled for one or more candidates. Voters are not limited to giving only one vote to a candidate. Instead, they can put multiple votes on one or more candidate.	NO	
Ranked Order Voting		
Ranked Order Voting: Voters can write in a ranked vote.	NO	
Ranked Order Voting: A ballot stops being counting when all ranked choices have been eliminated	NO	
Ranked Order Voting: A ballot with a skipped rank counts the vote for the next rank.	NO	
Ranked Order Voting: Voters rank candidates in a contest in order of choice. A candidate receiving a majority of the first choice votes wins. If no candidate receives a majority of first choice votes, the last place candidate is deleted, each ballot cast for the deleted candidate counts for the second choice candidate listed on the ballot. The process of eliminating the last place candidate and recounting the ballots continues until one candidate receives a majority of the vote	NO	

Exhibit 1

Feature/Characteristic	Yes/No	Comment
Ranked Order Voting: A ballot with two choices ranked the same, stops being counted at the point of two similarly ranked choices.	NO	
Ranked Order Voting: The total number of votes for two or more candidates with the least votes is less than the votes of the candidate with the next highest number of votes, the candidates with the least votes are eliminated simultaneously and their votes transferred to the next-ranked continuing candidate.	NO	

Exhibit 1

Feature/Characteristic	Yes/No	Comment
Provisional or Challenged Ballots		
Provisional/Challenged Ballots: A voted provisional ballots is identified but not included in the tabulation, but can be added in the central count.	YES	
Provisional/Challenged Ballots: A voted provisional ballots is included in the tabulation, but is identified and can be subtracted in the central count	NO	
Provisional/Challenged Ballots: Provisional ballots maintain the secrecy of the ballot.	YES	
Overvotes (must support for specific type of voting system)		
Overvotes: P & M: Overvote invalidates the vote. Define how overvotes are counted.	YES	Overvotes cause a warning to the voter and can be configured to allow voter to override.
Overvotes: DRE: Prevented from or requires correction of overvoting.	YES	
Overvotes: If a system does not prevent overvotes, it must count them. Define how overvotes are counted.	YES	If allowed via voter override, overvotes are tallied separately.
Overvotes: DRE systems that provide a method to data enter absentee votes must account for overvotes.	N/A	
Undervotes		
Undervotes: System counts undervotes cast for accounting purposes	YES	
Blank Ballots		
Totally Blank Ballots: Any blank ballot alert is tested.	YES	Precinct voters receive a warning; both precinct and central scanners will warn on blank ballots.
Totally Blank Ballots: If blank ballots are not immediately processed, there must be a provision to recognize and accept them	YES	Blank ballots are flagged. These ballots can be manually examined and then be scanned and accepted as blank; or precinct voter can override and accept.
Totally Blank Ballots: If operators can access a blank ballot, there must be a provision for resolution.	YES	Operators can examine a blank ballot, re-mark if needed and allowed, and then re-scan it.
Networking		
Wide Area Network – Use of Modems	NO	
Wide Area Network – Use of Wireless	NO	

Exhibit 1

Feature/Characteristic	Yes/No	Comment
Local Area Network – Use of TCP/IP	YES	Client/server only
Local Area Network – Use of Infrared	NO	
Local Area Network – Use of Wireless	NO	
FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic module	YES	
Used as (if applicable):		
Precinct counting device	YES	ImageCast Precinct
Central counting device	YES	ImageCast Central

Baseline Certification Engineering Change Orders (ECO)

ECO #	Component	Description
100503	ICP PCOS-320C & ICP PCOS-320A	Adding a COTS collapsible ballot box to AVL for use with the ICP
100521	Servers and Workstations	Added DELL P2419H monitor as a display device.
100527	EMS Workstations.	Added DELL Latitude 3490 computer with updated i3-8130U processor (Dual Core, 4MB Cache, 2.2GHz) to DVS PN 190-000061 (a client workstation).
100543	ICC Scanner	Update to the DR-G1130 Scanner LCD Panel User Interface.
100588	ICX Workstation	Added new models of VVPAT printer for use with the D-Suite ICX workstation due to previous model becoming commercially unavailable
100596	EMS Workstation	Added DELL Latitude 3400 computer as a client workstation due to the DELL Latitude 3490 computer becoming commercially unavailable for purchase
100597	EMS Server	Added DELL PowerEdge R640 computer with new processor and RAM as an AVL to the existing R640 server computer configurations
100602	EMS Server and Workstations	Added DELL Precision 3431 computer in an EMS Express Server and EMS Client Workstation configuration due to the DELL Precision 3430 computer becoming commercially unavailable for purchase
100603	ICC Scanner	Added DELL P2418HT monitor as a display device for ICC HiPro scanner workstation configuration due to the Lenovo 10QXPAR1US monitor becoming commercially unavailable for purchase